The Cosmological Argument

Whilst there is no one single version of the Cosmological Argument, the general approach that remains consistent throughout them is that they are based on some aspect of the universe that is taken to imply the existence of a necessary, uncaused being responsible for the creation of the universe. There are three chief versions: the Leibnizian, the Thomist, and the Kalam. 

The Leibnizian argument stems from the work of 17th century philosopher and mathematician, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. This argument starts from the simple fact that the universe exists and then argues that the existence of the universe is explainable via an external cause. The reason for this, argues Leibniz, is because everything that exists has a reason or explanation for its existence. 

Since the universe exists, it must have an explanation for its existence. Of course, it does not follow immediately that this explanation must be God, or even in an external cause. Now, some atheists have challenged the principle of sufficient reason by claiming that there are things that are brute facts about the world or universe. According to them, there are contingent states of affairs that have no explanation. 

However, it seems obvious that this can't be so, otherwise the entire enterprise of the physical, hard sciences is invalidated. For science is predicated on there being explanations for physical, observable phenomenon. If things could exist without any explanation at all, then we would have no way of knowing what things explainable and what things are not. 

In addition to this, we can grant that there are things who explanation is currently unknown due to our own epistemic limitations. In fact, we can additionally grant that there are things we cannot know (again due to epistemic or some other kind of limitations). However, this is no way commits us to or even entails that things can exist with no explanation at all. 

Some have instead chosen to challenge the principle of sufficient reason by claiming that things can exist unexplained that are necessary, such as numbers, or logical truths. First, it is far from clear that things such as numbers actually exist. The debate regarding abstract objects is not settled by any means, after all. However, it should seem apparent that, granting that such things actually exist in their own right, that this does not invalidate the principle of sufficient reason.

Rather, instead what necessary things entail is that something can exist whose explanation is not rooted in an external cause. Now, whilst this might seem promising at first for the atheist who might want to argue that the universe has an explanation not rooted in an external cause, it quickly becomes apparent that this avenue is not open to them. 

The reason for this is because the universe is contingent and not metaphysically necessary. The reason things such as numbers and logical truths can potentially exist without an external cause is because their explanation is rooted in the necessity of their own nature. Therefore, it follows that, as a contingently existing thing, the universe has an explanation of its existence rooted in an external cause. 

The second version of the Cosmological Argument comes to us from 12th century scholastic philosopher and theologian, Thomas Aquinas. Now, Thomas Aquinas relied heavily on Aristotelian metaphysics and believed a number of things that are contested, but a version of his arguments can be made that are not based on such concerns. 

Now, one thing to take note of is that Aristotle believed that the universe was past eternal, and whilst Thomas Aquinas believed in the finitude of the past as a matter of faith, he believed that it could not be shown via argument and must be accepted on the basis of revelation alone. Yet both men made arguments that entailed that the universe had a first cause. 

The reason for this is because objects are incapable of change on their own; they need something external to themselves to impart change upon them. Imagine a train consisting of an actually infinite number of train cars. That train will not move if none of the infinite train cars are a train engine. An actually infinite set of concrete objects cannot move if none of its members are capable of initiating change or motion. 

The third version of the Cosmological Argument comes to us from the 12th century Persian philosopher, Al-Ghazali. This argument is rooted in the fact that, in reality, the universe really isn't past eternal at all and must have had a beginning a finite amount of time ago. It is rooted in the simple premise that everything that begins to exist has a cause. 

For the longest time, many philosophers and then scientists assumed that the universe was past eternal. However, aside from the philosophical work done by philosophers such as Al-Ghazali, et al., there now exists scientific confirmation of the premise that the universe began to exist. As such, this argument has enjoyed something of a renaissance during the 20th and 21st centuries. 

The two chief arguments that are purely metaphysical against the past being eternal are: the impossibility of an actual infinity existing, and the impossibility of reaching actual infinity via successive addition or counting. The two chief arguments based on modern scientific evidence are: the expansion of the universe, and the thermodynamic properties of the universe. 

First, it should be prudent to differentiate between something that is actually infinite and something that is only potentially infinite. A potential infinity is a growing, albeit finite collection that tends towards infinity as a limit but never gets there. Whereas an actual infinity is a collection whose number is greater than any natural number. 

It is not hard to imagine the series of events in time being potentially infinite. Starting from a point, we can keep counting and counting to infinity but never ever reach an infinitieth number. The problem comes when we are asked to imagine the past as having no beginning either. Imagine coming across a man who is just finishing a countdown.

Starting at -5, he reaches 0 and, upon noticing you, informs you he has just finished counting all of the negative numbers. However, how can this be? If it is impossible to reach an infinitieth number, then it is impossible to start from negative infinity and count your way down to zero. Moreover, since the events in time stand in causal relations, how is it that he is finishing his countdown now and not at some other time? 

Cantorian set theory is of no avail as that only concerns the existence of infinite sets as abstract, mathematical objects which do not stand in causal relations. So, even if we grant for the sake of argument that an actual infinity can exist in the abstract realm, it becomes apparent that this cannot be the case in the concrete world. 

