The Trinity in the Bible

So, I got my first Muslim spammer/spambot/troll message on YouTube today. I won't bore you with the details of their message (given that it is your standard Islamic apologetics/polemics,) but this is my response to them. I thought I would post it here because: a) it seemed a good thing to blog about and b) it is long enough to fill up a proper blog post and saves me from coming up with something else. Either way, enjoy!
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The Holy Trinity is revealed both in the Old Testament and in the New Testament. In the Old Testament, the Trinity is revealed in subtle ways; in the New Testament, the Trinity is revealed fully and plainly, beginning at the Baptism of our Lord.

The Holy Trinity is one God in three Persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. These persons are distinct but not separate, and are not three gods. They are one God because They are one in essence or nature. The Father is the unbegotten Fountainhead of Deity. The Son is eternally begotten of the Father (John 1:18; 3:16; 16:28.) The Holy Spirit is the Helper (John 14:16) and Spirit of Truth (John 14:17; 16:13,) who proceeds from the Father (John 15:26.)

Genesis 1:1 - God the Father created the heavens and the earth. The Creed says: "I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and the earth."
Genesis 1:2 - The Spirit of God is the Holy Spirit. He hovered over creation in creative power and equality with the Father. He co-created with the Father.
Genesis 1:-3 - As the Word of God, the Son made the light (John 1:1-3.) With creative power and equality with the Father, He also co-created with the Father and the Spirit.
Genesis 1:26 - The pronouns "Us" and "Our" reveal a plurality of divine Persons. These Persons are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit operating in complete unity of the one divine Nature.

The Church fathers teach that the Father made heaven and earth through the Son and in the Holy Spirit. Thus, the Holy Trinity made heaven and earth, and the Church sings, "We glorify the Father, we exalt the Son, and we worship the Holy Spirit - the indivisible Trinity who exists as One - the Light and Lights, the Life and Lives, who grants light and life to the ends of the world."

Genesis 1:26-30 - The Trinity also made man. God the Father is speaking to God the Son, and He uses the personal pronouns Us and Our. These pronouns indicate three distinct Persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as noted in 1:1-3. The word image is in the singular, and shows the three distinct Persons of the Holy Trinity are one in nature and undivided. For it does not say, "Our images." Therefore, the Holy Trinity is one undivided nature in three distinct Persons. Man is not one in nature with the Holy Trinity. But He was made in the image and likeness of the Holy Trinity; and he was made male and female. Therefore, the dignity of each man and each woman is this image and likeness.

Genesis 2:7 - God formed Adam's body out of dust from the ground. The breath of life is the grace of the Holy Spirit, the Giver of Life (the Creed.) God breathed the breath of life into man's body, and he became a living soul. Therefore, Adam was a living soul because he possessed a body, a soul, and the grace of the Holy Spirit. After He rose from the dead, Jesus breathed on His disciples, and said, "Receive the Holy Spirit" (John 20:22.) For man failed to keep the grace of the Spirit, but through His Resurrection Jesus supplies His disciples abundantly with the life-giving grace of the Spirit. A disciple's responsibility is to live by this grace.

Genesis 2:8-17 - God gave man a place and a law. The place was Paradise, and the laws was the commandment given in 2:16-17. Man was to obey this commandment through the grace of God the Word. If he was obedient, he would enjoy the blessings of Paradise. But if he were to disobey the commandment, eh would die and his body would decay in the grace ("die by death.")

Genesis 2:18-25 - God, not man, established the law of marriage; therefore, marriage is holy. In the marriage union, the husband and the wife become one flesh (Genesis 2:24,) which St. Paul calls "a great mystery" (Ephesians 5:32.) This mystery is so great and wonderful that a man will leave his father and mother with the blessing and be joined to a woman in marriage. This joining, he will be devoted to her with sacrificial love and devotion, and she to him. This great mystery points to the greater mystery: the marriage of Christ to His Bride, the Church (Ephesians 5:22-33.) For He left His Father and became Man to seek a Bride. He loved His bride and gave His life for here. And in his divine vision of the new heaven and earth, the apostle John saw this Bride, the "New Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband" (Revelation 21:1, 2.)

Genesis 3:1-7 - The serpent is the devil (2 Corinthians 11:3, Revelation 12:9,) and he tempted Eve. He contradicted God's commandment (Genesis 2:16, 17) by denying death and decay in the grace as the penalty for disobedience (you shall not die by death.) He also tempted Eve with the promise of deification (you will be like gods, knowing good and evil.) But becoming like God comes through obedience to God, not through disobedience. Nevertheless, Eve was deceived, and thus disobeyed God. She, in turn, gave the fruit to her husband and he ate. In his disobedience, he willed contrary to the will of God, and thus ate. His free will was the first thing to suffer in the Fall, and thus is the first thing that needs healing in man.

Christ, by His death and Resurrection, conquered the devil and death, freeing mankind from the dear of death (Hebrews 2:14-15) an making possible a more complete communion between God and man than was ever possible before. This communion allows people to become "partakers of the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4,) to transcend death and, ultimately, the consequences of the Fall.

Genesis 3:8 - Adam and Eve now had a fallen will and tried to hide from God. Fallen man now has a fallen will, thus he has a tendency to run away from God. But the grace of Christ heals the will of those who return to Him through repentance, so they might freely pursue God and do His will.

Genesis 3:15 - The woman's seed is first Christ, and second His Church (Galatians 3:16, 26.) The serpent's seed as those who reject Christ and follow the devil (1 John 3:8-10.) Christ destroyed the devil through the cross (bruise your head.)

Genesis 3:24 - Because of Adam, man is born outside of Paradise. The tree of life prefigures Christ, though whom man regains Paradise.

Genesis 9:8-16 - Noah's seed is Christ (Luke 3:23, 36,) and the everlasting covenant (Genesis 9:16) is the new covenant God established in Him. God's rainbow in the clouds is His sign of the covenant.

Genesis 9:26 - Not only did the Lord God bless Noah Genesis 9:1,) but Noah blessed Him. Many Scriptures speak to this. For example, the Psalmist said, "For my foot stands in uprightness;/ In the Churches I will bless You, O Lord" (Psalms 25:12, Vesting Service.) Noah blessed God because of Shem, through whom Christ would come to save the world (Luke 3:36.)

Genesis 11:6 - Mankind was united as one race and one language. But this unity existed without the Holy Trinity, for man's true unity is union and communion with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Church is "the race of Christians" (Kairon Service,) "a holy nation" (1 Peter 2:9,) and glorifies God "with... one mouth" (Romans 15:6.) In the Great Litany, the Church prays "for the union of all men," a holy union based on the Holy Trinity.

Genesis 11:8 - The Lord divided this false unity for the sake of man's salvation, that man might seeks and find Him (Acts 17:26-28.) For they sought to build their unity by making a name for themselves (Genesis 11:4.) They cared nothing for the Lord God, by which man is saved.

Genesis 12:1-7 - "The Holy Spirit spoke through the prophets" (Creed.) He spoke through the prophet Moses, who wrote this Scripture. Thus, St. Paul said, "And the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by their faith, preached the gospel to Abraham beforehand, saying, 'In you all the nations shall be blessed" (Galatians 3:8.) Thus the Holy Spirit preached the gospel beforehand to Abraham. The Holy Spirit inspired Moses to write in Genesis 12:1 that the Lord said to Abram this scripture. Who is this Lord? He is God the Father, as St. Paul indicated in Galatians 3:8: "God would justify the Gentiles by faith." Thus, the Father preached the gospel beforehand to Abraham. In Genesis 12:7, the Holy Spirit inspired Moses to write that the Lord appeared to Abraham and spoke to him. Who is this Lord who appeared? The Holy Spirit identified Him in Genesis 15:1 as the Word of the Lord whom Abraham saw in a vision, and He identified Him as the Angel of the Lord in Genesis 16:7, 9, 10, 11, and 13. This Word is the Son of God and the Angel is also the Son of God, for He was no created angel. "He is called Angel because He alone reveals the Father (St. Athanasius.) Thus, the Son also preached the gospel beforehand to Abraham, for the Father always speaks through His Word. Therefore, when one person of the Trinity is present and working, the other two Persons are also present in one and the same working for the salvation of man. The Father works through the Son and in the Spirit.

Genesis 12:8 - Abraham is the father of all the faithful (Romans 4:11.) Since he built an altar of worship, therefore an altar is part of his faith. Bethel means "house of God," which foreshadows the Church as the house of God. The altar is central to worship. At the altar, the Church calls on the name of the Lord, as did Abraham.

Genesis 15:1-3 - The Word of the Lord is the Word of the Father. He is also the Son of God. Abraham saw God the Word in a vision. Thus, he saw Him before He became incarnate, as did the other Old Testament prophets.

Genesis 15:4 - The Voice of the Lord is also the Word of the father. He reassures Abraham that his heir will come from Abraham's own body. This refers to the birth of Isaac, based on God's promise. For man is saved by this promise through faith in Christ (Romans 4:17-25; 9:7, 8.)

Genesis 15:6 - Abraham believed in the promise in Genesis 12:1, and continued to believe it in Genesis 15:5. For Abraham's faith was living and growing - something dynamic. He was made righteous by this faith. So are both Jews and Gentiles. Righteousness is the gift of God through Jesus Christ (Romans 5:17.)

Genesis 15:7 - God the Word said to Abraham, "I am the God who brought you out Ur of the Chaldeans, to give you this land to inherit it." Thus, He identifies Himself as God. The Creed calls Him "True God of True God." For He is the Only-begotten of the Father, through whom the Father speaks and reveals Himself.

Genesis 15:8 - Abraham calls the Word his own Master and Lord, and thus recognises His divinity. The Church does the same thing.

Genesis 16:7 - The Lord is the Father, and the Angel is His Son. And the prophet Isaiah calls Him "the Angel of Great Counsel" (Isaiah 9:5.) "The Son is called Angel because He alone reveals the Father" (St. Athanasius.)

Genesis 16:9 - Since He is God, the Angel command Hagar. She obeyed (Genesis 16:15.) This Angel is the Word of God. "I will surely multiply your seed exceedingly, that it may not be counted because of its multitude." No created angel can do this. The Angel is God the Son.

Genesis 16:13 - Hagar called the Angel who appeared to her both Lord and God. The Church knows Him as the Only-begotten of the Father (John 1.) As the Father's Only-begotten, He is "true God of true God" (Creed.) One meaning of the name God is, You are the God who sees me. The Only-begotten sees everything. So do God the Father and God the Holy Spirit.

Genesis 17:1 - Thirteen years after the birth of Ishmael (Genesis 16:16,) the Lord appeared to Abram again and identified Himself as God, for He said to him, "I am your God." This appearance is another of the personal appearances of the Son of God to Abraham.

