Friday, 20 October 2023

Why There Almost Certainly Is A God: Part IV: The Argument From Reason

Today we shall be looking at an argument popularised by CS Lewis, and that is the argument from reason. According to naturalists, everything is the product of blind, unguided processes. This includes the evolutionary processes involved in the forming of our cognitive faculties. This presents the naturalist with a problem, however. Because any process that is blind and unguided isn't rational; it is non-rational. As such, if our cognitive faculties are the product of non-rational forces, then this undercuts our trust in the reliability of said cognitive faculties. 

Since, under naturalism, natural processes are blind, unguided, and non-rational, there is no reason to suppose that our cognitive faculties are reliable. Nothing but the rules of nature govern matter, and the brain is composed of matter. No immaterial mind or soul. After all, evolutionary forces only select for survivability, not truth. 

Religious belief, for instance, is widely claimed by naturalists as being a false belief that enhances survivability. So, a belief being selected by evolution is no guarantee of that belief being true. As such, there is no basis for determining which beliefs are true and which beliefs are false. 

Belief in naturalism, therefore, undercuts our trust in our cognitive faculties and, by extension, serves as a defeater for every belief we might have (including belief in naturalism). Therefore, naturalism is a self-defeating belief and so cannot possibly be rational. 

1. If naturalism is true, we have a defeater for any belief that we might hold. 

2. If we have a defeater for any belief that we might hold, we have a defeater for belief in naturalism. 

3. If naturalism is true, we have a defeater for belief in naturalism. 

4. If we have a defeater for belief in naturalism, we are not rational in believing naturalism.

5. Therefore, if naturalism is true, it is not rational to believe in naturalism.

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