I'll Be Back, Therefore I Am

The Trinity in the Bible

2012-01-25T16:26:00.002Z

So, I got my first Muslim spammer/spambot/troll message on YouTube today. I won't bore you with the details of their message (given that it is your standard Islamic apologetics/polemics,) but this is my response to them. I thought I would post it here because: a) it seemed a good thing to blog about and b) it is long enough to fill up a proper blog post and saves me from coming up with something else. Either way, enjoy!
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The Holy Trinity is revealed both in the Old Testament and in the New Testament. In the Old Testament, the Trinity is revealed in subtle ways; in the New Testament, the Trinity is revealed fully and plainly, beginning at the Baptism of our Lord.

The Holy Trinity is one God in three Persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. These persons are distinct but not separate, and are not three gods. They are one God because They are one in essence or nature. The Father is the unbegotten Fountainhead of Deity. The Son is eternally begotten of the Father (John 1:18; 3:16; 16:28.) The Holy Spirit is the Helper (John 14:16) and Spirit of Truth (John 14:17; 16:13,) who proceeds from the Father (John 15:26.)

Genesis 1:1 - God the Father created the heavens and the earth. The Creed says: "I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and the earth."
Genesis 1:2 - The Spirit of God is the Holy Spirit. He hovered over creation in creative power and equality with the Father. He co-created with the Father.
Genesis 1:-3 - As the Word of God, the Son made the light (John 1:1-3.) With creative power and equality with the Father, He also co-created with the Father and the Spirit.
Genesis 1:26 - The pronouns "Us" and "Our" reveal a plurality of divine Persons. These Persons are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit operating in complete unity of the one divine Nature.

The Church fathers teach that the Father made heaven and earth through the Son and in the Holy Spirit. Thus, the Holy Trinity made heaven and earth, and the Church sings, "We glorify the Father, we exalt the Son, and we worship the Holy Spirit - the indivisible Trinity who exists as One - the Light and Lights, the Life and Lives, who grants light and life to the ends of the world."

Genesis 1:26-30 - The Trinity also made man. God the Father is speaking to God the Son, and He uses the personal pronouns Us and Our. These pronouns indicate three distinct Persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as noted in 1:1-3. The word image is in the singular, and shows the three distinct Persons of the Holy Trinity are one in nature and undivided. For it does not say, "Our images." Therefore, the Holy Trinity is one undivided nature in three distinct Persons. Man is not one in nature with the Holy Trinity. But He was made in the image and likeness of the Holy Trinity; and he was made male and female. Therefore, the dignity of each man and each woman is this image and likeness.

Genesis 2:7 - God formed Adam's body out of dust from the ground. The breath of life is the grace of the Holy Spirit, the Giver of Life (the Creed.) God breathed the breath of life into man's body, and he became a living soul. Therefore, Adam was a living soul because he possessed a body, a soul, and the grace of the Holy Spirit. After He rose from the dead, Jesus breathed on His disciples, and said, "Receive the Holy Spirit" (John 20:22.) For man failed to keep the grace of the Spirit, but through His Resurrection Jesus supplies His disciples abundantly with the life-giving grace of the Spirit. A disciple's responsibility is to live by this grace.

Genesis 2:8-17 - God gave man a place and a law. The place was Paradise, and the laws was the commandment given in 2:16-17. Man was to obey this commandment through the grace of God the Word. If he was obedient, he would enjoy the blessings of Paradise. But if he were to disobey the commandment, eh would die and his body would decay in the grace ("die by death.")

Genesis 2:18-25 - God, not man, established the law of marriage; therefore, marriage is holy. In the marriage union, the husband and the wife become one flesh (Genesis 2:24,) which St. Paul calls "a great mystery" (Ephesians 5:32.) This mystery is so great and wonderful that a man will leave his father and mother with the blessing and be joined to a woman in marriage. This joining, he will be devoted to her with sacrificial love and devotion, and she to him. This great mystery points to the greater mystery: the marriage of Christ to His Bride, the Church (Ephesians 5:22-33.) For He left His Father and became Man to seek a Bride. He loved His bride and gave His life for here. And in his divine vision of the new heaven and earth, the apostle John saw this Bride, the "New Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband" (Revelation 21:1, 2.)

Genesis 3:1-7 - The serpent is the devil (2 Corinthians 11:3, Revelation 12:9,) and he tempted Eve. He contradicted God's commandment (Genesis 2:16, 17) by denying death and decay in the grace as the penalty for disobedience (you shall not die by death.) He also tempted Eve with the promise of deification (you will be like gods, knowing good and evil.) But becoming like God comes through obedience to God, not through disobedience. Nevertheless, Eve was deceived, and thus disobeyed God. She, in turn, gave the fruit to her husband and he ate. In his disobedience, he willed contrary to the will of God, and thus ate. His free will was the first thing to suffer in the Fall, and thus is the first thing that needs healing in man.

Christ, by His death and Resurrection, conquered the devil and death, freeing mankind from the dear of death (Hebrews 2:14-15) an making possible a more complete communion between God and man than was ever possible before. This communion allows people to become "partakers of the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4,) to transcend death and, ultimately, the consequences of the Fall.

Genesis 3:8 - Adam and Eve now had a fallen will and tried to hide from God. Fallen man now has a fallen will, thus he has a tendency to run away from God. But the grace of Christ heals the will of those who return to Him through repentance, so they might freely pursue God and do His will.

Genesis 3:15 - The woman's seed is first Christ, and second His Church (Galatians 3:16, 26.) The serpent's seed as those who reject Christ and follow the devil (1 John 3:8-10.) Christ destroyed the devil through the cross (bruise your head.)

Genesis 3:24 - Because of Adam, man is born outside of Paradise. The tree of life prefigures Christ, though whom man regains Paradise.

Genesis 9:8-16 - Noah's seed is Christ (Luke 3:23, 36,) and the everlasting covenant (Genesis 9:16) is the new covenant God established in Him. God's rainbow in the clouds is His sign of the covenant.

Genesis 9:26 - Not only did the Lord God bless Noah Genesis 9:1,) but Noah blessed Him. Many Scriptures speak to this. For example, the Psalmist said, "For my foot stands in uprightness;/ In the Churches I will bless You, O Lord" (Psalms 25:12, Vesting Service.) Noah blessed God because of Shem, through whom Christ would come to save the world (Luke 3:36.)

Genesis 11:6 - Mankind was united as one race and one language. But this unity existed without the Holy Trinity, for man's true unity is union and communion with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Church is "the race of Christians" (Kairon Service,) "a holy nation" (1 Peter 2:9,) and glorifies God "with... one mouth" (Romans 15:6.) In the Great Litany, the Church prays "for the union of all men," a holy union based on the Holy Trinity.

Genesis 11:8 - The Lord divided this false unity for the sake of man's salvation, that man might seeks and find Him (Acts 17:26-28.) For they sought to build their unity by making a name for themselves (Genesis 11:4.) They cared nothing for the Lord God, by which man is saved.

Genesis 12:1-7 - "The Holy Spirit spoke through the prophets" (Creed.) He spoke through the prophet Moses, who wrote this Scripture. Thus, St. Paul said, "And the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by their faith, preached the gospel to Abraham beforehand, saying, 'In you all the nations shall be blessed" (Galatians 3:8.) Thus the Holy Spirit preached the gospel beforehand to Abraham. The Holy Spirit inspired Moses to write in Genesis 12:1 that the Lord said to Abram this scripture. Who is this Lord? He is God the Father, as St. Paul indicated in Galatians 3:8: "God would justify the Gentiles by faith." Thus, the Father preached the gospel beforehand to Abraham. In Genesis 12:7, the Holy Spirit inspired Moses to write that the Lord appeared to Abraham and spoke to him. Who is this Lord who appeared? The Holy Spirit identified Him in Genesis 15:1 as the Word of the Lord whom Abraham saw in a vision, and He identified Him as the Angel of the Lord in Genesis 16:7, 9, 10, 11, and 13. This Word is the Son of God and the Angel is also the Son of God, for He was no created angel. "He is called Angel because He alone reveals the Father (St. Athanasius.) Thus, the Son also preached the gospel beforehand to Abraham, for the Father always speaks through His Word. Therefore, when one person of the Trinity is present and working, the other two Persons are also present in one and the same working for the salvation of man. The Father works through the Son and in the Spirit.

Genesis 12:8 - Abraham is the father of all the faithful (Romans 4:11.) Since he built an altar of worship, therefore an altar is part of his faith. Bethel means "house of God," which foreshadows the Church as the house of God. The altar is central to worship. At the altar, the Church calls on the name of the Lord, as did Abraham.

Genesis 15:1-3 - The Word of the Lord is the Word of the Father. He is also the Son of God. Abraham saw God the Word in a vision. Thus, he saw Him before He became incarnate, as did the other Old Testament prophets.

Genesis 15:4 - The Voice of the Lord is also the Word of the father. He reassures Abraham that his heir will come from Abraham's own body. This refers to the birth of Isaac, based on God's promise. For man is saved by this promise through faith in Christ (Romans 4:17-25; 9:7, 8.)

Genesis 15:6 - Abraham believed in the promise in Genesis 12:1, and continued to believe it in Genesis 15:5. For Abraham's faith was living and growing - something dynamic. He was made righteous by this faith. So are both Jews and Gentiles. Righteousness is the gift of God through Jesus Christ (Romans 5:17.)

Genesis 15:7 - God the Word said to Abraham, "I am the God who brought you out Ur of the Chaldeans, to give you this land to inherit it." Thus, He identifies Himself as God. The Creed calls Him "True God of True God." For He is the Only-begotten of the Father, through whom the Father speaks and reveals Himself.

Genesis 15:8 - Abraham calls the Word his own Master and Lord, and thus recognises His divinity. The Church does the same thing.

Genesis 16:7 - The Lord is the Father, and the Angel is His Son. And the prophet Isaiah calls Him "the Angel of Great Counsel" (Isaiah 9:5.) "The Son is called Angel because He alone reveals the Father" (St. Athanasius.)

Genesis 16:9 - Since He is God, the Angel command Hagar. She obeyed (Genesis 16:15.) This Angel is the Word of God. "I will surely multiply your seed exceedingly, that it may not be counted because of its multitude." No created angel can do this. The Angel is God the Son.

Genesis 16:13 - Hagar called the Angel who appeared to her both Lord and God. The Church knows Him as the Only-begotten of the Father (John 1.) As the Father's Only-begotten, He is "true God of true God" (Creed.) One meaning of the name God is, You are the God who sees me. The Only-begotten sees everything. So do God the Father and God the Holy Spirit.

Genesis 17:1 - Thirteen years after the birth of Ishmael (Genesis 16:16,) the Lord appeared to Abram again and identified Himself as God, for He said to him, "I am your God." This appearance is another of the personal appearances of the Son of God to Abraham.

Genesis 17:2-4 - The covenant that is established "in Christ" (Galatians 3:17.) God established it before the Mosaic covenant. Therefore, the Law of Moses, which came later, could not cancel it. Abraham's faith is multiplied exceedingly in the Church. For he is the father of many nations (see also Romans 4:16, 17.)

Genesis 17:7 - The God of the everlasting covenant is the Holy Trinity, for the Son is God of God, the Only-begotten of the Father. The Holy Spirit is also God of God, for He "proceeds from the Father" (Creed.)

Genesis 18:1-3 - The Holy Spirit says through the prophet Moses that God appeared to Abraham. This is another personal appearance of the Son of God to him. He saw thee men standing before him, but he worshipped only one of them as Lord, for He is Lord and God. The other two are called "angels" (Genesis 19:1.) The Son of God is Lord of all the angels.

