Why There Almost Certainly Is A God: Part VI: The Ontological Argument

Today we shall be looking at the last in a series of arguments in favour of the existence of God, and it can be a particularly hard one to grasp so that is why I saved it for last, and that is the Ontological argument for the existence. According to this argument, the mere logical possibility of God's existence entails His actual existence. 

This argument was first devised by Anselm of Canterbury, who phrased the argument in terms of the greatest conceivable being. Today, philosophers utilise the language of 'possible worlds' in their phraseology instead. 

To say that something is possible is to say that there is a possible world where that something is actual. So, if God's existence is logically possible, He exists in some possible world. That should, hopefully, be relatively easy to grasp at this point so far. 

Now, God is, by definition, maximally great and metaphysically necessary. Part of what that entails is necessary existence, which means existing in every possible world. If something that exists in every possible world exists in at least some possible world, then it exists in every possible world and, by extension, the actual world.

So, in other words, God's existence is either logically possible and He therefore exists, or His existence is logically impossible. There is no middle ground. This argument can be summed up as follows: 

1. If it is possible that God exists, then there is some possible world where God exists.

2. If God exists in some possible world, God exists in every possible world. 

3. If God exists in every possible world, then God exists in the actual world. 

4. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists. 

5. It is possible that God exists. 

6. Therefore, God exists.

Why There Almost Certainly Is A God: Part V: The Argument From Consciousness

Today we shall be looking at an argument that centres around the phenomenon of consciousness (hence the name). Consciousness is something that is at once both something intimately familiar to us and yet something that is particularly difficult to explain. It is a feature unique to sufficiently advanced living systems, such as humans. According to the argument from consciousness, consciousness possesses features that are inexplicable if naturalism is true. 

Whilst there may be more examples than this, for the purposes of today's post, we shall just be focusing on two of these: qualia and intentionality. Qualia refers to the subjective, first-person character of conscious experience. Intentionality is the quality of mental states to be about other things. To show how these elements of conscious experience cannot be explained under naturalism, we shall be exploring two sub-arguments: the knowledge argument, and the Chinese Room argument.

The knowledge argument asks us to imagine the following scenario. Suppose there exists a scientist who has, since birth, been locked in a black-and-white room, and their only information of the world outside comes from a black-and-white monitor. Suppose also that they learn all the physical information there is to know about human colour vision. Nevertheless, when the scientist is released and sees objects in colour for the first time, they acquire new information. 

1. The scientist has all the physical information about human colour vision before their release.

2. But there is some information that the scientist lacks before their release.

3. Therefore, not all information is physical information. 

The Chinese-Room argument is somewhat similar. It asks us to imagine a person who is locked in a closed room. They receives slips of paper under the door that contain Chinese symbols, and they possess a rule-book written in their native language explaining what symbols to reply with based on the symbols received. In this setup, the person in the room is manipulating symbols they do not understand according to a set of rules without actually understanding Chinese.

This is meant as a refutation specifically of the notion of strong AI, which is the claim that a sufficiently programmed computer/computer program can understand natural language as well as possessing other mental faculties humans possess. 

1. If Strong AI is true, then the man must gain an understanding of Chinese by following the rule-book. 

2. The man does not gain an understanding of Chinese.

3. Therefore, Strong AI is false.

If naturalism is true, then strong AI must be true. Since Strong AI is false, it likewise follows that naturalism is false. Moving back to the knowledge argument, if naturalism is true, then all information must be physical information. Since not all information is physical information, then naturalism is false. This furnishes us with the following argument against naturalism:

1. If naturalism is true, all mental states must be reducible to physical states.

2. Not all mental states are reducible to physical states.

3. Therefore, naturalism is false.

Why There Almost Certainly Is A God: Part IV: The Argument From Reason

Today we shall be looking at an argument popularised by CS Lewis, and that is the argument from reason. According to naturalists, everything is the product of blind, unguided processes. This includes the evolutionary processes involved in the forming of our cognitive faculties. This presents the naturalist with a problem, however. Because any process that is blind and unguided isn't rational; it is non-rational. As such, if our cognitive faculties are the product of non-rational forces, then this undercuts our trust in the reliability of said cognitive faculties. 

Since, under naturalism, natural processes are blind, unguided, and non-rational, there is no reason to suppose that our cognitive faculties are reliable. Nothing but the rules of nature govern matter, and the brain is composed of matter. No immaterial mind or soul. After all, evolutionary forces only select for survivability, not truth. 

Religious belief, for instance, is widely claimed by naturalists as being a false belief that enhances survivability. So, a belief being selected by evolution is no guarantee of that belief being true. As such, there is no basis for determining which beliefs are true and which beliefs are false. 

Belief in naturalism, therefore, undercuts our trust in our cognitive faculties and, by extension, serves as a defeater for every belief we might have (including belief in naturalism). Therefore, naturalism is a self-defeating belief and so cannot possibly be rational. 