Genesis 17:2-4 - The covenant that is established "in Christ" (Galatians 3:17.) God established it before the Mosaic covenant. Therefore, the Law of Moses, which came later, could not cancel it. Abraham's faith is multiplied exceedingly in the Church. For he is the father of many nations (see also Romans 4:16, 17.)

Genesis 17:7 - The God of the everlasting covenant is the Holy Trinity, for the Son is God of God, the Only-begotten of the Father. The Holy Spirit is also God of God, for He "proceeds from the Father" (Creed.)

Genesis 18:1-3 - The Holy Spirit says through the prophet Moses that God appeared to Abraham. This is another personal appearance of the Son of God to him. He saw thee men standing before him, but he worshipped only one of them as Lord, for He is Lord and God. The other two are called "angels" (Genesis 19:1.) The Son of God is Lord of all the angels.

Genesis 19:1 - The Holy Spirit through the prophet Moses calls two of the three men angels. When they arrived in Sodom, they met Lot at the gate.
Genesis 19:2 - Lot paid the angels due respect by calling them lords, but he did not worship them, for they were created beings.

Genesis 19:13 - The third man was the Lord, the Son of God, and he sent the other two to Sodom to destroy it.

Genesis 19:18 - Lot spoke to all three men, but prayed to the Lord in particular.

Genesis 19:24 - The Lord rained brimstone and fire... from the Lord out of heaven, that is, the Son rained brimstone and fire from the Father (St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Ambrose, St. Hilary of Poitiers.) Both have the name "Lord" because of Their equality and oneness of Lordship. For in Their essence, the Two are One and undivided (Creed.) The Holy Spirit, who spoke this scripture through the prophet Moses, is also one in Lordship with the Father and the Son, for as the Creed says, "I believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord... who proceeds from the Father." The destruction of Sodom and the adjoining city of Gomorrah is a warning to the ungodly concerning the Day of Judgement (2 Peter 2:6, 9; Jude 7.)

Genesis 20:2 - The city of Gerar was not Abraham's true city, for it was given to idolatry. The Gerarites worshipped the god Dagon (3 Kingdoms 5:2) and the goddess Ashtaroth (3 Kingdoms 31:10.) But when the Son of God became incarnate, and the word of the gospel went out to Gerar, idolatry in that place was destroyed. A church and a monastery were established there. One of its bishops, Marcian, attended the Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in AD 451. Truly, the city embraced the faith of Abraham.

Genesis 21:1 - The Son of God visited Sarah and fulfilled the promise He had given in Genesis 18:10 (St. Hilary of Poitiers.) Abraham and Sarah would have a son in their old age.

Genesis 21:17 - The Angel of God is the Son of God. He told Hagar that God, that is God the Father, had heard Ishmael's crying. "The Son is called Angel for He alone reveals the Father" (St. Athanasius.)

Genesis 21:18 - The Angel told Hagar He Himself (I will make) would make a great nation of Ishmael. Therefore, this Angel is God (see also, Genesis:19, 20,) for God alone can do such a thing. This Angel is not a created angel, but the Son of God Himself. And why would He make a great nation of Ishmael? Because after His Incarnation, Ishmael's descendants would embrace Abraham's faith based on the word of promise.

Genesis 24:7 - The Lord's Angel is the Son of God. The word angel also means messenger. In this meaning it is also akin to the term word. The Son of God is called both Angel and Word, for "He alone reveals the Father" (St. Athanasius.) Both names emphasise that the Son is the Will of God the Father. Thus, God spoke to Abraham through His will, and told him to leave his father's house for the lad of promise. The words He will send His angel before were prophesied by Abraham to his servant. He spoke these words by the Holy Spirit, as the Creed says: "I believe in the Holy Spirit... who spoke by the prophets."

Genesis 31:13 - In verse 11, the name "God" refers to the Father. But in this verse, the Angel is called the God who appeared. Thus, the Son is "true God of true God" (Creed.)

Isaiah 63:16 - The Father is our Redeemer. He not only created the world but redeems it as well.
Psalm 2:7, 8 - The Father's decree reveals the Son as inheriting the world. This inheritance is the people saved by the Son.
Isaiah 6:1-3: The words "Holy, Holy, Holy," declare the three Persons who save us. The name "Lord" declares the one essence of the Three.
Isaiah 44:3 - The Father pours out His Spirit on people like water on dry ground. The Holy Spirit quenches the thirst of the person who thirst for salvation.
Isaiah 48:16, 17 - The Son declares that the Father and the Spirit sent Him to redeem the world. Although the Son alone became a Man, all three Persons save mankind.

John 1:1-3 - The Word is the Son of God, who was present with the Father at the beginning of creation. He was Co-worker with the Father in creating the world.
John 8:58 - Jesus identifies Himself as having existed before Abraham. Before His coming in the flesh as Man, Jesus existed as the eternal Son of the Father, for He is begotten from the Father before all time and ages. He appeared to Moses in the burning bush and proclaimed Himself "I Am" (Exodus 3.)
Acts 2:17 - The Holy Spirit's descent at Pentecost affirms His presence in the Old Testament (Joel 2:28-32.)
Hebrews 1:8-10 - This Scripture affirms the Father is speaking to the Son in Psalms 44:7 and 101:26-28, in which the Father acknowledges the Son as God and Creator of the world. For the Son was the Father's Co-worker in creation.

Luke 1:35 - At the Annunciation, the Holy Spirit, the "power" if God the Father ("the Highest,") overshadowed the Virgin Mary; and she gave birth to So of God in His flesh.
Matthew 3:16-17 - When the Son of God was baptised in the Jordan by John, the Father's voice was heard from heaven, and the Holy Spirit descended on Him like a dove. As the main hymn for the Feast of Theophany says, "When You, O Lord, were baptised in the Jordan, the worship of the Trinity was made manifest."

I believe in one God, the Father Almighty of heaven and earth, and of all thing visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Only-Begotten, begotten of the Father before all worlds, Light of Light, Very God of Very God, begotten, not made; of one essence with the Father; by Whom all things were made; Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven an was incarnate of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, and was made Man; and was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered and was buried; the third day He rose again according to the Scriptures; and ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of the Father; and He shall come again with glory to judge the living and the dead; Whose Kingdom shall have no end. And I believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of Life, Who proceeds from the Father, Who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, Who spoke by the profits. And I believe in One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. I acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins. I look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come. Amen.

Are the Concepts and Objectives Behind the “Authentic Performance Movement” Fundamentally Flawed?

In this essay, we shall be examining the so-called “authentic performance movement” but what IS the authentic performance movement? This movement, also referred to as the historical authenticity movement and/or the early music movement, is a group of musicians, performers, and composers who “strive to realise the [baroque and classical period] composer’s intentions and expectations regarding performing style.”1 What this means then, is that said musicians, et al. strive to play Renaissance, Baroque, and Classical musical works in a way that they would have been played in their respective eras. This includes performing on instruments made in the same way as those from the period, using the same construction materials, designs, intonations, and tuning systems. Now that we have an adequate description of the movement in question, we may now move on to a critical analysis of its concepts and objectives (if indeed said movement even has any to be subjected to such scrutiny.)

The origins of this movement lie in the 1950s all the way through to the 1980s, and has continued on through the 90s up until present times.2 However the history behind this movement can be traced to developments as far back as during 18th and 19th centuries.3 During the eighteenth century, musical performance was focused on new music. This can be exemplified in the ‘Querelle des Bouffons’ that took place between 1752 and 1754, which was a controversy surrounding the merits of the newer Italian operas versus the merits of the older French operas. During this controversy, contemporary philosophes and other writers argued, sometimes vociferously, that the newer Italian opera was better than the older French operas pioneered by Jean-Baptiste Lully and promoted at the time by Jean-Phillipe Rameau. The people of that century simply did not care for older music. This can be contrasted with the 19th century, where there was a conscious move towards performing works by composers of older eras. As Bernard Sherman notes “admonitions to honor the composer’s performance intentions... became common in the 19th century and dominant in the twentieth.”4

Whilst there are number of reasons for why these developments took place during the 19th century, at the centre of the debate during the twentieth century was a debate concerning “authenticity.”5 Critics of the “authentic performance movement’ have focused intently over the usage of the word ‘authentic’ and it is this word in particular that is singled out as the principle target of the critics’ ire. It is primarily the controversy over the meaning of ‘authenticity’ that has led to the movement being given the alternate name: ‘historically informed performance movement.’6 However, there is some doubt as to whether or not “authenticity” really laid behind the movement. D. Fabian argues that the concept of authenticity being attributed to the movement was really down to critics taking “commercial propaganda at face value.”7 That is to say that those associated with the early music/historically informed performance movement do not seek ‘authenicity.’8

Thus, one could argue that identifying this movement as the ‘authentic performance movement’ is nothing more than a straw-man caricature. What then CAN be said about the aims of the early music/authentic/historically informed performance movement? Michelle Dulak argues that shift in emphasis from ‘authenticity’ to ‘historically informed performance’ is simply nothing more than semantic posturing:
“Early music” itself will hardly do, when so much of the repertoire concerned is so recent… “Authentic” has succumbed to a thousand critical blows, most of them richly deserved. “Contextual for no very obvious reason, was stillborn… “Period” and “historical” (with the variant “historically informed” remain, but a careful observer cannot help noting that even they become rarer with time. I venture to suggest that this linguistic fidgetiness has its roots in the changing nature of the beast itself.9
This view, however, misses the deeper differences between the notions of ‘authenticity’ and being ‘historically informed.’ Whilst they may seem two names for the same thing, there is a fundamental difference. Being ‘authentic’ from a musical perspective is not the same thing as being ‘historically informed.’ Edidin notes the argument of Kivy that a rendition of a composition can be authentic in a ‘personal’ sense and forms the basis of arranging as form of art.10

The fundamental argument against equating ‘authenticity’ with ‘historical informed performance’ then, is that the personal authenticity expressed in varying renditions of compositions past and present is of aesthetic value. The reason for this is because the very act of arranging is itself an art form that gives rise to new musical expressions. Therefore, it is inappropriate or perhaps unfair to label certain artistic expressions as ‘inauthentic.’ Whether because it was because of such criticisms, or if, as D. Fabian argues, that the movement never self-identified as such, since the 1990s the term ‘authentic’ has been subsequently dropped.11 Nowadays, the focus is more on performances being ‘historically informed’ that is to say performances which are historically accurate. Whether this has been part and parcel of the movement since the very beginning or whether this a new direction it seems as if this fascination of the past follows very much in the same vein as the fascination of the past exemplified by so many groups as far back as the Renaissance humanists and as contemporary as today.