Genesis 19:1 - The Holy Spirit through the prophet Moses calls two of the three men angels. When they arrived in Sodom, they met Lot at the gate.
Genesis 19:2 - Lot paid the angels due respect by calling them lords, but he did not worship them, for they were created beings.

Genesis 19:13 - The third man was the Lord, the Son of God, and he sent the other two to Sodom to destroy it.

Genesis 19:18 - Lot spoke to all three men, but prayed to the Lord in particular.

Genesis 19:24 - The Lord rained brimstone and fire... from the Lord out of heaven, that is, the Son rained brimstone and fire from the Father (St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Ambrose, St. Hilary of Poitiers.) Both have the name "Lord" because of Their equality and oneness of Lordship. For in Their essence, the Two are One and undivided (Creed.) The Holy Spirit, who spoke this scripture through the prophet Moses, is also one in Lordship with the Father and the Son, for as the Creed says, "I believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord... who proceeds from the Father." The destruction of Sodom and the adjoining city of Gomorrah is a warning to the ungodly concerning the Day of Judgement (2 Peter 2:6, 9; Jude 7.)

Genesis 20:2 - The city of Gerar was not Abraham's true city, for it was given to idolatry. The Gerarites worshipped the god Dagon (3 Kingdoms 5:2) and the goddess Ashtaroth (3 Kingdoms 31:10.) But when the Son of God became incarnate, and the word of the gospel went out to Gerar, idolatry in that place was destroyed. A church and a monastery were established there. One of its bishops, Marcian, attended the Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in AD 451. Truly, the city embraced the faith of Abraham.

Genesis 21:1 - The Son of God visited Sarah and fulfilled the promise He had given in Genesis 18:10 (St. Hilary of Poitiers.) Abraham and Sarah would have a son in their old age.

Genesis 21:17 - The Angel of God is the Son of God. He told Hagar that God, that is God the Father, had heard Ishmael's crying. "The Son is called Angel for He alone reveals the Father" (St. Athanasius.)

Genesis 21:18 - The Angel told Hagar He Himself (I will make) would make a great nation of Ishmael. Therefore, this Angel is God (see also, Genesis:19, 20,) for God alone can do such a thing. This Angel is not a created angel, but the Son of God Himself. And why would He make a great nation of Ishmael? Because after His Incarnation, Ishmael's descendants would embrace Abraham's faith based on the word of promise.

Genesis 24:7 - The Lord's Angel is the Son of God. The word angel also means messenger. In this meaning it is also akin to the term word. The Son of God is called both Angel and Word, for "He alone reveals the Father" (St. Athanasius.) Both names emphasise that the Son is the Will of God the Father. Thus, God spoke to Abraham through His will, and told him to leave his father's house for the lad of promise. The words He will send His angel before were prophesied by Abraham to his servant. He spoke these words by the Holy Spirit, as the Creed says: "I believe in the Holy Spirit... who spoke by the prophets."

Genesis 31:13 - In verse 11, the name "God" refers to the Father. But in this verse, the Angel is called the God who appeared. Thus, the Son is "true God of true God" (Creed.)

Isaiah 63:16 - The Father is our Redeemer. He not only created the world but redeems it as well.
Psalm 2:7, 8 - The Father's decree reveals the Son as inheriting the world. This inheritance is the people saved by the Son.
Isaiah 6:1-3: The words "Holy, Holy, Holy," declare the three Persons who save us. The name "Lord" declares the one essence of the Three.
Isaiah 44:3 - The Father pours out His Spirit on people like water on dry ground. The Holy Spirit quenches the thirst of the person who thirst for salvation.
Isaiah 48:16, 17 - The Son declares that the Father and the Spirit sent Him to redeem the world. Although the Son alone became a Man, all three Persons save mankind.

John 1:1-3 - The Word is the Son of God, who was present with the Father at the beginning of creation. He was Co-worker with the Father in creating the world.
John 8:58 - Jesus identifies Himself as having existed before Abraham. Before His coming in the flesh as Man, Jesus existed as the eternal Son of the Father, for He is begotten from the Father before all time and ages. He appeared to Moses in the burning bush and proclaimed Himself "I Am" (Exodus 3.)
Acts 2:17 - The Holy Spirit's descent at Pentecost affirms His presence in the Old Testament (Joel 2:28-32.)
Hebrews 1:8-10 - This Scripture affirms the Father is speaking to the Son in Psalms 44:7 and 101:26-28, in which the Father acknowledges the Son as God and Creator of the world. For the Son was the Father's Co-worker in creation.

Luke 1:35 - At the Annunciation, the Holy Spirit, the "power" if God the Father ("the Highest,") overshadowed the Virgin Mary; and she gave birth to So of God in His flesh.
Matthew 3:16-17 - When the Son of God was baptised in the Jordan by John, the Father's voice was heard from heaven, and the Holy Spirit descended on Him like a dove. As the main hymn for the Feast of Theophany says, "When You, O Lord, were baptised in the Jordan, the worship of the Trinity was made manifest."

I believe in one God, the Father Almighty of heaven and earth, and of all thing visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Only-Begotten, begotten of the Father before all worlds, Light of Light, Very God of Very God, begotten, not made; of one essence with the Father; by Whom all things were made; Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven an was incarnate of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, and was made Man; and was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered and was buried; the third day He rose again according to the Scriptures; and ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of the Father; and He shall come again with glory to judge the living and the dead; Whose Kingdom shall have no end. And I believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of Life, Who proceeds from the Father, Who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, Who spoke by the profits. And I believe in One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. I acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins. I look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come. Amen.

Are the Concepts and Objectives Behind the “Authentic Performance Movement” Fundamentally Flawed?

2011-12-07T18:44:00.000Z

In this essay, we shall be examining the so-called “authentic performance movement” but what IS the authentic performance movement? This movement, also referred to as the historical authenticity movement and/or the early music movement, is a group of musicians, performers, and composers who “strive to realise the [baroque and classical period] composer’s intentions and expectations regarding performing style.”1 What this means then, is that said musicians, et al. strive to play Renaissance, Baroque, and Classical musical works in a way that they would have been played in their respective eras. This includes performing on instruments made in the same way as those from the period, using the same construction materials, designs, intonations, and tuning systems. Now that we have an adequate description of the movement in question, we may now move on to a critical analysis of its concepts and objectives (if indeed said movement even has any to be subjected to such scrutiny.)

The origins of this movement lie in the 1950s all the way through to the 1980s, and has continued on through the 90s up until present times.2 However the history behind this movement can be traced to developments as far back as during 18th and 19th centuries.3 During the eighteenth century, musical performance was focused on new music. This can be exemplified in the ‘Querelle des Bouffons’ that took place between 1752 and 1754, which was a controversy surrounding the merits of the newer Italian operas versus the merits of the older French operas. During this controversy, contemporary philosophes and other writers argued, sometimes vociferously, that the newer Italian opera was better than the older French operas pioneered by Jean-Baptiste Lully and promoted at the time by Jean-Phillipe Rameau. The people of that century simply did not care for older music. This can be contrasted with the 19th century, where there was a conscious move towards performing works by composers of older eras. As Bernard Sherman notes “admonitions to honor the composer’s performance intentions... became common in the 19th century and dominant in the twentieth.”4

Whilst there are number of reasons for why these developments took place during the 19th century, at the centre of the debate during the twentieth century was a debate concerning “authenticity.”5 Critics of the “authentic performance movement’ have focused intently over the usage of the word ‘authentic’ and it is this word in particular that is singled out as the principle target of the critics’ ire. It is primarily the controversy over the meaning of ‘authenticity’ that has led to the movement being given the alternate name: ‘historically informed performance movement.’6 However, there is some doubt as to whether or not “authenticity” really laid behind the movement. D. Fabian argues that the concept of authenticity being attributed to the movement was really down to critics taking “commercial propaganda at face value.”7 That is to say that those associated with the early music/historically informed performance movement do not seek ‘authenicity.’8

Thus, one could argue that identifying this movement as the ‘authentic performance movement’ is nothing more than a straw-man caricature. What then CAN be said about the aims of the early music/authentic/historically informed performance movement? Michelle Dulak argues that shift in emphasis from ‘authenticity’ to ‘historically informed performance’ is simply nothing more than semantic posturing:
“Early music” itself will hardly do, when so much of the repertoire concerned is so recent… “Authentic” has succumbed to a thousand critical blows, most of them richly deserved. “Contextual for no very obvious reason, was stillborn… “Period” and “historical” (with the variant “historically informed” remain, but a careful observer cannot help noting that even they become rarer with time. I venture to suggest that this linguistic fidgetiness has its roots in the changing nature of the beast itself.9
This view, however, misses the deeper differences between the notions of ‘authenticity’ and being ‘historically informed.’ Whilst they may seem two names for the same thing, there is a fundamental difference. Being ‘authentic’ from a musical perspective is not the same thing as being ‘historically informed.’ Edidin notes the argument of Kivy that a rendition of a composition can be authentic in a ‘personal’ sense and forms the basis of arranging as form of art.10

The fundamental argument against equating ‘authenticity’ with ‘historical informed performance’ then, is that the personal authenticity expressed in varying renditions of compositions past and present is of aesthetic value. The reason for this is because the very act of arranging is itself an art form that gives rise to new musical expressions. Therefore, it is inappropriate or perhaps unfair to label certain artistic expressions as ‘inauthentic.’ Whether because it was because of such criticisms, or if, as D. Fabian argues, that the movement never self-identified as such, since the 1990s the term ‘authentic’ has been subsequently dropped.11 Nowadays, the focus is more on performances being ‘historically informed’ that is to say performances which are historically accurate. Whether this has been part and parcel of the movement since the very beginning or whether this a new direction it seems as if this fascination of the past follows very much in the same vein as the fascination of the past exemplified by so many groups as far back as the Renaissance humanists and as contemporary as today.

Robert Donington gives a possible explanation for this current obsession, especially the music of the Baroque period. He argues that it lies in the fact that there is actually a sense of continuality between music of the past and music of the present. That is to say, Baroque music exemplifies musical elements found in popular contemporary music today, chief among them being improvisation.
Much of our own contemporary music pursues such spontaneity and in baroque music this ingredient is contained in the very conditions of its authentic reportoire.12
However, is this attempt at historical recreation any less problematic than striving to create the most ‘authentic’ rendition of a performance? Writing about Renaissance music, Howard Mayer-Brown writes that the question of how music of the past was actually performed is one that is “difficult to answer because the music is so remote from us… that even the most basic facts about the way it was played must be demonstrated rather than assumed.”13 Bernard Sherman notes that “some authors believe that it is impossible for us to perform music exactly as it was done in its own era.”14

Whilst it therefore seems out-of-date to think of an ‘authentic performance movement’ but of a movement that endeavours to re-create compositions the way they were historically performed, it seems as if this does not change much. There are still problems with presuming one rendition of a Baroque period composition is more ‘historically authentic’ or ‘historically informed’ than another. This has been briefly hinted at and shall now be expounded upon in more detail now. What are the fundamental problems with historical Reconstructionism in relation to the music of the Baroque period and earlier? One issue lays in the fact that “performers did not simply follow instructions given them by composers” and that “musicians were expected to be able to invent new melodic material extempore.”15 In the Baroque and Renaissance periods, performing music involved more than simply reading the scores. The singers and instrumentalists of those times were fully expected to add elaborate improvised ornamentation, and according to precise musical rules. A problem then, lies in determining what these rules are and how they should be interpreted and applied.

