This argument for the existence of God, also known as the moral argument, is based on the objectivity of moral values and duties. It is argued that if God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist. Since objective moral values and duties do exist, then it is argued we can conclude that God therefore exists.
It's fairly simple and straightforward, especially compared to more sophisticated arguments, but is often misunderstood. For instance, one counter claim levelled against it is the argument that the premise that objective moral values and duties would not exist if God does not exist is false because there are atheists who are nevertheless moral people.
However, such an objection is misguided because the argument is not that belief in God is necessary for there to be moral people but that His existence is necessary for there to be objective moral values and duties. The argument concerns moral ontology, but the counter argument is discussing issues pertaining to moral epistemology. Thus, it is a complete red herring argument.
According to the axiological argument, God's existence for there to be objective moral facts, i.e. moral statements that can be true or false independent of our beliefs and mental states. The claim: 'ice cream is tasty' can be true or false but is a subjective truth since it depends upon whether or not I enjoy ice cream. Whereas the claim 'the moon exists' is true or false on the basis of whether or not there is object that we call the moon.
If God does not exist, then there would be no such thing as moral or immoral people. There would only be people behaving according to either their own personal tastes or perhaps on the basis of societal norms, but not according to an objective moral reality that exists independently of their beliefs and attitudes.
Whereas if God exists, then there exists an objective moral standard and thus an ontological basis for moral facts, regardless of whether anyone believes them or not. The entire planet could be populated with atheists, but for them to be moral atheists, there needs to be an objective moral standard, i.e. God.
It is a longstanding understanding that one cannot derive normative, prescriptive statements such as moral facts from facts about the natural world. This is known as the is/ought distinction or the naturalistic fallacy. It is fallacious to argue that something is moral or immoral on the basis of whether that action is 'natural' or not.
So, what options then, are there, for the atheist seeking to deny the conclusion of this argument? Now, one could argue that moral statements refer to subjective tastes, like societal attitudes and personal values, rather than overriding objective moral values and duties. However, it is important to note that, in such a scenario, there would be no moral facts. There would only be sociological and psychological truths about societal and personal tastes.
If moral statements are subjective, then they are not objective, which would therefore be a denial of the premise that objective moral standards and duties exist. But is this a satisfactory option? For one thing, people who do argue this rarely if ever seem to actually live according to such a view. Of course, this is merely a tu quoque.
Nevertheless, the fact that such an ethos is unlivable in practice could be taken as an argument against the view that moral statements are subjective. For instance, some modern ideologues are so committed to their view that 'all cultures are equal' that they are willing to tolerate murderers and rapists from other countries in their midst rather than be seen as being 'intolerant'.
However, if everyone lived that way, then it would result in chaos. Of course, one suggestion, often made by adherents of Darwinian evolutionary theory, is that moral beliefs are useful fictions meant to increase the collective chances of survival of a given population by encouraging behaviours more conducive to survival.
The reply to this argument, which is an argument in its own right, is that if our moral beliefs were selected for survival with no regards for their truth value, then we cannot trust our moral beliefs. However, the necessary corollary of that is that this would therefore apply to all of our beliefs.
This has been dubbed the Argument from Reason, and it simply the observation that if our cognitive faculties are not aimed at producing true beliefs, then this undercuts every belief we could ever hold, including belief in naturalism itself. Thus, naturalistic atheism is logically incoherent because its own defeater.
More specifically, in order for our beliefs to be warranted, they can't merely be only justified true beliefs, but, rather, they need to be beliefs produced by well-designed, properly functioning cognitive faculties aimed at producing true beliefs operating in the cognitive environment for which they were designed. So, aside from supporting moral objectivism, it is also an independent argument for the existence of God.
In addition to this reply, we can also state that if our moral beliefs are subjective with no objective components whatsoever, then this leads to either moral nihilism or moral non-cognitivism. Moral nihilism is the position that all moral statements are false, whereas moral non-cognitivism is the position that they are neither true nor false.