Robert Donington gives a possible explanation for this current obsession, especially the music of the Baroque period. He argues that it lies in the fact that there is actually a sense of continuality between music of the past and music of the present. That is to say, Baroque music exemplifies musical elements found in popular contemporary music today, chief among them being improvisation.
Much of our own contemporary music pursues such spontaneity and in baroque music this ingredient is contained in the very conditions of its authentic reportoire.12
However, is this attempt at historical recreation any less problematic than striving to create the most ‘authentic’ rendition of a performance? Writing about Renaissance music, Howard Mayer-Brown writes that the question of how music of the past was actually performed is one that is “difficult to answer because the music is so remote from us… that even the most basic facts about the way it was played must be demonstrated rather than assumed.”13 Bernard Sherman notes that “some authors believe that it is impossible for us to perform music exactly as it was done in its own era.”14

Whilst it therefore seems out-of-date to think of an ‘authentic performance movement’ but of a movement that endeavours to re-create compositions the way they were historically performed, it seems as if this does not change much. There are still problems with presuming one rendition of a Baroque period composition is more ‘historically authentic’ or ‘historically informed’ than another. This has been briefly hinted at and shall now be expounded upon in more detail now. What are the fundamental problems with historical Reconstructionism in relation to the music of the Baroque period and earlier? One issue lays in the fact that “performers did not simply follow instructions given them by composers” and that “musicians were expected to be able to invent new melodic material extempore.”15 In the Baroque and Renaissance periods, performing music involved more than simply reading the scores. The singers and instrumentalists of those times were fully expected to add elaborate improvised ornamentation, and according to precise musical rules. A problem then, lies in determining what these rules are and how they should be interpreted and applied.

More than this, we have to determine not just stylistic characteristics, but sonic characteristics, questions concerning instrument choice, instrument construction, instrument techniques, ensemble line-up, ensemble size, and a plethora of other issues. Whilst this might seem like a daunting task to some, the problem is even more insurmountable than this, for the documentary evidence (in terms of musical scores) we have is fragmentary.
Some authors believe that it is impossible for us to perform music exactly as it was done in its own era. In a few cases, such as the use of castrati singers, it is obviously impossible (or repellent) to re-create a known practice. But more generally, evidence about period performance practice is almost never complete, so performers must go beyond what scholars can certify as historically accurate. Doing so involves the use of the performers’ imaginations—and modern musical imaginations differ almost inevitably from those of previous centuries.16
Reconstructing music of the past is therefore immensely difficult if not impossible. The principle argument against attempts at accurate historical reconstruction of musical compositions is that “historical performers supplement the meagre documentary evidence with their own musical taste…”17

Interestingly enough, Taruskin, whom Dulak cites and refers to, despite offering stringent criticisms of the historicist enterprise, does not see the ahistoricity inherent in the historicist enterprise as a deathblow to their efforts. Rather, he argues that despite the “thin veneer of historicism” and the “rhetoric of authenticity,” the movement “constitutes proof that what [Taruskin] calls “authentistic” performance is a living tradition…”18 As Edidin concurs:
One way to qualify the extreme view [that deviations from history falsify the efforts of historicism] would be to hold that historical authenticity is but one source of aesthetic good among many…9
Whilst the two ideals, authenticity and historicism, are different, it seems then as if they overlap considerably after all. If one takes authenticity in music to mean something that is aesthetically good and enjoyable, and the efforts of historicisms achieve this affect, then it seems as if both concepts are vindicated.

Tracing the development of the “early music movement,” D. Fabian notes that despite arguments such as those above, those involved in the movement still clung to the idea that “an Urtext score reflected the composer’s ‘definitive version’ of the piece.” Those affiliated with the movement in the 1950s held to the ideal of ‘historical authenticity.’20 As aforementioned, Edidin reports a distinction Kivy made between personal and historical authenticity, and so in this sense the obsession over ‘authenticity’ in earlier critiques are misguided. What those in the authentic performance movement actually meant by ‘authenticity’ and what critics supposed they meant were two entirely different things. We may recall Dulak’s complaint earlier that the central aims of the authentic performance movement has been transmogrified, and this is somewhat justified given the vagueness of the term ‘authenticity.’ Yet, as we have seen, there is a fundamental distinction between ‘authenticity,’ ‘historicism.’ Furthermore, we are met with two types of authenticity, ‘personal authenticity’ and ‘historical authenticity.’

We have cleared up some of the terminology, but not all. In determining the aims and objectives of the authentic performance movement, we were met with two terms: the sufficiently vague term ‘authenticity’ and the more clearly defined term ‘historicism.’ However, we are now met with two new terms, as mentioned above. Personal authenticity, which refers to the art of arranging carried out by modern composers and performers who seek to re-create works of the past. Their re-working has aesthetic value whether it is “historically informed” or not. What then of ‘historical authenticity?’ Whilst some argue that historical authenticity is synonymous with efforts at trying to re-create musical compositions the way the original composer intended, I disagree. Whilst a desire at historical accuracy is obviously a major part of Historical Reconstructionism, historical authenticity is more than this. I take historical authenticity to refer to the aesthetic value of historicism; that is the effort to re-create compositions of the past as they would have been performed originally.

As previously discussed, Edidin notes that historicism21 can be at least one source of aesthetic good. However, he goes on to argue a further point that whilst historical reconstruction is “not necessarily or always a source of aesthetic good” that “there is good prima facie reason that it often will be a source of aesthetic good…”22 In other words, at least some examples of ‘historically informed performances’ will be aesthetically good because of efforts at historical reconstruction. Therefore what ‘historical reconstruction’ can be historically authentic in addition to being personal authentic by virtue of its being personally authentic. He develops this argument further by offering the premise that “the aesthetic payoff of following a composer’s performance suggestion is ultimately to be judged by experience of the result of that way of performing.”23

Having briefly reviewed the key concepts associated with the ‘authentic performance movement’ we have come to the following conclusions. The fundamental aim of the ‘authentic performance movement’ is merely an attempt at historical recreation; to re-create compositions according to the original wishes and intentions of the composers. The use of the term ‘authenticity’ was simply misleading colloquialism that. Debates over ‘authenticity,’ whilst somewhat misleading, are, however, enlightening nonetheless. We discussed the varying meanings of ‘authenticity’ and how they applied to the efforts of Historical Reconstructionism. The aim of this essay was to discuss to the objectives of the ‘authentic performance’ and weigh in as to whether these objectives were ‘fundamentally flawed’ or not. The discussion as to whether or not historical reconstruction of early compositions is a worthwhile enterprise almost entirely focused around philosophical, aesthetic concerns, as it was more or less admitted from the outset that our knowledge of how these pieces of music was actually performed is particularly fragmentary. What then, are our conclusions in this regard?

Authenticity is a word that has sparked a wide amount of controversy, with some regarding the use of the term highly offensive. However, more thoughtful commentators have offered expositions of what authenticity actually means, and then discussed how it relates to the ‘authentic performance movement.’ Authenticity can carry two meanings, personal authenticity and historical authenticity. Personal authenticity is the aesthetic value of a piece of music purely based on its value as art. Historical authenticity is typically used to refer to how historically accurate a work is, but I take it to mean the personal authenticity derived from efforts at historical reconstruction irrespective as to whether this historical reconstruction is ultimately successful or not. Thus, we can see two ways in which historical reconstruction is a worthwhile endeavour. Firstly, composers engage in the art of arranging. How they arrange other composer’s compositions and how they perform them leads to new musical expression.

Secondly, compositions can be aesthetically pleasing purely as a result of the attempts at historical reconstruction. That is to say that pieces that aspire to be historically informed can be more aesthetically pleasing than pieces that do not aspire to being historically informed. The only issue then is whether these aesthetic results are intentional or accidental by-products. However, I think such a question ultimately does not add to the discussion at hand (otherwise it would have been raised earlier) as the answer to such a question does not alter the aesthetic results. Whether it is deliberate or unintentional, ‘historically informed’ pieces can be aesthetically good. Note that this is also wholly independent of whether or not these pieces actually are historically accurate or not, thus rendering the question of whether such historical accuracy is possible a moot one. The question being discussed is whether or not the aims and objectives of the ‘authentic performance movement’ are fundamentally flawed or not. Whilst historical accuracy might simply be a quaint, ludicrous notion, aesthetic good can still come of it.

Bibliography
Books:
Howard Mayer Brown, Embellishing 16th-Century Music, Oxford University Press, (1976)
Robert Donington, Style and Performance, Faber Music, (1982)
David Schulenberg, Music of the Baroque, Oxford University Press, (2001)

Journals:
Michelle Dulak, The Quiet Metamorphosis of “Early Music,” Repercussions, Vol. 2, No. 2., University of California Berkley, (Fall, 2003), pp31-61
Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way: Historical Authenticity, Personal Authenticity, and the Performance of Classical Music, Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 32, No. 4, University of Illinois Press, (Winter, 1998), pp79-91
Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement: A Historical Review, International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 32, No. 2, Croatian Musicology Society, (Dec., 2001), pp153-167

Web Articles:
Bernard D. Sherman, Authenticity in Musical Performance, http://www.bsherman.net/encyclopedia.html (Accessed November 25th 2011)

Notes
1 Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way: Historical Authenticity, Personal Authenticity, and the Performance of Classical Music, Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 32, No. 4, University of Illinois Press, (Winter, 1998), pp79-91, p79
2 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement: A Historical Review, International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 32, No. 2, Croatian Musicology Society, (Dec., 2001), pp153-167, p153
3 Bernard D. Sherman, Authenticity in Musical Performance, http://www.bsherman.net/encyclopedia.html (Accessed November 25th 2011)
4 Ibid.
5 Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way, p79
6 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement: A Historical Review, International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 32, No. 2, Croatian Musicology Society, (Dec., 2001), pp153-167, p153
7 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement, p154
8 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement, p155
9 Michelle Dulak, The Quiet Metamorphosis of “Early Music,” Repercussions, Vol. 2, No. 2., University of California Berkley, (Fall, 2003), pp31-61, p31
10 Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way, p80
11 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement, p153
12 Robert Donington, Style and Performance, Faber Music, (1982), p6
13 Howard Mayer Brown, Embellishing 16th-Century Music, Oxford University Press, (1976), pvii
14 Bernard D. Sherman, Authenticity in Musical Performance, http://www.bsherman.net/encyclopedia.html (Accessed November 26th 2011)
15 Howard Mayer Brown, Embellishing 16th-Century Music, Oxford University Press, (1976), pvii
16 Bernard D. Sherman, Authenticity in Musical Performance, http://www.bsherman.net/encyclopedia.html (Accessed November 27th 2011)
17 Michelle Dulak, The Quiet Metamorphosis of “Early Music,” p33
18 Michelle Dulak, The Quiet Metamorphosis of “Early Music,” p34
19 Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way, p81
20 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement, p158
21 Edidin himself uses the term ‘historical authenticity’ as referring to the efforts of Historical Reconstructionism/historicism, whereas I take ‘historical authenticity’ to refer to the aesthetic value of the historicist enterprise.
22 Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way, p81
23 Ibid.

Did the Enlightenment Inspire the French Revolution?