More than this, we have to determine not just stylistic characteristics, but sonic characteristics, questions concerning instrument choice, instrument construction, instrument techniques, ensemble line-up, ensemble size, and a plethora of other issues. Whilst this might seem like a daunting task to some, the problem is even more insurmountable than this, for the documentary evidence (in terms of musical scores) we have is fragmentary.
Some authors believe that it is impossible for us to perform music exactly as it was done in its own era. In a few cases, such as the use of castrati singers, it is obviously impossible (or repellent) to re-create a known practice. But more generally, evidence about period performance practice is almost never complete, so performers must go beyond what scholars can certify as historically accurate. Doing so involves the use of the performers’ imaginations—and modern musical imaginations differ almost inevitably from those of previous centuries.16
Reconstructing music of the past is therefore immensely difficult if not impossible. The principle argument against attempts at accurate historical reconstruction of musical compositions is that “historical performers supplement the meagre documentary evidence with their own musical taste…”17

Interestingly enough, Taruskin, whom Dulak cites and refers to, despite offering stringent criticisms of the historicist enterprise, does not see the ahistoricity inherent in the historicist enterprise as a deathblow to their efforts. Rather, he argues that despite the “thin veneer of historicism” and the “rhetoric of authenticity,” the movement “constitutes proof that what [Taruskin] calls “authentistic” performance is a living tradition…”18 As Edidin concurs:
One way to qualify the extreme view [that deviations from history falsify the efforts of historicism] would be to hold that historical authenticity is but one source of aesthetic good among many…9
Whilst the two ideals, authenticity and historicism, are different, it seems then as if they overlap considerably after all. If one takes authenticity in music to mean something that is aesthetically good and enjoyable, and the efforts of historicisms achieve this affect, then it seems as if both concepts are vindicated.

Tracing the development of the “early music movement,” D. Fabian notes that despite arguments such as those above, those involved in the movement still clung to the idea that “an Urtext score reflected the composer’s ‘definitive version’ of the piece.” Those affiliated with the movement in the 1950s held to the ideal of ‘historical authenticity.’20 As aforementioned, Edidin reports a distinction Kivy made between personal and historical authenticity, and so in this sense the obsession over ‘authenticity’ in earlier critiques are misguided. What those in the authentic performance movement actually meant by ‘authenticity’ and what critics supposed they meant were two entirely different things. We may recall Dulak’s complaint earlier that the central aims of the authentic performance movement has been transmogrified, and this is somewhat justified given the vagueness of the term ‘authenticity.’ Yet, as we have seen, there is a fundamental distinction between ‘authenticity,’ ‘historicism.’ Furthermore, we are met with two types of authenticity, ‘personal authenticity’ and ‘historical authenticity.’

We have cleared up some of the terminology, but not all. In determining the aims and objectives of the authentic performance movement, we were met with two terms: the sufficiently vague term ‘authenticity’ and the more clearly defined term ‘historicism.’ However, we are now met with two new terms, as mentioned above. Personal authenticity, which refers to the art of arranging carried out by modern composers and performers who seek to re-create works of the past. Their re-working has aesthetic value whether it is “historically informed” or not. What then of ‘historical authenticity?’ Whilst some argue that historical authenticity is synonymous with efforts at trying to re-create musical compositions the way the original composer intended, I disagree. Whilst a desire at historical accuracy is obviously a major part of Historical Reconstructionism, historical authenticity is more than this. I take historical authenticity to refer to the aesthetic value of historicism; that is the effort to re-create compositions of the past as they would have been performed originally.

As previously discussed, Edidin notes that historicism21 can be at least one source of aesthetic good. However, he goes on to argue a further point that whilst historical reconstruction is “not necessarily or always a source of aesthetic good” that “there is good prima facie reason that it often will be a source of aesthetic good…”22 In other words, at least some examples of ‘historically informed performances’ will be aesthetically good because of efforts at historical reconstruction. Therefore what ‘historical reconstruction’ can be historically authentic in addition to being personal authentic by virtue of its being personally authentic. He develops this argument further by offering the premise that “the aesthetic payoff of following a composer’s performance suggestion is ultimately to be judged by experience of the result of that way of performing.”23

Having briefly reviewed the key concepts associated with the ‘authentic performance movement’ we have come to the following conclusions. The fundamental aim of the ‘authentic performance movement’ is merely an attempt at historical recreation; to re-create compositions according to the original wishes and intentions of the composers. The use of the term ‘authenticity’ was simply misleading colloquialism that. Debates over ‘authenticity,’ whilst somewhat misleading, are, however, enlightening nonetheless. We discussed the varying meanings of ‘authenticity’ and how they applied to the efforts of Historical Reconstructionism. The aim of this essay was to discuss to the objectives of the ‘authentic performance’ and weigh in as to whether these objectives were ‘fundamentally flawed’ or not. The discussion as to whether or not historical reconstruction of early compositions is a worthwhile enterprise almost entirely focused around philosophical, aesthetic concerns, as it was more or less admitted from the outset that our knowledge of how these pieces of music was actually performed is particularly fragmentary. What then, are our conclusions in this regard?

Authenticity is a word that has sparked a wide amount of controversy, with some regarding the use of the term highly offensive. However, more thoughtful commentators have offered expositions of what authenticity actually means, and then discussed how it relates to the ‘authentic performance movement.’ Authenticity can carry two meanings, personal authenticity and historical authenticity. Personal authenticity is the aesthetic value of a piece of music purely based on its value as art. Historical authenticity is typically used to refer to how historically accurate a work is, but I take it to mean the personal authenticity derived from efforts at historical reconstruction irrespective as to whether this historical reconstruction is ultimately successful or not. Thus, we can see two ways in which historical reconstruction is a worthwhile endeavour. Firstly, composers engage in the art of arranging. How they arrange other composer’s compositions and how they perform them leads to new musical expression.

Secondly, compositions can be aesthetically pleasing purely as a result of the attempts at historical reconstruction. That is to say that pieces that aspire to be historically informed can be more aesthetically pleasing than pieces that do not aspire to being historically informed. The only issue then is whether these aesthetic results are intentional or accidental by-products. However, I think such a question ultimately does not add to the discussion at hand (otherwise it would have been raised earlier) as the answer to such a question does not alter the aesthetic results. Whether it is deliberate or unintentional, ‘historically informed’ pieces can be aesthetically good. Note that this is also wholly independent of whether or not these pieces actually are historically accurate or not, thus rendering the question of whether such historical accuracy is possible a moot one. The question being discussed is whether or not the aims and objectives of the ‘authentic performance movement’ are fundamentally flawed or not. Whilst historical accuracy might simply be a quaint, ludicrous notion, aesthetic good can still come of it.

Bibliography
Books:
Howard Mayer Brown, Embellishing 16th-Century Music, Oxford University Press, (1976)
Robert Donington, Style and Performance, Faber Music, (1982)
David Schulenberg, Music of the Baroque, Oxford University Press, (2001)

Journals:
Michelle Dulak, The Quiet Metamorphosis of “Early Music,” Repercussions, Vol. 2, No. 2., University of California Berkley, (Fall, 2003), pp31-61
Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way: Historical Authenticity, Personal Authenticity, and the Performance of Classical Music, Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 32, No. 4, University of Illinois Press, (Winter, 1998), pp79-91
Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement: A Historical Review, International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 32, No. 2, Croatian Musicology Society, (Dec., 2001), pp153-167

Web Articles:
Bernard D. Sherman, Authenticity in Musical Performance, http://www.bsherman.net/encyclopedia.html (Accessed November 25th 2011)

Notes
1 Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way: Historical Authenticity, Personal Authenticity, and the Performance of Classical Music, Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 32, No. 4, University of Illinois Press, (Winter, 1998), pp79-91, p79
2 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement: A Historical Review, International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 32, No. 2, Croatian Musicology Society, (Dec., 2001), pp153-167, p153
3 Bernard D. Sherman, Authenticity in Musical Performance, http://www.bsherman.net/encyclopedia.html (Accessed November 25th 2011)
4 Ibid.
5 Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way, p79
6 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement: A Historical Review, International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 32, No. 2, Croatian Musicology Society, (Dec., 2001), pp153-167, p153
7 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement, p154
8 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement, p155
9 Michelle Dulak, The Quiet Metamorphosis of “Early Music,” Repercussions, Vol. 2, No. 2., University of California Berkley, (Fall, 2003), pp31-61, p31
10 Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way, p80
11 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement, p153
12 Robert Donington, Style and Performance, Faber Music, (1982), p6
13 Howard Mayer Brown, Embellishing 16th-Century Music, Oxford University Press, (1976), pvii
14 Bernard D. Sherman, Authenticity in Musical Performance, http://www.bsherman.net/encyclopedia.html (Accessed November 26th 2011)
15 Howard Mayer Brown, Embellishing 16th-Century Music, Oxford University Press, (1976), pvii
16 Bernard D. Sherman, Authenticity in Musical Performance, http://www.bsherman.net/encyclopedia.html (Accessed November 27th 2011)
17 Michelle Dulak, The Quiet Metamorphosis of “Early Music,” p33
18 Michelle Dulak, The Quiet Metamorphosis of “Early Music,” p34
19 Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way, p81
20 Dorottya Fabian, The Meaning of Authenticity and The Early Music Movement, p158
21 Edidin himself uses the term ‘historical authenticity’ as referring to the efforts of Historical Reconstructionism/historicism, whereas I take ‘historical authenticity’ to refer to the aesthetic value of the historicist enterprise.
22 Aron Edidin, Playing Bach His Way, p81
23 Ibid.

Did the Enlightenment Inspire the French Revolution?

2011-12-07T18:19:00.000Z

It has generally been asserted by some historians that the Enlightenment influenced the French Revolution.1 Postmodernist historians tend to go further and claim the Enlightenment directly led to the terror, and inspired subsequent totalitarian regimes also.2 Whilst the latter question is beyond the purview of this essay, we shall be exploring, on the other hand, the question of the Enlightenments role in the French Revolution if it indeed had one at all. The Enlightenment is an area that has perhaps been over-complicated by historians, and so we shall do our best to uncomplicate them here. Is there a relation between the Enlightenment and the Revolution? At first glance it may seem like a reasonable hypothesis. Yet the proposition that the Enlightenment caused (whether directly or indirectly) raises a number of questions. Not least of these being the question of how could a movement devoted to rational reform lead to such violence?3 Therefore in order to understand this question better, we need to look at the Enlightenment philosophes themselves.

It becomes clear once we get round to looking at the philosophes that they were no revolutionaries. Whilst the revolutionaries certainly appealed to writers such as Voltaire and Rousseau, the revolutionaries’ thinking “often proceeded in directions which would have horrified those whose names they used in order to legitimate their actions.”4 Stromberg notes that almost all of the philosophes that lived to the Revolution rejected it, and “virtually from the start.”5 The philosophes were very much elitists who believed in a hierarchical society with the ‘grands’ at the top, with Rousseau being the only exception. d’Alembert remarked that one did not a great deal of philosophy that societies, especially large states, needed clearly defined social ranks. Voltaire shared similar sentiments and believed that the masses should no be even taught how to read. This oligarchy therefore stands in stark contrast to the ideals of the revolutionaries who sought to enact a republic. Robert Darnton notes that by 1778 “the last generation of philosophes had become pensioned, petted, and completely integrated in high society.”6

Darnton cites the Archive Nationales, which contained a list of 147 “men of letters who request pensions” and ten dossiers on writers and their sources of support.7 The philosophes were very much dependant on sinecures and pensions, and NOT the sales of books. Of course, this raises further questions: to what extent did Enlightenment ideals filter down to the masses, and if not the Enlightenment philosophes what DID eighteenth century Frenchmen read? Robert Darnton, whom has already been cited, has made some considerable advancement in this regard. One such example is the Bibliotheque bleue, which were crude paperbacks carted about the countryside and were intended for semi-literate peasant communities. These works included mostly superstitious tales, medieval romances, and condensed versions of popular novels, not the enlightened philosophy of the philosophes.8 Furthermore, records by provincial publishers for ‘permission simples’ indicate that “educated provincials were about as far removed from the Enlightenment provincials as illiterate provincials.”8

Quite simply, books that later ages took be great “may not have been widely read under the Old Regime.”9 More than this, however, it seems as if there was an underground book market for “philosophical books” with particularly lewd title such as ‘Venus in the Cloister or Nun in the Nightgown’ and ‘The Woman of Pleasure.’ Darnton’s book The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France is devoted to this entire subject. The term “philosophical books” was used as a sort of codeword for books that would get publishers and shop owners into trouble, and were apparently in quite high demand. However, the chief impetus behind the revolution, Darton argues, were a group of writers wholly different from those of the Enlightenment philosophes. Darnton points to a fringe group of writers excluded from elite circles, men such as Carra, Gorsas, Mercier, Restif de la Bretonne, Manuel, Desmoulins, Collot d’Herbois, and Fabre d’Eglantine. In fact one of the writers named, Jean Marie Collot d’Herbois actually went to become a member of the Committee of Public Safety.