Now, moral nihilism simply seems obviously incoherent. For if one moral statement is false, then its negation must be true. This is simply a matter of logic. Moral non-cognitivism is a trickier customer, however. It's not obviously false like moral nihilism is. Of course, it isn't obviously true, either.
It certainly seems like that moral statements can be true or false. Various analyses made by non-cognitivists claim that moral statements do not express propositions, but rather attitudes. However, it seems to me as if they are misguided. For instance, sure, when I say: "X is wrong" there may or may not be an associated mental attitude accompanying it, such as disapproval or some such.
However, it is far from clear that this is the whole picture. Rather, it can be argued that certain actions elicit such mental attitudes because our moral intuitions are valid and our beliefs true such that, when those beliefs are violated, we react strongly. Non-cognitivists may complain that there exists some disparity regarding moral beliefs in that different people and societies hold conflicting views.
Whilst this is, of course, the case, note that conflicting views are prevalent in other areas too, yet we do not doubt that those statements are incapable of having a truth value. People in the past and even a minority of people today still believe that the world is flat. Some people even claim that 2+2 can equal 5. Yet we do not doubt that statements about the world or mathematical statements can be true or false.
Additionally, we can actually take what is normally construed as an argument against the existence of God and construct an argument in defence of the premise that objective moral values and duties exist. The argument from evil alleges that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of God, who is morally perfect and so on and so forth,
The problem with this argument, however, is that is is logically incoherent. For if moral values and duties exist, then God exists. If God does not exist, then moral values and duties do not exist. Thus, if it can be confirmed that objective moral evil exists, then the existence of God logically and inescapably follows.
It also hasn't escaped notice that there is nothing about the existence of moral evil that is obviously logically incompatible with the existence of God either. Ironically enough, atheist Stephen Law unintentionally provided a very good rebuttal to the argument from evil for noting that we cannot argue that a good God exists on the basis of moral goodness.
Now, whilst he intended this to be an argument against the existence of God, he has obviously misconstrued the axiological argument. We do not argue that God exists (and is good) because of the existence of moral goodness. We argue that He exists on the basis of objective moral facts. But what this does is show that, by corollary, that we cannot argue that God does not exist because of moral evil.
The contention that God exists and as actually evil is logically incoherent, since a maximally great being cannot be evil. The logical problem from evil has long been regarded as being refuted. Whereas the general theodicy that a good God can have good reasons for permitting evil is generally more than enough to show that even the so-called existential problem of evil is similarly a non-starter.
Now, one challenge to the view that God is the ontological source of moral facts is that of moral Platonism. Platonism is the view that abstract objects really exist, just in some kind of abstract realm. When applied to moral ontology, then, Platonism would entail that moral facts are ontologically grounded in abstract objects.
However, does this contention even make any sense? Sure, if the abstract object 'Good' existed, then we could say that goodness is objective, but then wouldn't there also be an abstract object called 'Evil'? At the least, wouldn't things we normally associate with evil, such as 'Injustice', 'Cruelty', and so on exist as well?
If so, then what reason would we have for aligning our personal values with the good rather than the evil? Whereas, if God exists, then we have a very real reason for preferring good over evil. Because evil would not exist independently of goodness but would rather be a privation of goodness, much in the same way that darkness is the absence of light and cold is the absence of heat.
One other challenge to the argument is the Euthyphro dilemma. Is something good because God says it is good, or does God say it is good because it is good. If the first option, then this seemingly makes morality arbitrary, but if the second then this presents a standard of goodness apart from God.
It is hard to see how this presents a serious problem, however. For this dilemma was meant as a refutation of polytheistic morality. It does nothing to challenge the ontological source of morality being grounded in a maximally great being. Since God is maximally good and morally perfect by His very nature, we can trust His commands as being good because He is good, thus presenting a third option to the dilemma not available to the polytheist.
Thus, having run the gamut of challenges to the argument, the axiological argument comes out on top as providing yet another argument that shows that God almost certainly exists. The argument from reason provides a nice supplement to this argument and also stands as an argument in favour of the existence of God in its own right.
No comments:
Post a Comment