It has generally been asserted by some historians that the Enlightenment influenced the French Revolution.1 Postmodernist historians tend to go further and claim the Enlightenment directly led to the terror, and inspired subsequent totalitarian regimes also.2 Whilst the latter question is beyond the purview of this essay, we shall be exploring, on the other hand, the question of the Enlightenments role in the French Revolution if it indeed had one at all. The Enlightenment is an area that has perhaps been over-complicated by historians, and so we shall do our best to uncomplicate them here. Is there a relation between the Enlightenment and the Revolution? At first glance it may seem like a reasonable hypothesis. Yet the proposition that the Enlightenment caused (whether directly or indirectly) raises a number of questions. Not least of these being the question of how could a movement devoted to rational reform lead to such violence?3 Therefore in order to understand this question better, we need to look at the Enlightenment philosophes themselves.

It becomes clear once we get round to looking at the philosophes that they were no revolutionaries. Whilst the revolutionaries certainly appealed to writers such as Voltaire and Rousseau, the revolutionaries’ thinking “often proceeded in directions which would have horrified those whose names they used in order to legitimate their actions.”4 Stromberg notes that almost all of the philosophes that lived to the Revolution rejected it, and “virtually from the start.”5 The philosophes were very much elitists who believed in a hierarchical society with the ‘grands’ at the top, with Rousseau being the only exception. d’Alembert remarked that one did not a great deal of philosophy that societies, especially large states, needed clearly defined social ranks. Voltaire shared similar sentiments and believed that the masses should no be even taught how to read. This oligarchy therefore stands in stark contrast to the ideals of the revolutionaries who sought to enact a republic. Robert Darnton notes that by 1778 “the last generation of philosophes had become pensioned, petted, and completely integrated in high society.”6

Darnton cites the Archive Nationales, which contained a list of 147 “men of letters who request pensions” and ten dossiers on writers and their sources of support.7 The philosophes were very much dependant on sinecures and pensions, and NOT the sales of books. Of course, this raises further questions: to what extent did Enlightenment ideals filter down to the masses, and if not the Enlightenment philosophes what DID eighteenth century Frenchmen read? Robert Darnton, whom has already been cited, has made some considerable advancement in this regard. One such example is the Bibliotheque bleue, which were crude paperbacks carted about the countryside and were intended for semi-literate peasant communities. These works included mostly superstitious tales, medieval romances, and condensed versions of popular novels, not the enlightened philosophy of the philosophes.8 Furthermore, records by provincial publishers for ‘permission simples’ indicate that “educated provincials were about as far removed from the Enlightenment provincials as illiterate provincials.”8

Quite simply, books that later ages took be great “may not have been widely read under the Old Regime.”9 More than this, however, it seems as if there was an underground book market for “philosophical books” with particularly lewd title such as ‘Venus in the Cloister or Nun in the Nightgown’ and ‘The Woman of Pleasure.’ Darnton’s book The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France is devoted to this entire subject. The term “philosophical books” was used as a sort of codeword for books that would get publishers and shop owners into trouble, and were apparently in quite high demand. However, the chief impetus behind the revolution, Darton argues, were a group of writers wholly different from those of the Enlightenment philosophes. Darnton points to a fringe group of writers excluded from elite circles, men such as Carra, Gorsas, Mercier, Restif de la Bretonne, Manuel, Desmoulins, Collot d’Herbois, and Fabre d’Eglantine. In fact one of the writers named, Jean Marie Collot d’Herbois actually went to become a member of the Committee of Public Safety.

These writers generally passed into obscurity, with the exception of those named, and were referred to by the philosophes as the ‘excrement of literature.’ Voltaire placed them in a social class below prostitutes and referred to them as the ‘dregs of humanity.’ Whilst Voltaire claimed he attacked this group of writers to put aspiring youths off from aspiring to be a writer (and thus ending up either starving or scraping a living) those who were able to scrape a living by the pen, such as Mercier, took extreme offence. They were also indignant at their place in society, and Darnton notes how Phillipe Fabre d’Eglantine, Jean-Louis Carra, and Antoine-Joseph Carra precipitated the downfall Charles-Alexandre de Callone after he did not award them pensions.10 The central issue was privilege; the Enlightenment philosophes and these writers were not. As Darnton puts it: “They had knocked on the doors of Voltaire’s Church, and the door remained closed.”11As such, these writers generally produced ‘libelles’ attacking the “grande monde”; that is, the society of the high cultured philosophes. They attacked the salon, the academies, the aristocracy, the church, and even the monarchy. These were the successors of the philosophes and they made themselves heard.

Whereas the philosophes were mostly if not entirely limited to the upper echelons of eighteenth century France, the Grub Street hacks were pumping out pamphlets that were quite widely read in some cases. Darnton specifically references the “polemical genius” of Simon-Henri Linguet.12 Jeremy Popkin, in response to Darnton’s earlier suggestion of Brissot as the template for the hacks of Grub Street, likewise notes that Linguet fits Darnton’s hypothesis, but that even Linguet “spent much of his career closely associated with powerful figures in French politics.”13 Popkin notes that their feelings of resentment have perhaps been exaggerated by Darnton, and that they were simply poor intellectuals who wrote whatever sold and were more than happy to attach themselves to wealthy and influential patrons such as the duc d’Orleans. Of course, this does not do much to undermine Darnton’s hypothesis, and Popkin himself even admitted to the inherent plausibility of Darnton’s hypothesis.14 Darnton’s argument is that these writers influenced the revolutionaries, and not the Enlightenment philosophes.

However, the question of what motivated them is a more complicated one and one that Darnton has since answered. These writers had arrived in Paris expecting to be received as eminent writers and to rise up as Voltaire did, but instead they plummeted to the bottom and so had to do whatever was required to survive. Grub Street was no gentlemanly affair, but a “grim struggle for survival” that “brought out baser elements.”15 Whether they harboured the vitriolic hatred of the establishment as Darnton suggests, and thus merely hedging their bets, or if they were simply downtrodden opportunists who were radicalised by their life at the bottom rung, many of their writings were certainly nefarious and dark. One Charles Thevenau de Morande produced work of such ghastly degradation that its depravity caused Voltaire to refer to it in horror as “one of those satanic works… where the most atrocious and most absurd calumny spreads a horrible poison on everything one respects and loves.”16

One aspect, however, that Darnton has perhaps overlooked is the indirect role that the Enlightenment played in influencing revolution. Many of these men had grown up as youths really believing that the ‘republic of letters,’ in fact, really did exist, and that they could be the next Voltaire or Diderot. In this sense, the Enlightenment led these men to aspire to be writers, and thus led to them ending up as radical Grub Street hacks, doing whatever literary work was needed just as long as it got them food on the table and a roof over their heads. More than this, however, the Enlightenment can also be argued to have made revolution possible. The central thesis of T. C. W. Blanning’s book The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture is that the Enlightenment era saw the rise of a ‘public sphere.’ That is to say “[b]y exchanging information, ideas, and criticism, these individuals created a cultural actor – the public- which has dominated European culture ever since.”17 What then is the relation between this new ‘general public’ and the Enlightenment?

It easy enough to see where the Grub Street hack writers would have come in. With the growing emphasis on newspapers, and other (what we would call) media outlets, this obviously left a gap for them to fill. More than this, public life began emphasising public venues, such as the theatre, and Blanning notes the ‘Querelle de Bouffons,’ a controversy that broke out over the merits of newer Italian opera, versus the older French operas of Lully of Rameau.18 This quarrel is interesting in that it not only involved the ‘general public’ but also the philosophes. Weighing in against Rameau was none other than Rousseau, Grimm and men such as Diderot and d’Alembert. The lesson Blanning claims can be inferred from this incident is that the court culture of Louis XIV began to be seen as outdated.19 Interestingly enough, d’Alembert wrote a pamphlet entitled ‘On the Liberty of Music.’ In it he writes that the ‘great political figures’ who oppose those argue for liberty in music complain that liberty in music is inextricably and inexorably linked with liberty in feeling, followed by liberty in thought, liberty in action, ending in the ruin of states.

Blanning notes that this is probably not too far off the mark. With the advent of the new Bouffon style of comedic opera, Rousseau saw the success of his own comic opera Le Devin du village, which Blanning argues “looks very much like an exercise in social criticism.”20 Rousseau then wrote his famous ‘Letter on French Music,’ whereby he accused the French of having no music, and that if they did it would be so much the worse for them. Such a brazen attack on French music caused deep offence, even amongst Frenchmen who preferred the Italian operas of the Bouffons and many made their complaints heard via print. As Outram notes, some of the new institutions and organisations that sprang up in this era “provided ways in which many different social strata could be exposed to the same ideas.”21 It was these institutions and this interchange of ideas that led to the emergence of a ‘new public sphere.’

Whence did this public sphere come? It was mostly the result of socio-political changes in not just Western Europe, but America also. Outram notes that the eighteenth century “was a time of economic expansion, increasing urbanisation, rising population, and improving communications in comparison to the stagnation of the previous century.”22 However, as Darnton notes, the philosophes themselves were not widely read in the lower classes. This new ‘general public’ read mostly gossip, pornography, and just general smut, which is generally where the Grub Street writers come in. The Grub Street writers, as we have previously discussed, were men who had grown up believing in a “republic of letters” but found out the hard way that unless you made it in the system of privilege and patronage, then you would not go very far. The one possible contradiction in Darnton’s hypothesis is that these Grub Street writers themselves actually read the Enlightenment philosophes or at least became somewhat acquainted with them. In the same way a youth today might aspire to become, say, an actor or musician, these men aspired to become the next Voltaire, or Diderot.

Upon finding that they could not succeed at their ambitious aspirations of fame and glory, and subsequently forced to live in the grim reality of Grub Street, they dispensed of such quaint ideals. In essence, they were desperate, and so wrote whatever would get them money. However, this can more or less be attributed to the socio-political factors above. It was the heightened sense of public awareness that gave a market for the writings of Grub Street, and made public opinion such a powerful force. Although the link between the Enlightenment philosophes and the Grub Street writers is there, which can further be demonstrated in how the revolutionaries attempted to justify their enterprise. In fact, more than this, Stromberg notes that, of the philosophes that were still alive, there was one group that attempted to “mediate between the great ideas of the past, on which they had been raised and which has dazzled them, and the tumultuous events of the present which might be the realisation of those ideas.”23 This group, however, ultimately failed, losing to the Jacobin faction, but this group distinctive and even had its own printing press to disseminate Enlightenment ideals to the general public.