These writers generally passed into obscurity, with the exception of those named, and were referred to by the philosophes as the ‘excrement of literature.’ Voltaire placed them in a social class below prostitutes and referred to them as the ‘dregs of humanity.’ Whilst Voltaire claimed he attacked this group of writers to put aspiring youths off from aspiring to be a writer (and thus ending up either starving or scraping a living) those who were able to scrape a living by the pen, such as Mercier, took extreme offence. They were also indignant at their place in society, and Darnton notes how Phillipe Fabre d’Eglantine, Jean-Louis Carra, and Antoine-Joseph Carra precipitated the downfall Charles-Alexandre de Callone after he did not award them pensions.10 The central issue was privilege; the Enlightenment philosophes and these writers were not. As Darnton puts it: “They had knocked on the doors of Voltaire’s Church, and the door remained closed.”11As such, these writers generally produced ‘libelles’ attacking the “grande monde”; that is, the society of the high cultured philosophes. They attacked the salon, the academies, the aristocracy, the church, and even the monarchy. These were the successors of the philosophes and they made themselves heard.

Whereas the philosophes were mostly if not entirely limited to the upper echelons of eighteenth century France, the Grub Street hacks were pumping out pamphlets that were quite widely read in some cases. Darnton specifically references the “polemical genius” of Simon-Henri Linguet.12 Jeremy Popkin, in response to Darnton’s earlier suggestion of Brissot as the template for the hacks of Grub Street, likewise notes that Linguet fits Darnton’s hypothesis, but that even Linguet “spent much of his career closely associated with powerful figures in French politics.”13 Popkin notes that their feelings of resentment have perhaps been exaggerated by Darnton, and that they were simply poor intellectuals who wrote whatever sold and were more than happy to attach themselves to wealthy and influential patrons such as the duc d’Orleans. Of course, this does not do much to undermine Darnton’s hypothesis, and Popkin himself even admitted to the inherent plausibility of Darnton’s hypothesis.14 Darnton’s argument is that these writers influenced the revolutionaries, and not the Enlightenment philosophes.

However, the question of what motivated them is a more complicated one and one that Darnton has since answered. These writers had arrived in Paris expecting to be received as eminent writers and to rise up as Voltaire did, but instead they plummeted to the bottom and so had to do whatever was required to survive. Grub Street was no gentlemanly affair, but a “grim struggle for survival” that “brought out baser elements.”15 Whether they harboured the vitriolic hatred of the establishment as Darnton suggests, and thus merely hedging their bets, or if they were simply downtrodden opportunists who were radicalised by their life at the bottom rung, many of their writings were certainly nefarious and dark. One Charles Thevenau de Morande produced work of such ghastly degradation that its depravity caused Voltaire to refer to it in horror as “one of those satanic works… where the most atrocious and most absurd calumny spreads a horrible poison on everything one respects and loves.”16

One aspect, however, that Darnton has perhaps overlooked is the indirect role that the Enlightenment played in influencing revolution. Many of these men had grown up as youths really believing that the ‘republic of letters,’ in fact, really did exist, and that they could be the next Voltaire or Diderot. In this sense, the Enlightenment led these men to aspire to be writers, and thus led to them ending up as radical Grub Street hacks, doing whatever literary work was needed just as long as it got them food on the table and a roof over their heads. More than this, however, the Enlightenment can also be argued to have made revolution possible. The central thesis of T. C. W. Blanning’s book The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture is that the Enlightenment era saw the rise of a ‘public sphere.’ That is to say “[b]y exchanging information, ideas, and criticism, these individuals created a cultural actor – the public- which has dominated European culture ever since.”17 What then is the relation between this new ‘general public’ and the Enlightenment?

It easy enough to see where the Grub Street hack writers would have come in. With the growing emphasis on newspapers, and other (what we would call) media outlets, this obviously left a gap for them to fill. More than this, public life began emphasising public venues, such as the theatre, and Blanning notes the ‘Querelle de Bouffons,’ a controversy that broke out over the merits of newer Italian opera, versus the older French operas of Lully of Rameau.18 This quarrel is interesting in that it not only involved the ‘general public’ but also the philosophes. Weighing in against Rameau was none other than Rousseau, Grimm and men such as Diderot and d’Alembert. The lesson Blanning claims can be inferred from this incident is that the court culture of Louis XIV began to be seen as outdated.19 Interestingly enough, d’Alembert wrote a pamphlet entitled ‘On the Liberty of Music.’ In it he writes that the ‘great political figures’ who oppose those argue for liberty in music complain that liberty in music is inextricably and inexorably linked with liberty in feeling, followed by liberty in thought, liberty in action, ending in the ruin of states.

Blanning notes that this is probably not too far off the mark. With the advent of the new Bouffon style of comedic opera, Rousseau saw the success of his own comic opera Le Devin du village, which Blanning argues “looks very much like an exercise in social criticism.”20 Rousseau then wrote his famous ‘Letter on French Music,’ whereby he accused the French of having no music, and that if they did it would be so much the worse for them. Such a brazen attack on French music caused deep offence, even amongst Frenchmen who preferred the Italian operas of the Bouffons and many made their complaints heard via print. As Outram notes, some of the new institutions and organisations that sprang up in this era “provided ways in which many different social strata could be exposed to the same ideas.”21 It was these institutions and this interchange of ideas that led to the emergence of a ‘new public sphere.’

Whence did this public sphere come? It was mostly the result of socio-political changes in not just Western Europe, but America also. Outram notes that the eighteenth century “was a time of economic expansion, increasing urbanisation, rising population, and improving communications in comparison to the stagnation of the previous century.”22 However, as Darnton notes, the philosophes themselves were not widely read in the lower classes. This new ‘general public’ read mostly gossip, pornography, and just general smut, which is generally where the Grub Street writers come in. The Grub Street writers, as we have previously discussed, were men who had grown up believing in a “republic of letters” but found out the hard way that unless you made it in the system of privilege and patronage, then you would not go very far. The one possible contradiction in Darnton’s hypothesis is that these Grub Street writers themselves actually read the Enlightenment philosophes or at least became somewhat acquainted with them. In the same way a youth today might aspire to become, say, an actor or musician, these men aspired to become the next Voltaire, or Diderot.

Upon finding that they could not succeed at their ambitious aspirations of fame and glory, and subsequently forced to live in the grim reality of Grub Street, they dispensed of such quaint ideals. In essence, they were desperate, and so wrote whatever would get them money. However, this can more or less be attributed to the socio-political factors above. It was the heightened sense of public awareness that gave a market for the writings of Grub Street, and made public opinion such a powerful force. Although the link between the Enlightenment philosophes and the Grub Street writers is there, which can further be demonstrated in how the revolutionaries attempted to justify their enterprise. In fact, more than this, Stromberg notes that, of the philosophes that were still alive, there was one group that attempted to “mediate between the great ideas of the past, on which they had been raised and which has dazzled them, and the tumultuous events of the present which might be the realisation of those ideas.”23 This group, however, ultimately failed, losing to the Jacobin faction, but this group distinctive and even had its own printing press to disseminate Enlightenment ideals to the general public.

It seems then, then the only link between the Enlightenment one can demonstrate is, at most, indirect. As Roger Chartier notes: “…the revolutionaries constructed a continuity that was primarily a process of justification and a search for paternity.”24 It should be clear, however, that the Enlightenment and the French Revolution are not as inexorably linked as previously assumed. A much more convincing argument, on the other hand, could be made in regards to the relationship between the Enlightenment and the American Revolution, but that is beyond the bounds of this essay to discuss. The biggest contributing factor were the new socio-political changes, and whether or not these changes were caused or influenced in any way by the Enlightenment is a question that shall not be addressed here (although certainly a relevant one!) A growing sense of public opinion and public awareness combined with the writings of Grub Street are ultimately what led to revolution, and whilst the link between Grub Street and the Enlightenment philosophes is certainly there, what also needs to be shown is that the public dissatisfaction with the court culture King Louis XIV and his successors was a result of the Enlightenment.

Perhaps the strongest conclusion that can be reached is that the philosophes were no revolutionaries, and even supported the current order, so if a more direct link could be shown between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, then it could simply be put down to a misuse of enlightened ideals, and not an intended outcome of the Enlightenment at all. Of course, whether a misuse of ideals is inevitable is a further question raised by all of this, and it seems that the philosophes themselves would be inclined to agree that it was, given their attitudes towards the lower classes. So, again, if there is a link between the Enlightenment and the revolution, it was because Enlightenment ideals filtered down to the lower classes too rapidly. Whilst Darnton has more or less shown that the philosophes were not widely read in the lower classes, it does leave the question of whether or not their ideals found their way to the lower classes anyway (in one form or another.) Whatever the answer, then it should not reflect too badly on the philosophes, given they were aware of such pitfalls themselves.