1. If naturalism is true, we have a defeater for any belief that we might hold. 

2. If we have a defeater for any belief that we might hold, we have a defeater for belief in naturalism. 

3. If naturalism is true, we have a defeater for belief in naturalism. 

4. If we have a defeater for belief in naturalism, we are not rational in believing naturalism.

5. Therefore, if naturalism is true, it is not rational to believe in naturalism.

Why There Almost Certainly Is A God: Part III: The Axiological Argument

Today we shall be focusing on things that more strictly philosophical, and that is the axiological argument. Also known as the moral argument. According to this argument, if objective moral values and duties do not exist, then God likewise does not exist. However, we can observe that there are objective moral values and duties in the world. Therefore, we can conclude that God exists. 

1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.

2. Objective moral values and duties exist.

3. Therefore, God exists. 

In order for moral values and duties to be objective, they have to be true independent of what we actually believe. For instance, suppose we lived in a world where the Nazis won the second World War, and virtually everyone accepted that the Holocaust was morally good. If moral values and duties are objective, then it would the Holocaust would still be evil, even if everybody believed otherwise. 

Moral truths would need to be just like any other truth. For instance, the world is a sphere regardless of how many people might believe it is flat. Most of us would likely accept premise two as at least being more plausibly true than its denial. The issue would then lie in the ontological basis of those moral facts.

Now, atheists might object that God is not necessary for morality because there are plenty of moral atheists. However, this reply misunderstands the argument. The argument is NOT that belief in God is required for moral behaviour. The argument is that the existence of God is required for there to be an ontological foundation for moral facts. 

It is a well-established fact in philosophy that one cannot derive moral claims from mere facts about the natural world. This is best described by David Hume's Is-Ought distinction, and the Naturalistic Fallacy. This leaves only a transcendent basis for moral facts. Of course, this does not automatically lead to theism. Some have posited that moral facts just exist as abstract objects, vis a vis Platonism. 

However, there are problems with such a moral theory. The first and most obvious problem is that abstract objects do not stand in causal relations. As such, it is hard to see how we would have moral duties. Whereas, if we were beholden to a transcendent lawgiver, i.e. a personal being, then there is no such problem.

The second problem is that if the transcendent basis for moral facts is impersonal, then there is no reason to believe that our moral compasses align with these transcendent moral facts. It would simply be a massive coincidence if our moral values align with these. Whereas a personal being could influence the course of events, reveal itself in history, and so on. This leaves only a transcendent, personal basis for moral facts. 

Why There Almost Certainly Is A God: Part II: The Teleological Argument

Today we shall be looking at an argument that is much maligned but is actually one of the strongest arguments for the existence of God. Otherwise known as the design argument, the teleological argument proceeds from the fact that there exists a strong appearance of design in the universe and argues that there must therefore exist a cosmic designer. 

It is thought by most that evolutionary theory was the death knell of design arguments, but this is simply not the case. For one thing, as our knowledge has grown, we have discovered goal-directed behaviour in biological systems. Dubbed 'teleonomy', these examples are cited as examples of the appearance of goal-directed behaviour in the absence of design, but the absence of design is not argued for, it is simply assumed.

Secondly, and more importantly, evolutionary theory is limited to the field of biology. It has nothing to say about the appearance of design in chemistry and physics. Indeed, the best examples of design in nature come to us from the field of astrophysics, where it has been discovered that the very laws and constants of nature themselves are extraordinarily fine-tuned. 

If the value of the constant of gravity were altered only slightly in either direction, then the universe would not have been life-permitting. What is more, the initial conditions of the universe likewise are extraordinarily fine-tuned. The probability of the low entropy condition of the early universe arising by chance has been calculated by the likes of Roger Penrose as being 1 in 10^10^123. 

This probability is so astronomically low that you would have a better chance of hitting a bullseye the size of a proton on a dartboard the size of the observable universe. There are three possible explanations for the appearance of design: chance, physical necessity, or actual design. 

The argument is simply that the appearance of design in the universe cannot be due to chance or physical necessity, leaving actual design as the only result left. 

1. The universe is finely-tuned for life.

2. This fine-tuning is due to chance, physical necessity, or design.

3. The fine-tuning is not due to chance or physical necessity,

4. Therefore, the fine-tuning is due to design.

Why There Almost Certainly Is A God: Part Ic: The Thomistic Cosmological Argument

In the third post of this series, we shall be looking at the last of the different types of cosmological argument, the cosmological argument(s) of Thomas Aquinas. This argument is derived from the first two of Aquinas' Five Ways. The argument goes as follows: 

1. There exists a series of causes.

2. This series of causes cannot be infinite.

3. Therefore, there exists a first cause that is itself uncaused. 

We've already touched upon this somewhat in the post on the Kalam argument. However, the kind of series being referred to in each argument is different. Whereas the Kalam is talking about a successive series, the cosmological argument of Thomas Aquinas is referring to a simultaneous series. 

A successive series is where each cause produces its effect in sequence, much like a chain of dominoes knocking each other over. Whereas, in a simultaneous series, the causes in the chain exist and act upon each other at the same time, much like a locomotive pulling a series of train cars. 