It seems then, then the only link between the Enlightenment one can demonstrate is, at most, indirect. As Roger Chartier notes: “…the revolutionaries constructed a continuity that was primarily a process of justification and a search for paternity.”24 It should be clear, however, that the Enlightenment and the French Revolution are not as inexorably linked as previously assumed. A much more convincing argument, on the other hand, could be made in regards to the relationship between the Enlightenment and the American Revolution, but that is beyond the bounds of this essay to discuss. The biggest contributing factor were the new socio-political changes, and whether or not these changes were caused or influenced in any way by the Enlightenment is a question that shall not be addressed here (although certainly a relevant one!) A growing sense of public opinion and public awareness combined with the writings of Grub Street are ultimately what led to revolution, and whilst the link between Grub Street and the Enlightenment philosophes is certainly there, what also needs to be shown is that the public dissatisfaction with the court culture King Louis XIV and his successors was a result of the Enlightenment.

Perhaps the strongest conclusion that can be reached is that the philosophes were no revolutionaries, and even supported the current order, so if a more direct link could be shown between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, then it could simply be put down to a misuse of enlightened ideals, and not an intended outcome of the Enlightenment at all. Of course, whether a misuse of ideals is inevitable is a further question raised by all of this, and it seems that the philosophes themselves would be inclined to agree that it was, given their attitudes towards the lower classes. So, again, if there is a link between the Enlightenment and the revolution, it was because Enlightenment ideals filtered down to the lower classes too rapidly. Whilst Darnton has more or less shown that the philosophes were not widely read in the lower classes, it does leave the question of whether or not their ideals found their way to the lower classes anyway (in one form or another.) Whatever the answer, then it should not reflect too badly on the philosophes, given they were aware of such pitfalls themselves.

Bibliography
T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660-1789, Oxford University Press, (2002)
Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, Lydia G. Cochran, trns., Duke University Press, (1991)
Robert Darnton, The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France, W.W. Norton & Company, (1996)
Robert Darnton, In Search of the Enlightenment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 43, No.1, (March, 1971), University of Chicago Press, pp113-132
Robert Darnton, The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France, Past and Present, No. 51, (May, 1971), Oxford University Press, pp81-115
Haydn T. Mason, ed., The Darnton Debate: Books and Revolution in the Eighteenth Century, Voltaire Foundation Ltd., (1998)
Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment: New Approaches to European History, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, (2005)
Roland N. Stromberg, The Philosophes and the French Revolution: Reflections on Some Recent Research, The History Teacher, Vol. 21, No. 3, (May, 1988), Society for the History of Education, pp321-339

Notes:
1 For example, Peter Gay.
2 The same historians also tend to deny that the Enlightenment had any influence and all, not to mention postmodernism denies the objectivity of historical research. This is an irony that they otherwise appear to be blind to.
3 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment: New Approaches to European History, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, (2005), p126
4 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment, p131
5 Roland N. Stromberg, The Philosophes and the French Revolution: Reflections on Some Recent Research, The History Teacher, Vol. 21, No. 3, (May, 1988), Society for the History of Education, pp321-339, p323
6 Robert Darnton, In Search of the Enlightenment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 43, No.1, (March, 1971), University of Chicago Press, pp113-132, p119
7 Robert Darnton, The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France, Past and Present, No. 51, (May, 1971), Oxford University Press, pp81-115, p85-86
8 Robert Darnton, In Search of the Enlightenment, p127
9 Robert Darnton, In Search of the Enlightenment, p124
10 Robert Darnton, Two Paths Through the Social History of Ideas, from Haydn T. Mason, ed., The Darnton Debate: Books and Revolution in the Eighteenth Century, Voltaire Foundation Ltd., (1998), p253
11 Robert Darnton, The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France, p100
12 Robert Darnton, The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France, p101
13 Jeremy D. Popkin, Robert Darnton’s Alternative (to the) Enlightenment, from Haydn T. Mason, ed., The Darnton Debate: Books and Revolution in the Eighteenth Century, Voltaire Foundation Ltd., (1998), p110
14 Jeremy D. Popkin, Robert Darnton’s Alternative (to the) Enlightenment, from Haydn T. Mason, ed., The Darnton Debate, p108
15 Robert Darnton, The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France, p102
16 Ibid.
17 T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660-1789, Oxford University Press, (2002), p2
18 T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture, p357-360
19 T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture, p360
20 T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture, p363
21 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment, p12
22 Ibid.
23 Roland N. Stromberg, The Philosophes and the French Revolution, p327
24 Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, Lydia G. Cochran, trns., Duke University Press, (1991), p5

Norman Geisler: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing

For those of you who don't know, a "controversy" has erupted in 'Evangelical circles' in the United States. I use inverted commas when I say "controversy" because the subject being discussed is so non-controversial that it is truly mind-boggling how anyone could be so infantile as to make an issue out of this. Michael Licona, a Christian apologist and New Testament scholar who has done admirable work for God's Kingdom, has recently published a new book that came out last year entitled The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach which is perhaps the most solid defence of the resurrection of Jesus to date. The source of the "controversy" in Dr. Licona's interpretation of Matthew 27, which describes an event where dead saints are resurrected on the eve of Jesus' crucifixion, an event only described in Matthew. Dr. Licona believes that it is best interpreted as apocalyptic imagery rather than as a historical event. Where is the controversy you may be asking? Indeed, when I first heard about this I asked the very same question. It seems as if Norman Geisler, whom I had never even so much as heard of prior to this 'debacle,' has taken issue with his interpretation, not because it is wrong but because it is "against inerrancy." I kid you not.

Now, I do not hold to Biblical Inerrancy, nor do I hold to Divine Inspiration or even Sola Scriptura. These are all infantile doctrines that have no place in a serious-minded Christian's theology, as they serve to undermine Christ's authority as God's sole revelation to humanity. They are not affirmed by scripture, nor are they necessary. Yet, I fundamentally disagree with Geisler. How does one's interpretation of scripture determine whether the Bible is inerrant? If Dr. Licona is correct, and the resurrection of saints was intended as apocalyptic rather than historical, how does this count as an error in any way? The issue is whether or not Dr. Licona is correct or not and, since I am personally friends with Licona's son-in-law Nick Peters and thus am in a position to know, I can tell you that Dr. Licona is the kind of man to accept correction with humility. Geisler would need to show that Licona's interpretation is erroneous.

However, this is not what Geisler has done. Instead, he has thrown a temper tantrum and resorted to the worst kinds of childish tactics. Not only has he consistently attacked Dr. Licona, repeatedly, but has now tried to poison the well against Dr. Licona by taking snippets of Licona's book where the word 'myth' (amongst others) is used and then presented them as if there were all from Licona's pen when in actual fact Licona is merely considering the hypotheses of others. Indeed, one such example comes from a footnote quoting somebody else! This is truly deplorable, and demonstrably un-Christian. Now, not being beleaguered by insufferably sub-Biblical doctrines derived from the still-born Reformation, I personally have no problem with accepting either interpretation. The interesting thing, however, is that a number of Licona's fellow Inerrantists have come out in support of him, even if they disagree with his interpretation. For example, William Lane Craig entertained this interpretation in a podcast back in 2008, and continues to defend Dr. Licona, as does Paul Copan, Daniel Wallace, JP Holding, et al.

One issue that I would also like to raise is that how one interprets this passage does not affect whether the Bible is inerrant or not and to suggest otherwise is perhaps the most prolific example of overweening stupidity and ignorance possible for any human being to articulate whilst simultaneously knowing how to function in human society. In order to deny inerrancy, then one has to suggest that the Bible could feasibly contain errors. Yet Licona is not suggesting this at all, he is suggesting that we have interpreted Matthew's intentions incorrectly. Geisler, it seems, is putting his personal interpretation of scripture on par with scripture itself. Something that I find deliciously ironic considering Geisler, as a fundamentalist 'evangelical' protestant, presumably holds to sola scriptura and all that other rubbish.

Now, Biblical Inerrancy and Divine Inspiration are inherently problematic for me. The general explanation is that God's Holy Spirit indwelt within the Apostles and miraculously caused them to write down exactly what God wanted. This raises a good number of major problems:
1. The Holy Spirit indwells in all Christians; those whom accept Jesus and follow His commands. As such, why were the Apostles inerrant in what they pontificated upon and regular Christians not?
2. Such overriding of the Apostles' free wills fits Calvinism, but not the Biblical description of Divine Providence.
3. Even if we accept Calvinism (as jarringly un-Biblical as it is), then we are still at a loss to explain why God allows some to be Inerrant, but not others (in the same way we are at a loss to explain why God chooses some to be saved and other to be damned under a Calvinist framework.)
4. The Apostles disagreed with each other. For example, the disagreement between Peter and Paul, which is recorded in scripture itself. If the Apostle's Gospel accounts were inerrant, then why aren't their other pontifications inerrant also?

It is much easier to believe what the Bible actually teaches: namely that God's Word (God the Son) became incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ of Nazareth and that God, being omniscient, chose the right time and place to become incarnate so that His message of salvation could be written down as accurately as humanly possible and that if there are any errors, they are tiny ones that do not affect His message whatsoever. I personally think no such errors have ever actually come to light, since I don't think any actually exist. I just don't hold to the incredibly naive belief that it is completely without error just because it is the Bible. Now, a stupid person might ask what basis we have for this if we deny inerrancy. Simple, the evidence. I believe what I believe based on evidence and experience. There is mountains of evidence for the general reliability of the Gospels, and I have experienced God. There is mountains of evidence that the resurrection occurred as a historical event. I do not do what Geisler does and blindly accept these things a priori just because I was bought up believing those things.

Geisler, in creating this controversy where no controversy existed, has handed the enemies of Christianity a powerful weapon. His conduct is uncharitable, and more seriously un-Christian. Dr. Licona is universally recognised as a foremost Christian Apologist and New Testament scholar whose work is both valued and well-received. Norman Geisler's legacy is denouncing such a well-renowned scholar as "denying inerrancy" simply for disagreeing with his personal interpretation of scripture. Matthew 7:15-16 says: "Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves. By their fruit you will recognize them. Do people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs from thistles?" I recognise Geisler's fruits as being thoroughly rotten to the core.

Kalam and Cosmology

An important part of Kalam are the scientific facts supporting premise 2. Now, whilst I agree that an actual infinite number of things is impossible, I do not see why something cannot exist for an infinite period of time. I am personally leaning towards Craig's notion of God being eternal (and thus atemporal) sans the universe, and temporal since creation, but am as of yet undecided. However, I wanted to look at the scientific evidence for premise 2. The two pieces of scientific evidence that can be used to infer that the universe began to exist are: the expansion of the universe and the second law of thermodynamics. Regarding expansion, two theorems are cited, the Hawking-Penrose Singularity Theorem(s) and the Borde-Guth-Vilinken theorem.

As it stands, there are five exceptions to the Hawking-Penrose theorem:
1. Closed time-like curves.
2. Strong energy condition violated (eternal inflation.)
3. Quantum Gravity models.
4. Generic energy condition violated ("exotic" spacetime.)
5. No closed trapped surface in our past.