Bibliography
T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660-1789, Oxford University Press, (2002)
Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, Lydia G. Cochran, trns., Duke University Press, (1991)
Robert Darnton, The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France, W.W. Norton & Company, (1996)
Robert Darnton, In Search of the Enlightenment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 43, No.1, (March, 1971), University of Chicago Press, pp113-132
Robert Darnton, The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France, Past and Present, No. 51, (May, 1971), Oxford University Press, pp81-115
Haydn T. Mason, ed., The Darnton Debate: Books and Revolution in the Eighteenth Century, Voltaire Foundation Ltd., (1998)
Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment: New Approaches to European History, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, (2005)
Roland N. Stromberg, The Philosophes and the French Revolution: Reflections on Some Recent Research, The History Teacher, Vol. 21, No. 3, (May, 1988), Society for the History of Education, pp321-339

Notes:
1 For example, Peter Gay.
2 The same historians also tend to deny that the Enlightenment had any influence and all, not to mention postmodernism denies the objectivity of historical research. This is an irony that they otherwise appear to be blind to.
3 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment: New Approaches to European History, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, (2005), p126
4 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment, p131
5 Roland N. Stromberg, The Philosophes and the French Revolution: Reflections on Some Recent Research, The History Teacher, Vol. 21, No. 3, (May, 1988), Society for the History of Education, pp321-339, p323
6 Robert Darnton, In Search of the Enlightenment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 43, No.1, (March, 1971), University of Chicago Press, pp113-132, p119
7 Robert Darnton, The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France, Past and Present, No. 51, (May, 1971), Oxford University Press, pp81-115, p85-86
8 Robert Darnton, In Search of the Enlightenment, p127
9 Robert Darnton, In Search of the Enlightenment, p124
10 Robert Darnton, Two Paths Through the Social History of Ideas, from Haydn T. Mason, ed., The Darnton Debate: Books and Revolution in the Eighteenth Century, Voltaire Foundation Ltd., (1998), p253
11 Robert Darnton, The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France, p100
12 Robert Darnton, The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France, p101
13 Jeremy D. Popkin, Robert Darnton’s Alternative (to the) Enlightenment, from Haydn T. Mason, ed., The Darnton Debate: Books and Revolution in the Eighteenth Century, Voltaire Foundation Ltd., (1998), p110
14 Jeremy D. Popkin, Robert Darnton’s Alternative (to the) Enlightenment, from Haydn T. Mason, ed., The Darnton Debate, p108
15 Robert Darnton, The High Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France, p102
16 Ibid.
17 T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660-1789, Oxford University Press, (2002), p2
18 T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture, p357-360
19 T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture, p360
20 T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture, p363
21 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment, p12
22 Ibid.
23 Roland N. Stromberg, The Philosophes and the French Revolution, p327
24 Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, Lydia G. Cochran, trns., Duke University Press, (1991), p5

Norman Geisler: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing

2011-12-03T13:56:00.001Z

For those of you who don't know, a "controversy" has erupted in 'Evangelical circles' in the United States. I use inverted commas when I say "controversy" because the subject being discussed is so non-controversial that it is truly mind-boggling how anyone could be so infantile as to make an issue out of this. Michael Licona, a Christian apologist and New Testament scholar who has done admirable work for God's Kingdom, has recently published a new book that came out last year entitled The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach which is perhaps the most solid defence of the resurrection of Jesus to date. The source of the "controversy" in Dr. Licona's interpretation of Matthew 27, which describes an event where dead saints are resurrected on the eve of Jesus' crucifixion, an event only described in Matthew. Dr. Licona believes that it is best interpreted as apocalyptic imagery rather than as a historical event. Where is the controversy you may be asking? Indeed, when I first heard about this I asked the very same question. It seems as if Norman Geisler, whom I had never even so much as heard of prior to this 'debacle,' has taken issue with his interpretation, not because it is wrong but because it is "against inerrancy." I kid you not.

Now, I do not hold to Biblical Inerrancy, nor do I hold to Divine Inspiration or even Sola Scriptura. These are all infantile doctrines that have no place in a serious-minded Christian's theology, as they serve to undermine Christ's authority as God's sole revelation to humanity. They are not affirmed by scripture, nor are they necessary. Yet, I fundamentally disagree with Geisler. How does one's interpretation of scripture determine whether the Bible is inerrant? If Dr. Licona is correct, and the resurrection of saints was intended as apocalyptic rather than historical, how does this count as an error in any way? The issue is whether or not Dr. Licona is correct or not and, since I am personally friends with Licona's son-in-law Nick Peters and thus am in a position to know, I can tell you that Dr. Licona is the kind of man to accept correction with humility. Geisler would need to show that Licona's interpretation is erroneous.

However, this is not what Geisler has done. Instead, he has thrown a temper tantrum and resorted to the worst kinds of childish tactics. Not only has he consistently attacked Dr. Licona, repeatedly, but has now tried to poison the well against Dr. Licona by taking snippets of Licona's book where the word 'myth' (amongst others) is used and then presented them as if there were all from Licona's pen when in actual fact Licona is merely considering the hypotheses of others. Indeed, one such example comes from a footnote quoting somebody else! This is truly deplorable, and demonstrably un-Christian. Now, not being beleaguered by insufferably sub-Biblical doctrines derived from the still-born Reformation, I personally have no problem with accepting either interpretation. The interesting thing, however, is that a number of Licona's fellow Inerrantists have come out in support of him, even if they disagree with his interpretation. For example, William Lane Craig entertained this interpretation in a podcast back in 2008, and continues to defend Dr. Licona, as does Paul Copan, Daniel Wallace, JP Holding, et al.

One issue that I would also like to raise is that how one interprets this passage does not affect whether the Bible is inerrant or not and to suggest otherwise is perhaps the most prolific example of overweening stupidity and ignorance possible for any human being to articulate whilst simultaneously knowing how to function in human society. In order to deny inerrancy, then one has to suggest that the Bible could feasibly contain errors. Yet Licona is not suggesting this at all, he is suggesting that we have interpreted Matthew's intentions incorrectly. Geisler, it seems, is putting his personal interpretation of scripture on par with scripture itself. Something that I find deliciously ironic considering Geisler, as a fundamentalist 'evangelical' protestant, presumably holds to sola scriptura and all that other rubbish.

Now, Biblical Inerrancy and Divine Inspiration are inherently problematic for me. The general explanation is that God's Holy Spirit indwelt within the Apostles and miraculously caused them to write down exactly what God wanted. This raises a good number of major problems:
1. The Holy Spirit indwells in all Christians; those whom accept Jesus and follow His commands. As such, why were the Apostles inerrant in what they pontificated upon and regular Christians not?
2. Such overriding of the Apostles' free wills fits Calvinism, but not the Biblical description of Divine Providence.
3. Even if we accept Calvinism (as jarringly un-Biblical as it is), then we are still at a loss to explain why God allows some to be Inerrant, but not others (in the same way we are at a loss to explain why God chooses some to be saved and other to be damned under a Calvinist framework.)
4. The Apostles disagreed with each other. For example, the disagreement between Peter and Paul, which is recorded in scripture itself. If the Apostle's Gospel accounts were inerrant, then why aren't their other pontifications inerrant also?

It is much easier to believe what the Bible actually teaches: namely that God's Word (God the Son) became incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ of Nazareth and that God, being omniscient, chose the right time and place to become incarnate so that His message of salvation could be written down as accurately as humanly possible and that if there are any errors, they are tiny ones that do not affect His message whatsoever. I personally think no such errors have ever actually come to light, since I don't think any actually exist. I just don't hold to the incredibly naive belief that it is completely without error just because it is the Bible. Now, a stupid person might ask what basis we have for this if we deny inerrancy. Simple, the evidence. I believe what I believe based on evidence and experience. There is mountains of evidence for the general reliability of the Gospels, and I have experienced God. There is mountains of evidence that the resurrection occurred as a historical event. I do not do what Geisler does and blindly accept these things a priori just because I was bought up believing those things.

Geisler, in creating this controversy where no controversy existed, has handed the enemies of Christianity a powerful weapon. His conduct is uncharitable, and more seriously un-Christian. Dr. Licona is universally recognised as a foremost Christian Apologist and New Testament scholar whose work is both valued and well-received. Norman Geisler's legacy is denouncing such a well-renowned scholar as "denying inerrancy" simply for disagreeing with his personal interpretation of scripture. Matthew 7:15-16 says: "Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves. By their fruit you will recognize them. Do people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs from thistles?" I recognise Geisler's fruits as being thoroughly rotten to the core.

Kalam and Cosmology

2011-11-10T12:51:00.000Z

An important part of Kalam are the scientific facts supporting premise 2. Now, whilst I agree that an actual infinite number of things is impossible, I do not see why something cannot exist for an infinite period of time. I am personally leaning towards Craig's notion of God being eternal (and thus atemporal) sans the universe, and temporal since creation, but am as of yet undecided. However, I wanted to look at the scientific evidence for premise 2. The two pieces of scientific evidence that can be used to infer that the universe began to exist are: the expansion of the universe and the second law of thermodynamics. Regarding expansion, two theorems are cited, the Hawking-Penrose Singularity Theorem(s) and the Borde-Guth-Vilinken theorem.

As it stands, there are five exceptions to the Hawking-Penrose theorem:
1. Closed time-like curves.
2. Strong energy condition violated (eternal inflation.)
3. Quantum Gravity models.
4. Generic energy condition violated ("exotic" spacetime.)
5. No closed trapped surface in our past.

Of these, number 4 and 5 are not expected to be part of "reasonable" physical models of the universe.

Closed Time-like Curves
A Closed Time-like Curve is essentially where time is "closed." What this means is that if time were represented as a drawing, rather than being a straight line, it loops back on itself, thus returning to the starting point. As a physical reality, CTCs are "time-machines" whereby the universe is not cylical, but that it returns back to its original starting point, in essence "creating itself." This is a model proposed by J. Richard Gott and Li-Xin Li, whereby the universe's timeline loops back upon itself to "become it's own mother." In other words, the SAME big bang is occuring over and over again, rather than a series of different big bangs and big crunches. So, you can think of a CTC very much like a time-machine.

Of course, there is pretty serious physical problem with this model as it violates the Chronology Protection Conjecture. Gott and Li state that CTCs should exist in a pure vacuum state, with no real particles, Hawking radiation, or bubbles because this stray radiation would destroy the CTC. The reason for this is because the radiation would build up to infinity, producing infinite spacetime curvature and destroying the CTC. This is described by Kip Thorne using the following example:

"Imagine that Carole is zooming back to Earth with one wormhole mouth in her spacecraft, and I am sitting at home on Earth with the other. When the spacecraft gets to within 10 light- years of Earth, it suddenly becomes possible for radiation (electromagnetic waves) to use the wormhole for time travel: any random bit of radiation that leaves our home in Pasadena traveling at the speed of light toward the spacecraft can arrive at the spacecraft after 10 years’ time (as seen on Earth), enter the wormhole mouth there, travel back in time by 10 years (as seen on Earth), and emerge from the mouth on Earth at precisely the same moment as it started its trip. The radiation piles right on top of its previous self, not just in space but in spacetime, doubling its strength. What’s more, during the trip each quantum of radiation (each photon) got boosted in energy due to the relative motion of the wormhole mouths (a “Doppler- shift” boost)."

The radiation keeps piling on top of itself, over and over again with Doppler-boosted energy making an infinitely strong beam of radiation. This beam would then produce a singularity, thereby (probably) destroying the wormhole and preventing a time-machine from ever existing. Gott and Li, however, are aware of this problem and have proposed the following solution. They have proposed a special zero-temperature empty space, called an "adapted Rindler vacuum" as a special initial state for the universe. However, such a move has produced further problems, indicated by William Hiscock and D.H. Coule, et al.. The first problem is that their choice of initial conditions are incredibly finely-tuned. Coule notes that the Gott-Li model is only possible in Misner space with identification scale b = 2p, or b = 2pr0 for the multiple de Sitter case. Not only is this inconsistent with Quantum uncertainty, but this parameter is not a constant but liable to change dynamically. When it does change, the CTC destabilises. Secondly, given more realistic physical force fields, such a vacuum is also unstable.

Eternal Inflation
The second exception are inflation models, such as chaotic inflation. Cosmic inflation was proposed to solve a number of problems that otherwise pervaded the standard model. For example, the horizon, flatness, and cosmic relic problems. Alan Guth's proposal was that the universe underwent a period of exponential super-rapid expansion. Inflationary theory is now generally well-accepted. However, inflationary theory has led to inflationary models of how the universe came to be, such as Andrei Linde's chaotic inflation model. In this model, the big-bang is just a regional event within a multiverse of expanding bubbles, with each bubble giving rise to even more expanding regions, and so on ad infinitum. However, a theorem produced by Guth, along with Arvin Borde and Alexander Vilenkin states that such an inflating universe must have had a beginning. They explain:

"Our argument shows that null and time-like geodesics are, in general, past-incomplete in inflationary models, whether or not energy conditions hold, provided only that the averaged expansion condition Hav > 0 holds along these past-directed geodesics. A remarkable thing about this theorem is its sweeping generality. We made no assumptions about the material content of the universe. We did not even assume that gravity is described by Einstein’s equations. So, if Einstein’s gravity requires some modification, our conclusion will still hold. The only assumption that we made was that the expansion rate of the universe never gets below some nonzero value, no matter how small. This assumption should certainly be satisfied in the inflating false vacuum. The conclusion is that past-eternal inflation without a beginning is impossible."