As far as the second philosophical argument is concerned, since we cannot reach an infinitieth number, then any series formed by successive addition cannot reach actual infinity either. However, some point to Zeno's paradoxes to show that, actually, we routinely traverse the infinite all the time. For instance, before we can cross a certain distance, we must cross 1/2 of it, and, before that, 1/4, and so on ad infinitum. 

However, it should be noted that, in this example, we are presented with another case of a potential infinity. We can keep dividing a finite line as long as we like, but we will never reach an infinitieth division. Whereas the series of events in time is a concrete collection of definite and discreet parts that are equal in length. 

The only objection to such philosophical arguments that makes any sense is the claim that, if the past must be finite, then surely this means God is past finite as well, right? This is understandable, but this makes the mistake of assuming that everything that exists is temporal. Whilst we can envision an absolute beginning to time, it is possible that there existed timeless states of affairs in the absence of time. 

As such, we can envision God being timeless sans creation and entering into time at the point of creation. Could the universe or some part of it have existed timelessly? However, this does not seem to be possible. 

This is where the scientific arguments come into play. First, we know from observational data that the universe is expanding. However, any geodesic that has an average positive expansion must have a beginning. This was initially shown by Hawking and Penrose in their singularity theorems, although these were based on general relativity and so some critics argued that quantum gravity models could subvert the absolute beginning implied by such theorems. 

However, that window was firmly shut in 2003 when Alan Guth, Arvind Borde, and Alexander Vilenkin devised a theorem that applied to quantum gravity and even higher dimensional models as well. This has led a sort of retreat into highly speculative cosmological models that feature negative or zero average expansion that nevertheless possess features that require there to be a beginning of the universe in the finite past anyway. 

However, the one fact that no model has been able to controvert is the fact that the universe has not yet reached heat death. Because of entropy, the universe is slowly tending towards thermodynamic equilibrium, or 'heat death'. However, if the universe is past eternal, surely this would have already happened by now? 

Some therefore have retreated to some particularly bizarre objections to the Kalam cosmological argument. Some have argued that nothing, in fact, begins to exist. Whether because they are mereological nihilists who believe that only simple objects exist, or because they hold to a tenseless theory of time, they deny a premise that virtually nobody in their right mind would ever question.

Mereological nihilism denies that there are composite objects and instead maintains that only simple objects like particles exist. In such a view, only these exist and what we falsely believe are composite objects are simply arrangements of matter arranged in certain ways. 

Aside from begging the question in favour of naturalism, it maintains that what we refer to as our self does not exist. I'll be blunt; any view that entails one's own non-existence is not worthy of serious refutation. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that the standard Big Bang model does not describe the expansion of matter into already existing space but describes the expansion of space itself. 

Some have claimed that there are alleged counterexamples to the principle of causation, such as virtual particle-antiparticle pairs, or radioactive decays, but this is the result of equivocation. In the case of virtual particles, these are particle-antiparticle pairs that emerge from the quantum vacuum before quickly annihilating each other and turning back into energy. 

Virtual particles are therefore at every level an example of something coming from something. Whereas radioactive decays are an example of something being caused but in a manner that is currently impossible to predict. If things could just pop into being uncaused, then why does not everything and anything just appear? Why is it only particles and universes?

The better avenue of argument is to try and rely on the tenseless theory of time. On such a view, temporal becoming is not an objective feature of reality. Instead, past, present, and future all exist at the same time tenselessly in a four-dimensional spacetime block. On such a view, the universe just exists tenselessly. 

However, such a view is not particularly defensible. Now, critics allege that such a view is entailed by the special theory of relativity, but this is a half-truth at best. In reality, the four-dimensional view of spacetime is one particular metaphysical interpretation of special relativity, albeit one that enjoys a lot of support among scientists. 

Yet, the differing metaphysical interpretations of special relativity are equal from a purely evidential point of view. There are two other views to consider. Now, the first, which was Einstein's own original view, was that space is 3D but that there was no privileged reference frame. However, this led to a number of strange features that led to Einstein ultimately rejecting this view and accepting the 4D view.

The second view, however, that of Lorentz, was that there is a privileged reference frame, which resolved the problems that plagued Einstein's own view. Aside from this fact, Einstein later came to accept this Lorentzian view on the basis of his general theory of relativity. 

The main argument against a tenseless view and in support of the view that time really is tensed (and temporal becoming is thus an objective feature of reality) is that any illusion of temporal becoming requires there to be temporal becoming. Temporal becoming is simply an irreducible and indispensable feature of reality.

The logical conclusion of these three versions of the cosmological argument is that there exists an explanation of the universe that is an uncaused first cause that is timeless (at least, sans the universe), spaceless, immaterial, and enormously powerful. However, such a cause must also be personal. 

The reason for this is because the only things we know of that are immaterial and spaceless are either abstract objects or minds. However, since abstract objects do not stand in causal relations, this leaves the only possibility as that of a disembodied mind.