Of these, number 4 and 5 are not expected to be part of "reasonable" physical models of the universe.

Closed Time-like Curves
A Closed Time-like Curve is essentially where time is "closed." What this means is that if time were represented as a drawing, rather than being a straight line, it loops back on itself, thus returning to the starting point. As a physical reality, CTCs are "time-machines" whereby the universe is not cylical, but that it returns back to its original starting point, in essence "creating itself." This is a model proposed by J. Richard Gott and Li-Xin Li, whereby the universe's timeline loops back upon itself to "become it's own mother." In other words, the SAME big bang is occuring over and over again, rather than a series of different big bangs and big crunches. So, you can think of a CTC very much like a time-machine.

Of course, there is pretty serious physical problem with this model as it violates the Chronology Protection Conjecture. Gott and Li state that CTCs should exist in a pure vacuum state, with no real particles, Hawking radiation, or bubbles because this stray radiation would destroy the CTC. The reason for this is because the radiation would build up to infinity, producing infinite spacetime curvature and destroying the CTC. This is described by Kip Thorne using the following example:

"Imagine that Carole is zooming back to Earth with one wormhole mouth in her spacecraft, and I am sitting at home on Earth with the other. When the spacecraft gets to within 10 light- years of Earth, it suddenly becomes possible for radiation (electromagnetic waves) to use the wormhole for time travel: any random bit of radiation that leaves our home in Pasadena traveling at the speed of light toward the spacecraft can arrive at the spacecraft after 10 years’ time (as seen on Earth), enter the wormhole mouth there, travel back in time by 10 years (as seen on Earth), and emerge from the mouth on Earth at precisely the same moment as it started its trip. The radiation piles right on top of its previous self, not just in space but in spacetime, doubling its strength. What’s more, during the trip each quantum of radiation (each photon) got boosted in energy due to the relative motion of the wormhole mouths (a “Doppler- shift” boost)."

The radiation keeps piling on top of itself, over and over again with Doppler-boosted energy making an infinitely strong beam of radiation. This beam would then produce a singularity, thereby (probably) destroying the wormhole and preventing a time-machine from ever existing. Gott and Li, however, are aware of this problem and have proposed the following solution. They have proposed a special zero-temperature empty space, called an "adapted Rindler vacuum" as a special initial state for the universe. However, such a move has produced further problems, indicated by William Hiscock and D.H. Coule, et al.. The first problem is that their choice of initial conditions are incredibly finely-tuned. Coule notes that the Gott-Li model is only possible in Misner space with identification scale b = 2p, or b = 2pr0 for the multiple de Sitter case. Not only is this inconsistent with Quantum uncertainty, but this parameter is not a constant but liable to change dynamically. When it does change, the CTC destabilises. Secondly, given more realistic physical force fields, such a vacuum is also unstable.

Eternal Inflation
The second exception are inflation models, such as chaotic inflation. Cosmic inflation was proposed to solve a number of problems that otherwise pervaded the standard model. For example, the horizon, flatness, and cosmic relic problems. Alan Guth's proposal was that the universe underwent a period of exponential super-rapid expansion. Inflationary theory is now generally well-accepted. However, inflationary theory has led to inflationary models of how the universe came to be, such as Andrei Linde's chaotic inflation model. In this model, the big-bang is just a regional event within a multiverse of expanding bubbles, with each bubble giving rise to even more expanding regions, and so on ad infinitum. However, a theorem produced by Guth, along with Arvin Borde and Alexander Vilenkin states that such an inflating universe must have had a beginning. They explain:

"Our argument shows that null and time-like geodesics are, in general, past-incomplete in inflationary models, whether or not energy conditions hold, provided only that the averaged expansion condition Hav > 0 holds along these past-directed geodesics. A remarkable thing about this theorem is its sweeping generality. We made no assumptions about the material content of the universe. We did not even assume that gravity is described by Einstein’s equations. So, if Einstein’s gravity requires some modification, our conclusion will still hold. The only assumption that we made was that the expansion rate of the universe never gets below some nonzero value, no matter how small. This assumption should certainly be satisfied in the inflating false vacuum. The conclusion is that past-eternal inflation without a beginning is impossible."

Interestingly enough, it has also been argued that eternal inflation cannot be future eternal either: http://arxiv.org/abs/1106.3542. Of course, as with the Hawking-Penrose theorem, there are exceptions to the Borde-Guthe-Vilenkin theorem:
1. Infinite contraction (such as de Sitter cosmology.)
2. Asymptotically static models.
3. Infinite cyclicity (such as the Baum-Frampton model, or Penrose's CCC.)
4. Time reversal at singularity (Aguirre-Gratton model.)

Infinite Contraction
This is where a spatially infinite universe contracts down to a singularity and then "bounces" into our present expansion. Therefore, the universe would not be, on average, in a state of cosmic expansion since the contraction phase 'cancels it out.' This is problematic for several reasons. Not only do the initial conditions have to be extremely fine-tuned, the collapse phase is so unstable as to require an additional level of fine-tuning so that it will be able to the collapse can turn around back into an expansion. Otherwise, a certain phenomenon known as "BKL chaos" occurs, which prevents such a bounce occurring. This requires an extraordinary amount of fine-tuning.

Asymptotically Static Space-time
An asymptotically static space is one in which the average expansion rate of the universe over its history is equal to zero, since the expansion rate of the universe “at” infinity is zero. Hence, the universe, perhaps in the asymptotic past, is in a static state neither expanding nor contracting. However, we know from observation that the universe has indeed been expanding, so how can it be said to have an average expansion of zero throughout it's history? William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair offer the following example:

"Would not the average expansion rate have to be greater than zero? No, not when we include “infinity” in the average. Consider an analogy in which the local government decides that, henceforth, everyone will pay property taxes according to the average value of property (per acre) in the county instead of on one’s individual assessment. This might be good or bad for you, depending on whether you live in the high end district. But suppose that your county suddenly expanded to include the Sahara Desert. The Sahara is worthless and big, hence the average value of property, by the square mile, dives precipitously. Further, the larger the Sahara is, the closer to zero one’s property taxes will be. In the limit as the Sahara grows to infinite size, one’s property taxes will go to zero. In a similar way, a zero expansion condition at infinity would have the same impact on the average expansion rate."

Ellis, et al. propose that the universe initially existed in such a state (known as an Einstein Static State) and transformed into the universe we see today via an inflationary phase. However, such a model is not past eternal either. How such an ESS is unstable. Small fluctuations in the size of the universe are inevitable (given Quantum Theory) and thus such a state cannot remain in balance for an infinite time. Secondly, the observable universe is NOT static, and the required mechanism to force such a transition between an ESS and our own universe (either a quantum or thermal fluctuation) implies that this initial ESS is not infinite. If you utilise the low-energy solution of loop quantum gravity, then this protects against perturbations of a limited size, however smaller perturbations would eventually build up leading to the creation of a universe such as ours. In other words, we can again infer the finitude of the ESS based upon the mechanism that gets us from the ESS to our current universe.

Cyclic Models
Cyclic models are those that postulate that our big bang is but one in an infinite cycle of big-bangs and crunches. In this respect, our universe never begins to exist; or rather, our big bang is A beginning rather than THE beginning. The overwhelming problem for such models lies in the second law of thermodynamics, as for every cycle, entropy increases. In other words, only a finite number of cycles are possible until the universe reaches a state of maximum entropy and suffers heat death. In recent years, there have been serious efforts to revitalise such models with the Baum-Frampton model and (even more recently) the Penrose Conformal Cyclic Cosmology. Paul Frampton and Lauris Baum propose that phantom energy, a type of dark energy with an equation of state (the ratio between pressure and energy density) less than -1, pervades the universe. This leads to a type of expansion that typically is thought to lead to a Big Rip. However, Baum and Framptom propose that, very close to the Big Rip event, the universe splits into noninteracting and causally disconnected patches. Most of these patches only contain phantom energy and are devoid of normal matter and radiation. The entropy content of the universe is contained in the patches containing thinly spread out particles and radiation. The patches only containing phantom energy then contract by an amount exactly equal to the expansion the universe underwent since the Big Bang. Prior to reaching a singularity, the contracting patches then "bounce" into another expansion phase. The process then repeats, with each patch fractioning into more baby universes with each cycle.

The problems with such a model, however, are legion. First, in order to avoid the BVG theorem, the average contraction for every geodesic must equal exactly the average expansion, but this is again something that would require extraordinary amounts of fine-tuning. The second problem is how exactly the various patches remain causally disconnected. Given infinite past time, an infinite amount of matter and radiation would have been produced, and the model avoids infinite entropy by removing it to different patches. However, simply shoving the entropy into other patches raises the question of whether or not, given infinite time and a countable infinity of patches, that these patches must eventually collide. The causal disconnection mechanism that occurs in lieu of the Big Rip does not work because the disconnected patches do come back into causal contact. After all, causal horizons are not real physical barriers. Thirdly, certain factors would prevent a singular bounce. Contracting space filled with quantum fields will have a certain "ergodic" property as it shrinks. The fields will become excited and produce chaotic fluctuations which will prevent cycling as spontaneously created matter with a different equation of state will dominate the energy field. Lastly, these inhomogeneous fluctuations would result in the appearance of a fluid of black holes leading to a "Black Crunch."

A second cylic model is Roger Penrose's Conformal Cyclic Cosmology. Penrose suggests that the initial "singularity" is, in reality, the same thing as the open ended de-Sitter like expansion which our universe seems about to experience. However, the main problem with such an equivalence is that the entropy of the initial state of the universe is vanishingly small, whereas the entropy of the de-Sitter like end state is maximized. Penrose, however, has opted to invoke a non-unitary loss of information at black holes in order to equalise this entropy. However, this approach does not succeed as information is not lost to black holes. Lastly, Penrose has recently claimed observational support of concentric rings of low variance in the CMB data provided by the WMAP. However, two papers have been published both of which were unable to replicate Penrose's results:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1012.1268
and
http://arxiv.org/abs/1012.1305

Time-Deconstruction
A fourth way to avoid the BGV theorem where the arrow of time reverses at the t = -infinity hypersurface so that the universe expands into both halves of the full de-Sitter space. It is possible, then, to evade the theorem through a gross deconstruction of the notion of time. Suppose one asserts that in the past contracting phase the direction of time is reversed. Time then flows in both directions away from the singularity. However, this model denies the evolutionary continuity of the universe which is topologically prior to t and our universe. The other side of the de Sitter space is not our past. For the moments of that time are not earlier than t or any of the moments later than t in our universe. There is no connection or temporal relation whatsoever of our universe to that other reality. Efforts to de-construct time thus fundamentally reject the evolutionary paradigm.