Interestingly enough, it has also been argued that eternal inflation cannot be future eternal either: http://arxiv.org/abs/1106.3542. Of course, as with the Hawking-Penrose theorem, there are exceptions to the Borde-Guthe-Vilenkin theorem:
1. Infinite contraction (such as de Sitter cosmology.)
2. Asymptotically static models.
3. Infinite cyclicity (such as the Baum-Frampton model, or Penrose's CCC.)
4. Time reversal at singularity (Aguirre-Gratton model.)

Infinite Contraction
This is where a spatially infinite universe contracts down to a singularity and then "bounces" into our present expansion. Therefore, the universe would not be, on average, in a state of cosmic expansion since the contraction phase 'cancels it out.' This is problematic for several reasons. Not only do the initial conditions have to be extremely fine-tuned, the collapse phase is so unstable as to require an additional level of fine-tuning so that it will be able to the collapse can turn around back into an expansion. Otherwise, a certain phenomenon known as "BKL chaos" occurs, which prevents such a bounce occurring. This requires an extraordinary amount of fine-tuning.

Asymptotically Static Space-time
An asymptotically static space is one in which the average expansion rate of the universe over its history is equal to zero, since the expansion rate of the universe “at” infinity is zero. Hence, the universe, perhaps in the asymptotic past, is in a static state neither expanding nor contracting. However, we know from observation that the universe has indeed been expanding, so how can it be said to have an average expansion of zero throughout it's history? William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair offer the following example:

"Would not the average expansion rate have to be greater than zero? No, not when we include “infinity” in the average. Consider an analogy in which the local government decides that, henceforth, everyone will pay property taxes according to the average value of property (per acre) in the county instead of on one’s individual assessment. This might be good or bad for you, depending on whether you live in the high end district. But suppose that your county suddenly expanded to include the Sahara Desert. The Sahara is worthless and big, hence the average value of property, by the square mile, dives precipitously. Further, the larger the Sahara is, the closer to zero one’s property taxes will be. In the limit as the Sahara grows to infinite size, one’s property taxes will go to zero. In a similar way, a zero expansion condition at infinity would have the same impact on the average expansion rate."

Ellis, et al. propose that the universe initially existed in such a state (known as an Einstein Static State) and transformed into the universe we see today via an inflationary phase. However, such a model is not past eternal either. How such an ESS is unstable. Small fluctuations in the size of the universe are inevitable (given Quantum Theory) and thus such a state cannot remain in balance for an infinite time. Secondly, the observable universe is NOT static, and the required mechanism to force such a transition between an ESS and our own universe (either a quantum or thermal fluctuation) implies that this initial ESS is not infinite. If you utilise the low-energy solution of loop quantum gravity, then this protects against perturbations of a limited size, however smaller perturbations would eventually build up leading to the creation of a universe such as ours. In other words, we can again infer the finitude of the ESS based upon the mechanism that gets us from the ESS to our current universe.

Cyclic Models
Cyclic models are those that postulate that our big bang is but one in an infinite cycle of big-bangs and crunches. In this respect, our universe never begins to exist; or rather, our big bang is A beginning rather than THE beginning. The overwhelming problem for such models lies in the second law of thermodynamics, as for every cycle, entropy increases. In other words, only a finite number of cycles are possible until the universe reaches a state of maximum entropy and suffers heat death. In recent years, there have been serious efforts to revitalise such models with the Baum-Frampton model and (even more recently) the Penrose Conformal Cyclic Cosmology. Paul Frampton and Lauris Baum propose that phantom energy, a type of dark energy with an equation of state (the ratio between pressure and energy density) less than -1, pervades the universe. This leads to a type of expansion that typically is thought to lead to a Big Rip. However, Baum and Framptom propose that, very close to the Big Rip event, the universe splits into noninteracting and causally disconnected patches. Most of these patches only contain phantom energy and are devoid of normal matter and radiation. The entropy content of the universe is contained in the patches containing thinly spread out particles and radiation. The patches only containing phantom energy then contract by an amount exactly equal to the expansion the universe underwent since the Big Bang. Prior to reaching a singularity, the contracting patches then "bounce" into another expansion phase. The process then repeats, with each patch fractioning into more baby universes with each cycle.

The problems with such a model, however, are legion. First, in order to avoid the BVG theorem, the average contraction for every geodesic must equal exactly the average expansion, but this is again something that would require extraordinary amounts of fine-tuning. The second problem is how exactly the various patches remain causally disconnected. Given infinite past time, an infinite amount of matter and radiation would have been produced, and the model avoids infinite entropy by removing it to different patches. However, simply shoving the entropy into other patches raises the question of whether or not, given infinite time and a countable infinity of patches, that these patches must eventually collide. The causal disconnection mechanism that occurs in lieu of the Big Rip does not work because the disconnected patches do come back into causal contact. After all, causal horizons are not real physical barriers. Thirdly, certain factors would prevent a singular bounce. Contracting space filled with quantum fields will have a certain "ergodic" property as it shrinks. The fields will become excited and produce chaotic fluctuations which will prevent cycling as spontaneously created matter with a different equation of state will dominate the energy field. Lastly, these inhomogeneous fluctuations would result in the appearance of a fluid of black holes leading to a "Black Crunch."

A second cylic model is Roger Penrose's Conformal Cyclic Cosmology. Penrose suggests that the initial "singularity" is, in reality, the same thing as the open ended de-Sitter like expansion which our universe seems about to experience. However, the main problem with such an equivalence is that the entropy of the initial state of the universe is vanishingly small, whereas the entropy of the de-Sitter like end state is maximized. Penrose, however, has opted to invoke a non-unitary loss of information at black holes in order to equalise this entropy. However, this approach does not succeed as information is not lost to black holes. Lastly, Penrose has recently claimed observational support of concentric rings of low variance in the CMB data provided by the WMAP. However, two papers have been published both of which were unable to replicate Penrose's results:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1012.1268
and
http://arxiv.org/abs/1012.1305

Time-Deconstruction
A fourth way to avoid the BGV theorem where the arrow of time reverses at the t = -infinity hypersurface so that the universe expands into both halves of the full de-Sitter space. It is possible, then, to evade the theorem through a gross deconstruction of the notion of time. Suppose one asserts that in the past contracting phase the direction of time is reversed. Time then flows in both directions away from the singularity. However, this model denies the evolutionary continuity of the universe which is topologically prior to t and our universe. The other side of the de Sitter space is not our past. For the moments of that time are not earlier than t or any of the moments later than t in our universe. There is no connection or temporal relation whatsoever of our universe to that other reality. Efforts to de-construct time thus fundamentally reject the evolutionary paradigm.

Quantum Gravity Models
The final exception to the Hawking-Penrose theorem are Quantum Gravity models. The Hawking-Penrose singularity theorem is based on General Relativity, but GR breaks down when we get to the very small. Thus, a Quantum description of Gravity is required to explain the earliest phases of the universe where GR breaks down. Quantum Gravity Models can be categorised into three groups:
1. String models (such as the Veneziano-Gasperini Pre-Big Bang inflation model and the Steinhardt-Turok Ekpyrotic Cyclic model.)
2. Loop quantum models (such as Bojowald, et al.'s cyclic LQG model, and Ellis et al.'s asymptotically static model.)
3. Semiclassical models (such as Vilenkin's Quantum Tunnelling model and the Hartle-Hawking No Boundary model.)

String Scenarios
String theory is probably the most popular area within Quantum Gravity, and perhaps the most well-known publicly. String theory postulates that the most fundamental elementary particles are tiny 1-dimensional vibrating strings and postulated a minimum size known as the planck length. This area of research has opened up a wide new range of ideas, and is a very fruitful area of research. As such, there are currently two string models that seek to describe a past-infinite pre-Big Bang era, the pre-Big Bang scenario of Gabriele Veneziano and Maurizio Gasperini, and the Ekpryotic Cyclic model of Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok.

Pre-Big Bang Inflation
This model postulates a pre-Big Bang state much like our post-Big Bang state. Since our state is eternal into the future, the previous state was eternal into the past. Whereas our state will develop into a nearly empty, widely dispersed collection of thin gas and radiation, this is what the previous state was developing from. Through gravitational contraction, regions of the pre-Big Bang universe turned into black holes and, due to quantum effects, once the black holes have reached a certain critical density, they undergo a "bounce" into a big bang. However, Veneziano suggests that this beginning is infinitely distant and never reachable. If this is to be interpreted realistically, then one might ask how we ever arrived at the present if this is the case. However, the models does have an initial phase:
(1) a static (Milne) universe, or string perturbative vacuum (SPV) phase, which is then followed by...
(2) a quasi-Milne phase, which is a "perturbed" SPV.
(3) an inflationary phase.
(4) a Post-Big Bang FRW phase typical of the standard big bang model.

The SPV is unstable, which is why it is not eternally static but leads to the following phases, meaning that it must be finite in the past.

Ekpyrotic Cyclic Scenario
The Ekpyrotic Cyclic Scenario is one that postulates a higher-dimensionality. That is to say, in this model, our universe exists within a brane, and these branes collide. Our big bang and subsequent expansion was caused when our brane collided with another. Eventually, our universe is subject to heat death death and then another big bang is started by the next collision. But has such a model been cycling forever? Steinhardt and Turok suggest that the universe began in a singularity but that it has been cycling forever. The Ehpyrotic scenario successfully evades the BKL chaos, but such a model is not an exception to the BGV theorem, and so requires a beginning. Borde, Guthe, and Vilenkin apply their theorem even to higher dimensional cosmologies such as the Steinhardt-Turok model and so this is does not avert a beginning.

Loop Quantum Gravity
Loop Quantum Gravity takes the view that space-time is quantised, in other words, divided into discrete constituent parts. As with string theory, there is a minimum size in nature that prevents infinite singularities from occurring. It is important to note that Bojowald, et al. are not committed a model with an infinite past, so falsifying an infinite cycle would not necessary falsify LQG per se. However, our focus here is whether or not LQG can really be infinite.

There are two problems that the LQG model must overcome and that is:
(1) there is no known physical mechanism for producing a cyclic "bounce."
(2) thermodynamic considerations show that the universe of this present day should have reached thermodynamic equilibrium (aka 'heat death.')

Martin Bojowald, the foremost exponent and defender of LQG today believes he has solutions to both of these. With regards to the first problem the major issue is overcoming the aforementioned BKL chaos. This chaos has shown to be calmed by a LQG approach. However, the second problem is far more challenging. How can there be truly cyclic behaviour when the second law of thermodynamics predicts that entropy increases from cycle to cycle? Using a semi-classical approach, the end of out current cycle should differ in entropy from the beginning by a factor of 10^22. Given no energy input, how can such an outcome be avoided? There are three proposed solutions to this:
1. The problem is epistemic only.
2. Our current classical understanding of entropy is misleading.
3. Cycle by cycle, the entropy state is genuinely reversible.