It should be clear that, even were a train composed of an infinite number of train cars, it would not move without a train engine. So, even if the past series of events in time is infinite, there would still need to be a first cause according to this argument. 

Why There Almost Certainly Is A God: Part Ib: The Kalam Cosmological Argument

The next argument in this series we shall be investigating will be the Kalam cosmological argument. Originally devised by Christian philosopher and theologian, John Philoponus, this argument was subsequently developed independently by Muslim philosopher and theologian, al-Ghazali. The argument proceeds from the fact that the universe has a beginning and concludes that there is a cause of the universe.

The argument is as follows: 

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. The universe has a cause.

In order to escape the conclusion, we must deny at least one of the two premises. Denying the first premise is patently absurd, as there is no possible state of affairs where things can come into being from absolutely no antecedent conditions whatsoever. Even in virtual particle-antiparticle pairs, these emerge from the quantum vacuum, which is a sea of fluctuating energy and not the total absence of being. 

If things could just come into being without a cause, then why don't things constantly appear uncaused all of the time? Why is it only universes that can come into being uncaused? We can therefore conclude that the first premise is more plausibly true than its alternative. What then of the second premise? 

At first blush, it might seem as if the atheist might have a little more truck, however, such a conclusion is premature. Whilst it might not be as obvious, the premise that the universe began to exist is certainly a sure one. The reason for this is because we have strong, scientific evidence that shows that the universe began to exist. 

Moreover, philosophical considerations preclude the universe from being the kind of thing that can just exist uncaused. According to scientific evidence, we can conclude that the universe began to exist based on two factors: the expansion of the universe, and entropy. According to the Bord-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, any geodesic in a state of average, positive expansion must have a beginning. 

Whereas, entropy is the tendency of  closed systems to head towards equilibrium over time. Since we have not reached maximum entropy, it follows that the universe came into being a finite amount of time ago. Now, there are certain models that seek to posit a beginningless universe, but these models run into unique problems of their own that preclude them from being viable. 

Philosophically, we can conclude that the universe is not the sort of thing that can exist without a beginning. For starters, the past series of events in time within the universe are formed via successive addition, and an actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition. Such a series can be potentially infinite only. 

What this means is that, whilst such a series can be endless, it cannot be beginningless. An actual infinity, if such a thing is even possible, can only exist all at once, so to speak. So, we can conclude with confidence that the universe has a beginning in the finite past. 

A conceptual analysis of what it means to be a cause of the universe reveals several interesting properties such a thing must possess: it must be immaterial and spaceless, as well as timeless, for the universe consists of all time and space, and likewise contains all matter and energy. 

As the cause of time, then it likewise follows that there can't be anything chronologically prior to such a cause, making it the first cause in the series of events in time. Such a cause is also itself uncaused, since it did not begin to exist a finite amount of time ago in the past. 

Such a cause must also be personal. The main reason for this is because the only way to produce a temporal effect from a timeless cause is if it is endowed with the powers and faculty of willful decision-making. A timeless cause that is personal can freely will to effect change, thus resulting in the creation of time itself. 

An impersonal timeless cause would only be capable of producing a timeless effect, and since we exist temporally and not timelessly, we can conclude with confidence that the first cause of the universe is likewise personal.

Why There Almost Certainly Is A God: Part Ia: The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

I've been inactive for awhile and so thought I'd get back into things with a series concerning the existence of God. The title of this blog post is taken from a good book by British theologian, Keith Ward, which is itself an inversion of a phrase taken from Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion. We shall first start by perusing the various cosmological arguments in favour of God's existence, starting with the argument of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz or the Leibnizian cosmological argument.

According to Leibniz, everything that exists has an explanation for its existence. For most things, that explanation is typically rooted in an external cause. Leibniz argues that there must be an ultimate explanation for why there is something (i.e. the universe) rather than nothing, which follows from his first premise. If everything has an explanation for its existence, then there is an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing.

Now, whilst most things in everyday experience have an explanation rooted in an external cause, this is not the only possible type of explanation. Something could be self-explanatory, that is to say: it could have an explanation rooted in the necessity of its own nature. In order for atheism to be true, the universe (or at the least, some part of it) would have to be metaphysically necessary in order to be self-explanatory.

Is the universe self-explanatory? Or, rather, is it metaphysically necessary in the sense meant by philosophers? The answer is no, for the universe lacks properties that is required for something to be considered metaphysically necessary. Something that is metaphysically necessary possesses all of its attributes necessarily, meaning it is the same in every possible world. For example, the universe is comprised of matter and energy, which can be organised differently and so there are different possible configurations in each possible world.

So, the universe must have an explanation rooted in an external cause. Can this chain of explanations go on infinitely? No, for there must be an ultimate explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. In order to escape an infinite chain, we must posit an ultimate explanation that is itself self-explanatory, that is to say, it is metaphysically necessary.

We are presented with the following argument:
1. Everything that exists has an explanation for its existence, rooted in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
2. The universe exists.
3. The universe has an explanation for its existence.
4. The universe does not have an explanation for its existence rooted in the necessity of its own nature.
5. Therefore the universe has an explanation for its existence rooted in an external cause.