Quantum Gravity Models
The final exception to the Hawking-Penrose theorem are Quantum Gravity models. The Hawking-Penrose singularity theorem is based on General Relativity, but GR breaks down when we get to the very small. Thus, a Quantum description of Gravity is required to explain the earliest phases of the universe where GR breaks down. Quantum Gravity Models can be categorised into three groups:
1. String models (such as the Veneziano-Gasperini Pre-Big Bang inflation model and the Steinhardt-Turok Ekpyrotic Cyclic model.)
2. Loop quantum models (such as Bojowald, et al.'s cyclic LQG model, and Ellis et al.'s asymptotically static model.)
3. Semiclassical models (such as Vilenkin's Quantum Tunnelling model and the Hartle-Hawking No Boundary model.)

String Scenarios
String theory is probably the most popular area within Quantum Gravity, and perhaps the most well-known publicly. String theory postulates that the most fundamental elementary particles are tiny 1-dimensional vibrating strings and postulated a minimum size known as the planck length. This area of research has opened up a wide new range of ideas, and is a very fruitful area of research. As such, there are currently two string models that seek to describe a past-infinite pre-Big Bang era, the pre-Big Bang scenario of Gabriele Veneziano and Maurizio Gasperini, and the Ekpryotic Cyclic model of Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok.

Pre-Big Bang Inflation
This model postulates a pre-Big Bang state much like our post-Big Bang state. Since our state is eternal into the future, the previous state was eternal into the past. Whereas our state will develop into a nearly empty, widely dispersed collection of thin gas and radiation, this is what the previous state was developing from. Through gravitational contraction, regions of the pre-Big Bang universe turned into black holes and, due to quantum effects, once the black holes have reached a certain critical density, they undergo a "bounce" into a big bang. However, Veneziano suggests that this beginning is infinitely distant and never reachable. If this is to be interpreted realistically, then one might ask how we ever arrived at the present if this is the case. However, the models does have an initial phase:
(1) a static (Milne) universe, or string perturbative vacuum (SPV) phase, which is then followed by...
(2) a quasi-Milne phase, which is a "perturbed" SPV.
(3) an inflationary phase.
(4) a Post-Big Bang FRW phase typical of the standard big bang model.

The SPV is unstable, which is why it is not eternally static but leads to the following phases, meaning that it must be finite in the past.

Ekpyrotic Cyclic Scenario
The Ekpyrotic Cyclic Scenario is one that postulates a higher-dimensionality. That is to say, in this model, our universe exists within a brane, and these branes collide. Our big bang and subsequent expansion was caused when our brane collided with another. Eventually, our universe is subject to heat death death and then another big bang is started by the next collision. But has such a model been cycling forever? Steinhardt and Turok suggest that the universe began in a singularity but that it has been cycling forever. The Ehpyrotic scenario successfully evades the BKL chaos, but such a model is not an exception to the BGV theorem, and so requires a beginning. Borde, Guthe, and Vilenkin apply their theorem even to higher dimensional cosmologies such as the Steinhardt-Turok model and so this is does not avert a beginning.

Loop Quantum Gravity
Loop Quantum Gravity takes the view that space-time is quantised, in other words, divided into discrete constituent parts. As with string theory, there is a minimum size in nature that prevents infinite singularities from occurring. It is important to note that Bojowald, et al. are not committed a model with an infinite past, so falsifying an infinite cycle would not necessary falsify LQG per se. However, our focus here is whether or not LQG can really be infinite.

There are two problems that the LQG model must overcome and that is:
(1) there is no known physical mechanism for producing a cyclic "bounce."
(2) thermodynamic considerations show that the universe of this present day should have reached thermodynamic equilibrium (aka 'heat death.')

Martin Bojowald, the foremost exponent and defender of LQG today believes he has solutions to both of these. With regards to the first problem the major issue is overcoming the aforementioned BKL chaos. This chaos has shown to be calmed by a LQG approach. However, the second problem is far more challenging. How can there be truly cyclic behaviour when the second law of thermodynamics predicts that entropy increases from cycle to cycle? Using a semi-classical approach, the end of out current cycle should differ in entropy from the beginning by a factor of 10^22. Given no energy input, how can such an outcome be avoided? There are three proposed solutions to this:
1. The problem is epistemic only.
2. Our current classical understanding of entropy is misleading.
3. Cycle by cycle, the entropy state is genuinely reversible.

Regarding the first solution, Bojowald proposes that there is a large, unobservable part of the initial singularity that is genuine generic manifold, which is a state of maximum entropy featuring random inhomogeneity and anisotropy. The entropy of the initial and final singularities would be similar and an inflation mechanism of a small patch of this manifold would then produce the requisite homogeneity and isotropy. However, it is exceedingly improbable to find ourselves as the product of an inflationary event of a generic manifold. We should be seeing a universe roughly 1/10th the size of our own if it were the case as it is exceedingly improbable for a universe of our size to arise from such an event. The second, bigger, problem is that this epistemic account takes no account of entropy generation during the cycle, and over infinite time it would build up. The same thing goes for the second solution. Even if the classical approach to entropy is misleading, the quantum approach would still recognise entropy build up. Therefore, the only remaining option is that LQG would need to be fully reversible but, as Bojowald admits, the jury is still out. In addition to the entropy issue, however, is the issue of dark energy. If dark energy is the form of a cosmological constant, then it would have led to open-ended expansion the first time. However, if dark energy takes the form of quintessence it is possible that there could be reverse consistent with a collapse phase, but this leads to a new problem. Different modes of the matter field would become excited such that the next bounce would differ from the preceding one, and so one particular cycle can lead to open-ended expansion. It would eventually reach open-ended expansion, and so cannot be infinite.

Semi-classical Inflation
Semi-classical models refer to models that attempt to explain how inflation got started quantum-mechanically. In such models, the universe is treated quantum mechanically and thus described by a wave function rather by classical space-time. The two major examples of such attempts come to us from none other than Alexander Vilenkin himself, who utilised a quantum tunnelling model, and from James Hartle and the famed Stephen Hawking. These models are interesting in that they describe the universe quantum mechanically, but our universe DOES have a beginning. How then do they overcome the problem of origins?

Vilenkin's Quantum Tunnelling Model
Alexander Vilenkin, one of three authors of the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, describes his approach thus:

"Many people suspected that in order to understand what actually happened in the beginning, we should treat the universe quantum-mechanically and describe it by a wave function rather than by a classical spacetime. This quantum approach to cosmology was initiated by DeWitt and Misner, and after a somewhat slow start received wide recognition in the last two decades or so. The picture that has emerged from this line of development is that a small closed universe can spontaneously nucleate out of nothing, where by ‘nothing’ I mean a state with no classical space and time. The cosmological wave function can be used to calculate the probability dis- tribution for the initial configurations of the nucleating universes. Once the universe nucleates, it is expected to go through a period of inflation, driven by the energy of a false vacuum. The vacuum energy is eventually thermalized, inflation ends, and from then on the universe follows the standard hot cosmological scenario."

Vilenkin uses an analogy of a particle that quantum tunnels through a potential well. An ordinary FRW universe classically does not have enough energy to escape into an open-ended expansion. However, in Quantum Mechanics, there is a probability that instead of recollapse, the universe will tunnel through the energy barrier and lead into an inflationary phase. Vilenkin's solution is that our universe arised from a state of null topology; a small, closed, spherical, and metastable universe. However, such a state has only existed, and in fact can only have existed for a finite amount of time, so whilst Vilenkin's model solves the problem of creation of OUR universe, it one-ups the problem. The universe clearly has a beginning in this approach.

Hartle-Hawking No Boundary Model
A similar approach us utilised by Stephen Hawking and James Hartle. They opt for Richard Feynman's approach to QM by seeking to find the probability for a certain final quantum state by a path integral "sum over histories." This is a superposition of states where every possible universe history is part of the wave function and each possible state has an associated probability of becoming actual. They estimate the subset of universes that are expected to dominate the calculations. They describe the earliest state that the universe emerges from as a Euclidian metric, which removes the initial singularity.

These models more or less take the same approach. Vilenkin notes:

"I understand that a universe of zero radius is not necessarily the same thing as no universe at all. But mathematically my quantum tunneling from nothing is described by the same “shuttle- cock” geometry as Hartle and Hawking [NB Figure 3.21]. (In fact, the shuttlecock first appeared in my 1982 paper.) This geometry is certainly not past-eternal, and there is no point on the Euclidean sphere which you can identify as the initial universe of zero size. So, if the Hartle- Hawking approach avoids the “paradoxes of creation”, I don’t see why my mine doesn’t."

Whilst the authors of these models might think otherwise, there are a number of factors why such a state prior to the universe is itself finite. Gott and Li offer a number of critique of these semi-classical approaches (which ironically also serve to undercut their preferred CTC model) and show that such a prior state is not past eternal.

(1) Transitions in QM are always between allowed classical states (Vilenkin and Hartle–Hawking’s approach has a transition from a classically forbidden region to a classically allowed region).
(2) The Vilenkin and Hartle–Hawking approaches should contain realistic energy fields (something closer to what we actually see in nature). If they did, then Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle would require that the initial state of their models have a finite and nonzero energy. It that is the case, then semi-classical quantum models actually start in a classically allowed metastable state, rather than “nothing.”

The semi-classical quantum gravity approaches of Vilenkin, Hartle, and Hawking ironically posit a universe that began to exist. A fact that is either not realised or glossed over. Probably a bit of both, considering physicists aren't philosophers (which Stephen Hawking's book The Grand Design makes abundantly clear.) So, yes, there are exceptions to both theorems, however either the exceptions are not viable, or there is another condition that requires a beginning.

Criticising William Lane Craig

William Lane Craig is probably today's foremost defender of Christian theism, and definitely one of the most well-known Christian philosopher and theologian. As such, he has come under considerable attack from atheists. Now, I have defended Dr. Craig consistently, and will continue to do so. However, some have accused me of being uncritical of Dr. Craig, of following everything he says and spouting "Craigisms." Oh really? Well, unfortunately for these Dawkinsian automatons, I don't. I am critical of Dr. Craig, when I think he is actually wrong. Let's consider a few points now.

1. His style of presentation.
I agree with Peter Hitchen's assessment that Craig's manner of presentation is "too American." As much as I admire Dr. Craig and his work, and whilst I enjoy listening to him speak, in debates he tends to try and pack as many points into as tight a space as possible. I don't think this is necessarily a bad thing, however. My primary criticism is that this style opens Dr. Craig up to the attack that he is using the "Gish Gallop" style of debate. That he is trying to bog down his opponent with as many points as possible. Now, such an attack is an ad hominem, and thus invalid, but stupid, uncritically minded people would think this a salient point. I think it would be better if Craig focused on a smaller number of arguments in debates, rather than try and fire off as many as he can and then just stick to the one's his opponents address. Now, a skilled opponent would be able to keep up, but, let's face it, not every great thinker is always a great speaker.