Regarding the first solution, Bojowald proposes that there is a large, unobservable part of the initial singularity that is genuine generic manifold, which is a state of maximum entropy featuring random inhomogeneity and anisotropy. The entropy of the initial and final singularities would be similar and an inflation mechanism of a small patch of this manifold would then produce the requisite homogeneity and isotropy. However, it is exceedingly improbable to find ourselves as the product of an inflationary event of a generic manifold. We should be seeing a universe roughly 1/10th the size of our own if it were the case as it is exceedingly improbable for a universe of our size to arise from such an event. The second, bigger, problem is that this epistemic account takes no account of entropy generation during the cycle, and over infinite time it would build up. The same thing goes for the second solution. Even if the classical approach to entropy is misleading, the quantum approach would still recognise entropy build up. Therefore, the only remaining option is that LQG would need to be fully reversible but, as Bojowald admits, the jury is still out. In addition to the entropy issue, however, is the issue of dark energy. If dark energy is the form of a cosmological constant, then it would have led to open-ended expansion the first time. However, if dark energy takes the form of quintessence it is possible that there could be reverse consistent with a collapse phase, but this leads to a new problem. Different modes of the matter field would become excited such that the next bounce would differ from the preceding one, and so one particular cycle can lead to open-ended expansion. It would eventually reach open-ended expansion, and so cannot be infinite.

Semi-classical Inflation
Semi-classical models refer to models that attempt to explain how inflation got started quantum-mechanically. In such models, the universe is treated quantum mechanically and thus described by a wave function rather by classical space-time. The two major examples of such attempts come to us from none other than Alexander Vilenkin himself, who utilised a quantum tunnelling model, and from James Hartle and the famed Stephen Hawking. These models are interesting in that they describe the universe quantum mechanically, but our universe DOES have a beginning. How then do they overcome the problem of origins?

Vilenkin's Quantum Tunnelling Model
Alexander Vilenkin, one of three authors of the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, describes his approach thus:

"Many people suspected that in order to understand what actually happened in the beginning, we should treat the universe quantum-mechanically and describe it by a wave function rather than by a classical spacetime. This quantum approach to cosmology was initiated by DeWitt and Misner, and after a somewhat slow start received wide recognition in the last two decades or so. The picture that has emerged from this line of development is that a small closed universe can spontaneously nucleate out of nothing, where by ‘nothing’ I mean a state with no classical space and time. The cosmological wave function can be used to calculate the probability dis- tribution for the initial configurations of the nucleating universes. Once the universe nucleates, it is expected to go through a period of inflation, driven by the energy of a false vacuum. The vacuum energy is eventually thermalized, inflation ends, and from then on the universe follows the standard hot cosmological scenario."

Vilenkin uses an analogy of a particle that quantum tunnels through a potential well. An ordinary FRW universe classically does not have enough energy to escape into an open-ended expansion. However, in Quantum Mechanics, there is a probability that instead of recollapse, the universe will tunnel through the energy barrier and lead into an inflationary phase. Vilenkin's solution is that our universe arised from a state of null topology; a small, closed, spherical, and metastable universe. However, such a state has only existed, and in fact can only have existed for a finite amount of time, so whilst Vilenkin's model solves the problem of creation of OUR universe, it one-ups the problem. The universe clearly has a beginning in this approach.

Hartle-Hawking No Boundary Model
A similar approach us utilised by Stephen Hawking and James Hartle. They opt for Richard Feynman's approach to QM by seeking to find the probability for a certain final quantum state by a path integral "sum over histories." This is a superposition of states where every possible universe history is part of the wave function and each possible state has an associated probability of becoming actual. They estimate the subset of universes that are expected to dominate the calculations. They describe the earliest state that the universe emerges from as a Euclidian metric, which removes the initial singularity.

These models more or less take the same approach. Vilenkin notes:

"I understand that a universe of zero radius is not necessarily the same thing as no universe at all. But mathematically my quantum tunneling from nothing is described by the same “shuttle- cock” geometry as Hartle and Hawking [NB Figure 3.21]. (In fact, the shuttlecock first appeared in my 1982 paper.) This geometry is certainly not past-eternal, and there is no point on the Euclidean sphere which you can identify as the initial universe of zero size. So, if the Hartle- Hawking approach avoids the “paradoxes of creation”, I don’t see why my mine doesn’t."

Whilst the authors of these models might think otherwise, there are a number of factors why such a state prior to the universe is itself finite. Gott and Li offer a number of critique of these semi-classical approaches (which ironically also serve to undercut their preferred CTC model) and show that such a prior state is not past eternal.

(1) Transitions in QM are always between allowed classical states (Vilenkin and Hartle–Hawking’s approach has a transition from a classically forbidden region to a classically allowed region).
(2) The Vilenkin and Hartle–Hawking approaches should contain realistic energy fields (something closer to what we actually see in nature). If they did, then Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle would require that the initial state of their models have a finite and nonzero energy. It that is the case, then semi-classical quantum models actually start in a classically allowed metastable state, rather than “nothing.”

The semi-classical quantum gravity approaches of Vilenkin, Hartle, and Hawking ironically posit a universe that began to exist. A fact that is either not realised or glossed over. Probably a bit of both, considering physicists aren't philosophers (which Stephen Hawking's book The Grand Design makes abundantly clear.) So, yes, there are exceptions to both theorems, however either the exceptions are not viable, or there is another condition that requires a beginning.

Criticising William Lane Craig

2011-11-04T13:26:00.001Z

William Lane Craig is probably today's foremost defender of Christian theism, and definitely one of the most well-known Christian philosopher and theologian. As such, he has come under considerable attack from atheists. Now, I have defended Dr. Craig consistently, and will continue to do so. However, some have accused me of being uncritical of Dr. Craig, of following everything he says and spouting "Craigisms." Oh really? Well, unfortunately for these Dawkinsian automatons, I don't. I am critical of Dr. Craig, when I think he is actually wrong. Let's consider a few points now.

1. His style of presentation.
I agree with Peter Hitchen's assessment that Craig's manner of presentation is "too American." As much as I admire Dr. Craig and his work, and whilst I enjoy listening to him speak, in debates he tends to try and pack as many points into as tight a space as possible. I don't think this is necessarily a bad thing, however. My primary criticism is that this style opens Dr. Craig up to the attack that he is using the "Gish Gallop" style of debate. That he is trying to bog down his opponent with as many points as possible. Now, such an attack is an ad hominem, and thus invalid, but stupid, uncritically minded people would think this a salient point. I think it would be better if Craig focused on a smaller number of arguments in debates, rather than try and fire off as many as he can and then just stick to the one's his opponents address. Now, a skilled opponent would be able to keep up, but, let's face it, not every great thinker is always a great speaker.

2. Burden of Proof
Dr. Craig quite rightly points out that whilst theists have the burden of proof to show that God exists, atheists have an equal burden to show that God does not exist. However, my chief criticism is Dr. Craig's seemingly pedantic insistence that his opponent "tear down" all his arguments and then erect their own. In writing, this is a perfectly reasonable demand, but I think in an oral debate, such a request seems a bit too much, unless the opponent is skilled enough of a debater, and again opens Dr. Craig up to the ad hominem attack mentioned above.

3. The Witness of the Holy Spirit and Proper Basicality
I agree that it is the witness of the Holy Spirit that ultimately converts a person to Christ or not. However, I do not think this is an argument for the existence of God. Now, whilst Craig notes that this is not an argument from the existence of God, I do not think that he is clear enough, and sometimes it sounds like he is speaking as if it is an argument. The personal religious experience of human beings is meant to show that belief in God is "properly basic." That is to say, that there are no de jure arguments against theism, only de facto objections. This may be an important qualifier, but it is not an argument FOR God, and I think Craig needs to be a lot clearer about this.

3. Divine Command Theory and the Moral Argument
I don't think Craig's divine command theory or moral argument are sound. Now, as part of a cumulative case for the existence of God, Craig's moral argument is fine, but as a stand alone argument it does not work. Now, I agree with Craig on each premise. If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist. Objective moral values and duties exist. So, why do I think this isn't a good argument? Because I don't see how it can be demonstrated that objective moral values and duties exist without first showing that God exists. My agreeing that they exist is not an argument. I could be wrong, however unlikely that might seem. Craig could be wrong. We could all be wrong! How do we know that moral values and duties are truly objective? After all, the argument that our moral beliefs are illusory could be true! There could be no moral values and duties at all! I do not think that this is true, but that is only because I already have good reasons for believing in God. Thus, the moral argument's purpose is only to show that objective morality is dependent on God, not that God actually exists.

Moving on to Craig's divine command theory, I agree with Craig that the good is grounded in God's nature. However, I think that this idea is underdeveloped. Whilst I agree that being good is simply to be obedient to God, that is only because I believe God is actually good. If God were evil, then He would not be worthy to be obeyed or worshipped, no matter how powerful all knowledgeable he is. Now, I have no trouble admitting that God orders something only if it is good. Atheists and theists alike think this is problematic for it implies a standard of goodness apart from God. I don't see how this is so. It is my contention that this standard of goodness exists only if a good God exists. To understand why I think this is so, it is important to understand what I think goodness is based upon. When we moralise, we assume that our lives have intrinsic worth. When we do something that devalues this worth, it is morally wrong. So, if I were to walk up to someone and punch them in the face because I enjoyed punching people in the face, that would be morally wrong, because I am not treating that person as if their life has any intrinsic value. So, now why do I think this standard of goodness is dependent on a good God? Well, for the simple reason that without a moral lawgiver, we don't have any reason whatsoever to actually follow this standard of goodness. However, even more important than this, if a good God does not exist, then our lives have no intrinsic value. Now, these points can of course be debated. I am merely just describing where I disagree with Craig and elucidating my own views.

4. Jesus' Dishonourable Burial
In a 2004 article that Craig wrote for the Expositor Times, he addressed an essay by one Byron McCane, titled "Where No One Had Yet Been Lain: The Shame of Jesus' Burial" which can be found in "Authenticating the Activities of Jesus" by B.D. Chilton and C.A. Evans (eds.) I shall summarise McCane's case, with quotations and then mention the points bought up by Craig and offer a response to them. The central premises of McCane's article are:
• The processes of burial and mourning were meant to honour the dead and the denial of these honours was a further dishonour.
• Based on Jewish custom, the Jewish leadership in Jesus’ day would have wanted Jesus buried, not left on the cross.

"Ordinarily, death is an event which disrupts the functioning social order, for the death of any particular individual tears away a member of a social network and forces the network to reconstitute itself. Death rituals – i.e., burial customs and rites of mourning – are social processes which the wounds which death inflicts on the social group. By burying the dead and mourning their absence, members of a society affirm that someone significant had been lost. When the Romans did not permit the burial of crucifixion victims, then, they were doing more than merely showing off the power of Rome: they were also declaring that the deaths of these victims were not a loss to Roman society. Far from it, the deaths of condemned criminals actually served to strengthen and preserve Rome, protecting and defending the social order of the Empire." - Byron McCane, Where No One Had Yet Been Lane: The Shame of Jesus' Burial, from B.D. Chilton, and C.A. Evans, eds., Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, Brill, (1998), p433

"For Jews, one of those values was the importance of belonging to an extended family group. The foundational narrative for Jewish culture was a story about a man whose descendents were to be more numerous than the starts in the sky, and respect for the family was enshrined in the moral charter of Judaism: “honor your father and mother.” Jews in Jesus’ day typically lived in extended family groups, and routinely identified themselves in legal documents, inscriptions, and literature as “X, son (or daughter) of Y.” At life’s end, they thought it best to be buried with their nearest kin. To be buried away from the family tomb – by design, not by fate – was to be cast adrift from these cultural patterns, and dislodged from a place in the family. To be unmourned by one’s nearest relatives was to be effaced from the cultural landscape. It was worse than unfortunate, it was a shame." - Byron McCane, Where No One Had Yet Been Lane: The Shame of Jesus' Burial, from B.D. Chilton, and C.A. Evans, eds., Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, Brill, (1998), p444

Whilst it was customary to leave crucifixion victims on their crosses to be eaten birds, sometimes the Romans did allow them to be buried, and since it was prohibited in Judaism to leave a man hanging on a tree, then it makes sense that the Jewish authorities would have petitioned to bury Jesus. Burying Jesus away from the family tomb was their way of dishonouring Jesus themselves, and was not against the precepts of Judaism. Furthermore, the admission in the Gospels narratives that Joseph of Arimathea, a member of the Sanhedrin, buried Jesus rather than His family or disciples, is another extremely embarrassing feature of the Gospel story. A dishonourable burial coupled with the fact a member of the Sanhedrin burying Jesus would have been very shameful for the early Christians to admit.