2. Burden of Proof
Dr. Craig quite rightly points out that whilst theists have the burden of proof to show that God exists, atheists have an equal burden to show that God does not exist. However, my chief criticism is Dr. Craig's seemingly pedantic insistence that his opponent "tear down" all his arguments and then erect their own. In writing, this is a perfectly reasonable demand, but I think in an oral debate, such a request seems a bit too much, unless the opponent is skilled enough of a debater, and again opens Dr. Craig up to the ad hominem attack mentioned above.

3. The Witness of the Holy Spirit and Proper Basicality
I agree that it is the witness of the Holy Spirit that ultimately converts a person to Christ or not. However, I do not think this is an argument for the existence of God. Now, whilst Craig notes that this is not an argument from the existence of God, I do not think that he is clear enough, and sometimes it sounds like he is speaking as if it is an argument. The personal religious experience of human beings is meant to show that belief in God is "properly basic." That is to say, that there are no de jure arguments against theism, only de facto objections. This may be an important qualifier, but it is not an argument FOR God, and I think Craig needs to be a lot clearer about this.

3. Divine Command Theory and the Moral Argument
I don't think Craig's divine command theory or moral argument are sound. Now, as part of a cumulative case for the existence of God, Craig's moral argument is fine, but as a stand alone argument it does not work. Now, I agree with Craig on each premise. If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist. Objective moral values and duties exist. So, why do I think this isn't a good argument? Because I don't see how it can be demonstrated that objective moral values and duties exist without first showing that God exists. My agreeing that they exist is not an argument. I could be wrong, however unlikely that might seem. Craig could be wrong. We could all be wrong! How do we know that moral values and duties are truly objective? After all, the argument that our moral beliefs are illusory could be true! There could be no moral values and duties at all! I do not think that this is true, but that is only because I already have good reasons for believing in God. Thus, the moral argument's purpose is only to show that objective morality is dependent on God, not that God actually exists.

Moving on to Craig's divine command theory, I agree with Craig that the good is grounded in God's nature. However, I think that this idea is underdeveloped. Whilst I agree that being good is simply to be obedient to God, that is only because I believe God is actually good. If God were evil, then He would not be worthy to be obeyed or worshipped, no matter how powerful all knowledgeable he is. Now, I have no trouble admitting that God orders something only if it is good. Atheists and theists alike think this is problematic for it implies a standard of goodness apart from God. I don't see how this is so. It is my contention that this standard of goodness exists only if a good God exists. To understand why I think this is so, it is important to understand what I think goodness is based upon. When we moralise, we assume that our lives have intrinsic worth. When we do something that devalues this worth, it is morally wrong. So, if I were to walk up to someone and punch them in the face because I enjoyed punching people in the face, that would be morally wrong, because I am not treating that person as if their life has any intrinsic value. So, now why do I think this standard of goodness is dependent on a good God? Well, for the simple reason that without a moral lawgiver, we don't have any reason whatsoever to actually follow this standard of goodness. However, even more important than this, if a good God does not exist, then our lives have no intrinsic value. Now, these points can of course be debated. I am merely just describing where I disagree with Craig and elucidating my own views.

4. Jesus' Dishonourable Burial
In a 2004 article that Craig wrote for the Expositor Times, he addressed an essay by one Byron McCane, titled "Where No One Had Yet Been Lain: The Shame of Jesus' Burial" which can be found in "Authenticating the Activities of Jesus" by B.D. Chilton and C.A. Evans (eds.) I shall summarise McCane's case, with quotations and then mention the points bought up by Craig and offer a response to them. The central premises of McCane's article are:
• The processes of burial and mourning were meant to honour the dead and the denial of these honours was a further dishonour.
• Based on Jewish custom, the Jewish leadership in Jesus’ day would have wanted Jesus buried, not left on the cross.

"Ordinarily, death is an event which disrupts the functioning social order, for the death of any particular individual tears away a member of a social network and forces the network to reconstitute itself. Death rituals – i.e., burial customs and rites of mourning – are social processes which the wounds which death inflicts on the social group. By burying the dead and mourning their absence, members of a society affirm that someone significant had been lost. When the Romans did not permit the burial of crucifixion victims, then, they were doing more than merely showing off the power of Rome: they were also declaring that the deaths of these victims were not a loss to Roman society. Far from it, the deaths of condemned criminals actually served to strengthen and preserve Rome, protecting and defending the social order of the Empire." - Byron McCane, Where No One Had Yet Been Lane: The Shame of Jesus' Burial, from B.D. Chilton, and C.A. Evans, eds., Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, Brill, (1998), p433

"For Jews, one of those values was the importance of belonging to an extended family group. The foundational narrative for Jewish culture was a story about a man whose descendents were to be more numerous than the starts in the sky, and respect for the family was enshrined in the moral charter of Judaism: “honor your father and mother.” Jews in Jesus’ day typically lived in extended family groups, and routinely identified themselves in legal documents, inscriptions, and literature as “X, son (or daughter) of Y.” At life’s end, they thought it best to be buried with their nearest kin. To be buried away from the family tomb – by design, not by fate – was to be cast adrift from these cultural patterns, and dislodged from a place in the family. To be unmourned by one’s nearest relatives was to be effaced from the cultural landscape. It was worse than unfortunate, it was a shame." - Byron McCane, Where No One Had Yet Been Lane: The Shame of Jesus' Burial, from B.D. Chilton, and C.A. Evans, eds., Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, Brill, (1998), p444

Whilst it was customary to leave crucifixion victims on their crosses to be eaten birds, sometimes the Romans did allow them to be buried, and since it was prohibited in Judaism to leave a man hanging on a tree, then it makes sense that the Jewish authorities would have petitioned to bury Jesus. Burying Jesus away from the family tomb was their way of dishonouring Jesus themselves, and was not against the precepts of Judaism. Furthermore, the admission in the Gospels narratives that Joseph of Arimathea, a member of the Sanhedrin, buried Jesus rather than His family or disciples, is another extremely embarrassing feature of the Gospel story. A dishonourable burial coupled with the fact a member of the Sanhedrin burying Jesus would have been very shameful for the early Christians to admit.

Let's look at Craig's points. Now, and this is a point some others have made, I think Craig's main fault here is that he simply doesn't take seriously or doesn't fully understand the social-cultural background here. 1st century Jews, Greeks, and Romans all live in societies that operated on an honour-shame oriented collectivist cultural setting. Furthermore, their understanding of honour and shame was radically different to our own. The closest parallel would be Japanese culture, for instance where warriors would commit Seppuku (ritual self-disembowelment) if they faced capture in battle (dying in battle was considered more honourable than allowing oneself to be caught by the enemy) or as a means of capital punishment if said Samurai had committed a major offence, thus bringing a major amount of shame to the community. So, when Craig says that simply being buried away from the family tomb isn't a dishonourable burial, I think that Craig is simply pre-supossing a modern view of honour onto ancient people. You have to remember, in the 1st century, societies were collectivist (or agonistic) cultures. The family unit was of fundamental importance, and the collective society as a whole superseded individualism.

What then of Craig's others points? These I think are better although similarly miss the mark. He notes that Jesus died in Jerusalem, and that surely people regularly died away from their family location. Yes and no. Yes, Jesus died in Jerusalem, and others surely did die away from their family location. However, the overwhelming majority of people tended to stay with their families. Secondly, it was the duty of the family to retrieve the remains of their deceased and give them a proper burial. He points out that poor people could not have afforded a family tomb. This is also true, but irrelevant. The poor were frequently subjected to dishonour at the hands of the wealthy and elite. That was their place in life, and something that they simply tolerated. Being poor was considered shameful.

One further point Craig makes is that the language used doesn't seem dishonourable. He argues that the treatment of Jesus' body by Joseph of Arimathea is honourable, not dishonourable. This is actually true, from the description given, Joseph treats Jesus' body with respect. However, this would not have been enough to mitigate the dishonour of either Jesus' crucifixion or his burial. This does not change that being buried away from the family tomb and lack of mourning rites WERE dishonourable to these people.

5. Biblical infallibility and the Old Testament Conquest
When discussing the Old Testament, one issue that is bought up is the slaughter of the Canaanites. One of his responses was to say that, at worst, the OT is fallible. Either it didn't happen, or God did not really command it. I agree that these are possibilities, but I think Craig should explore these ideas further. Presumably, he is forbidden from actually denouncing inerrancy, since Talbot requires its faculties to agree to inerrancy, and so keeps shtum, lest he loses his job. These leads to one gripe I have with most of Christianity as a whole. Why do people think inerrancy is necessary? I admire Craig for even hinting that the Bible could be fallible, (and I know of Christians who are inerrantists, such as JP Holding and Michael Licona), who freely admit that such beliefs are not necessary to Christianity. Now, I wanted to discuss Craig's other responses to the OT conquests. Whilst I agree that it was not really a genocide or even a conquest, but a driving out, and that the Canaanites were truly evil, I don't think his suggestion that it really happened was rather convincing. Now, I agree that children who die too young ostensibly go to heaven, and that even those who die without ever knowing Jesus might somehow be allowed into heaven providing certain conditions are true, however, why think God when then take a "Kill them all, I know my own, attitude?" God has the authority to take life, granted, but such a command seems to me malicious. The parents were evil, yes, but why kill innocents along with? The simple answer to this is that there was no such command. Some children would have been killed, but only if they were "of age" so to speak. The truly young would have been spared, and this can be inferred from the linguistic not to mention the socio-cultural context. In order for Craig to show that God was moral to command the Israelites to kill innocent children, he seriously needs to develop this idea more. I think that it isn't moral, although I could be wrong, no matter how unlikely I think it is.

6. Craig's stance on evolution and Intelligent Design.
Whilst I am aware of Craig's view on evolutionary theory and biology, and even agree with it (at least partially), I think he is a little too unclear on this. Whilst he freely admits to not being a creationist, and that he accepts the age of the earth and the age of the universe estimates provided by scientists, his statements on evolution are often vague and apt to be misinterpreted. For instance, he often says that macroevolution is a leap in logic. I initially thought he was making the classic micro/macro error, but it turns out that his criticism here was that he didn't think the current proposed mechanisms in evolution were enough to sufficiently demonstrate the reality of large scale or "macro" evolution. This is fare less controversial, and even something I potentially agree with. Whilst I see no difference between micro and macroevolution, it is possible, and I think it might even actually be true that scientists haven't provided a full account of how evolution has occurred. Craig thinks new mechanisms are required to explain macroevolution (although I am unsure if he actually believes macroevolution HAS actually occurred. Again, my chief criticism here is that is a little unclear, although, again, it could be simply down to Talbot's "statement of faith" that Craig has to agree to in order to work there (not to mention various societies he is a member of.) In which case, this is more a fault with the narrow-minded and dogmatic views of certain Christians.

Now, I have admitted where and why I disagree with Craig, but note how I have not once called him names, suggested he is dishonest (etc.) or implied anything derogatory or defamatory about him.