Let's look at Craig's points. Now, and this is a point some others have made, I think Craig's main fault here is that he simply doesn't take seriously or doesn't fully understand the social-cultural background here. 1st century Jews, Greeks, and Romans all live in societies that operated on an honour-shame oriented collectivist cultural setting. Furthermore, their understanding of honour and shame was radically different to our own. The closest parallel would be Japanese culture, for instance where warriors would commit Seppuku (ritual self-disembowelment) if they faced capture in battle (dying in battle was considered more honourable than allowing oneself to be caught by the enemy) or as a means of capital punishment if said Samurai had committed a major offence, thus bringing a major amount of shame to the community. So, when Craig says that simply being buried away from the family tomb isn't a dishonourable burial, I think that Craig is simply pre-supossing a modern view of honour onto ancient people. You have to remember, in the 1st century, societies were collectivist (or agonistic) cultures. The family unit was of fundamental importance, and the collective society as a whole superseded individualism.

What then of Craig's others points? These I think are better although similarly miss the mark. He notes that Jesus died in Jerusalem, and that surely people regularly died away from their family location. Yes and no. Yes, Jesus died in Jerusalem, and others surely did die away from their family location. However, the overwhelming majority of people tended to stay with their families. Secondly, it was the duty of the family to retrieve the remains of their deceased and give them a proper burial. He points out that poor people could not have afforded a family tomb. This is also true, but irrelevant. The poor were frequently subjected to dishonour at the hands of the wealthy and elite. That was their place in life, and something that they simply tolerated. Being poor was considered shameful.

One further point Craig makes is that the language used doesn't seem dishonourable. He argues that the treatment of Jesus' body by Joseph of Arimathea is honourable, not dishonourable. This is actually true, from the description given, Joseph treats Jesus' body with respect. However, this would not have been enough to mitigate the dishonour of either Jesus' crucifixion or his burial. This does not change that being buried away from the family tomb and lack of mourning rites WERE dishonourable to these people.

5. Biblical infallibility and the Old Testament Conquest
When discussing the Old Testament, one issue that is bought up is the slaughter of the Canaanites. One of his responses was to say that, at worst, the OT is fallible. Either it didn't happen, or God did not really command it. I agree that these are possibilities, but I think Craig should explore these ideas further. Presumably, he is forbidden from actually denouncing inerrancy, since Talbot requires its faculties to agree to inerrancy, and so keeps shtum, lest he loses his job. These leads to one gripe I have with most of Christianity as a whole. Why do people think inerrancy is necessary? I admire Craig for even hinting that the Bible could be fallible, (and I know of Christians who are inerrantists, such as JP Holding and Michael Licona), who freely admit that such beliefs are not necessary to Christianity. Now, I wanted to discuss Craig's other responses to the OT conquests. Whilst I agree that it was not really a genocide or even a conquest, but a driving out, and that the Canaanites were truly evil, I don't think his suggestion that it really happened was rather convincing. Now, I agree that children who die too young ostensibly go to heaven, and that even those who die without ever knowing Jesus might somehow be allowed into heaven providing certain conditions are true, however, why think God when then take a "Kill them all, I know my own, attitude?" God has the authority to take life, granted, but such a command seems to me malicious. The parents were evil, yes, but why kill innocents along with? The simple answer to this is that there was no such command. Some children would have been killed, but only if they were "of age" so to speak. The truly young would have been spared, and this can be inferred from the linguistic not to mention the socio-cultural context. In order for Craig to show that God was moral to command the Israelites to kill innocent children, he seriously needs to develop this idea more. I think that it isn't moral, although I could be wrong, no matter how unlikely I think it is.

6. Craig's stance on evolution and Intelligent Design.
Whilst I am aware of Craig's view on evolutionary theory and biology, and even agree with it (at least partially), I think he is a little too unclear on this. Whilst he freely admits to not being a creationist, and that he accepts the age of the earth and the age of the universe estimates provided by scientists, his statements on evolution are often vague and apt to be misinterpreted. For instance, he often says that macroevolution is a leap in logic. I initially thought he was making the classic micro/macro error, but it turns out that his criticism here was that he didn't think the current proposed mechanisms in evolution were enough to sufficiently demonstrate the reality of large scale or "macro" evolution. This is fare less controversial, and even something I potentially agree with. Whilst I see no difference between micro and macroevolution, it is possible, and I think it might even actually be true that scientists haven't provided a full account of how evolution has occurred. Craig thinks new mechanisms are required to explain macroevolution (although I am unsure if he actually believes macroevolution HAS actually occurred. Again, my chief criticism here is that is a little unclear, although, again, it could be simply down to Talbot's "statement of faith" that Craig has to agree to in order to work there (not to mention various societies he is a member of.) In which case, this is more a fault with the narrow-minded and dogmatic views of certain Christians.

Now, I have admitted where and why I disagree with Craig, but note how I have not once called him names, suggested he is dishonest (etc.) or implied anything derogatory or defamatory about him.

Primary Source Analysis: Rousseau’s Profession of Faith of Savoyard Vicar (1762)

2011-10-31T13:11:00.000Z

The piece in question is a section from the novel Emile by French enlightenment author, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from the section of the book entitled Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar. Emile is a treatise on the nature of education and the nature of man, and the section of the book Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar being intended to provide an example of how religious matters should be discussed with young people. Emile is written in the form of a novel, and the ideals that Rousseau wishes to promote are expressed via the characters. Specifically, Rousseau, in writing Emile sought to describe a system of education that would enable, what he refers to in The Social Contract as “natural man” to survive a corrupt society. The character of Emile and his tutors being used to describe how this “natural man” would go about being educated. The Savoyard vicar is said to represent Rousseau’s own ideas on religion, and was supposedly based upon two Savoyard priests that Rousseau had known in his childhood: Abbé Gaime from Turin and Abbé Gâtier from Annecy.

Rousseau was a French Enlightenment philosophe and writer most famous for his brilliantly written essays. The French Enlightenment was strongly characterised by an attitude critical both of religion in general and Christianity in particular, and a number of Enlightenment thinkers outside of France held similar views also. However, Rousseau was different in that, whilst he was a deist, he disagreed regarding several key points. First of all, he denied the materialism of men such as d’Holbach, Diderot, et al. Secondly, he was highly critical of rationalism. Rousseau was famous for his emphasis on emotion and romanticism. One of Rousseau’s key ideas was that of “natural man.” Rousseau believed that man should live by his emotions and instincts; man should act naturally. As such, he defended what he referred to as “natural religion,” which is a sentiment expressed in Emile. The language employed in Savoyard Vicar is emotive and sensual. For example, consider how the Savoyard Vicar describes how he knows that God exists: “I perceive the Deity in all his works; I feel him within me & behold him in every object around me…” and: “He remains at an equal distance from my senses & understanding (beyond reason.) (Emphasis mine.) Thus the God of Rousseau, as expressed by the Savoyard Vicar, is present in His creation and can be experienced, unlike the impersonal God of traditional Deism.

Rousseau is therefore arguing that God cannot be known via reason and the senses, but instead can only be known via personal religious experience. However, since God can only be known via such experiences, God’s nature, or ‘essence’ is thus fundamentally unknown (although Rousseau is adamant that omnibenevolence is an essential characteristic and attribute of God.) Rousseau, however, goes on to describe religious pluralism, or universalism. He maintains that what matters is your relationship with God, and so it does not matter what religious tradition you grew up in. In other words, all religions can lead to God. This is in sharp distinction to the other Enlightenment Deists, who believe that God can be demonstrated to exist via reason and logical arguments, and Christian Enlightenment figures such as John Locke who maintained the same. One slight discrepancy, however, is how, throughout the rest of the novel, religion plays no role in Emile’s life.

Rousseau’s argument is not particularly convincing, even if it does have some justification. Whilst it could be argued that belief in God is properly basic based on religious experience, so that there are no de jure objections to theism, the argument that God cannot be argued as existing via reason is unjustified. Rousseau himself argues that God is present within nature, but if that is the case than Rousseau’s argument, that God is inaccessible to reason and the senses, is undermined! In other words, he contradicts his own argument. Furthermore, it can be argued that subjective religious experiences ARE a form of sensory data. They might not be rational, but I do not think it can be argued that they are not a form of sense data. After all, atheists would presumably put religious experience solely to some form of neural activity, such as endorphins or similar (although such an argument could be criticised on the grounds that it commits the genetic fallacy.) Back to Rousseau’s emphasis on feeling, however, there are several good arguments for theism that ARE based on reason, the cosmological argument, the teleological argument, the axiological argument, the ontological argument, and the ratiological argument. These are arguments that theists, including many enlightenment thinkers themselves, have consistently used for centuries.

Thus I think Rousseau can be criticised on the grounds that he simply assumes his argument to be true. With that said, I do think there is some merit to the argument that God can be known via religious experience. I just don’t think it is the sole basis upon which can affirm a viable worldview. Rousseau was trying to justify religious belief in God, yet ironically enough his view that God can only be known through emotion and subjective experience, actually serves to undercut warrant in belief in God. Indeed, Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, David Hume, upon hearing that copies of Emile were being burned, remarked that: “[Rousseau] has not had the precaution to throw any veil over his sentiments; and, as he scorns to dissemble his contempt for established opinions, he could not wonder that all the zealots were in arms against him. The liberty of the press is not so secured in any country ... as not to render such an open attack on popular prejudice somewhat dangerous.” Rousseau was devastated and crushed by such words. Nonetheless, many of the ideals expressed in Emile became important in the field of pedagogy, despite its being burned, and became the basis for a new system of education. Whilst his religious ideas were certainly nuanced, and in some cases insightful, I think they fell short of the mark.

The Fundamental Underlying Principles of the US Constitution

2011-10-31T08:58:00.000Z

By 1783, the American War of Independence had ended with the Treaty of Paris. The fledgling nation of America had emerged victorious, overcoming the oppressive might of the British Empire. However, independence was thrust on the new nation as equally as it had been won. For whilst they had the ability to govern themselves, and without interference, it left them the entirely precarious position of having to govern the country for themselves. Quite simply, how were they going to do it? To make matters more complicated, they faced various economic and political problems. America’s place in international politics was very much indebted to French protection and guarantee, and the British were deliberately engaging in trading policies that provided them a monopoly over America. To top it all, Congress was practically useless and each state effectively went its own way. The US was in debt with no clear or discernible way of paying them off.

Despite obtaining its freedom and independence, America was therefore faced with three major obstacles to its progress as a nation. How was America going to solve its financial debt? How was America going to triumph over British merchants? How was America going to get out from under the political shadow of France and Great Britain? These three problems combined together to pose the following question: how was America going to devise a permanent framework for the government of the American nation? Things had gotten to the point that some in Massachusetts even attempted rebellion, although were dispersed by state militia. The time had come to amend the Articles of Confederation. The solution was that the US needed a strong national federal government, but the problem lay in decided how it should be run. Furthermore, they also had the anti-federalists to contend with, who were suspicious and distrustful of a national federal government.

It was decided that the states needed to meet together in convention to discuss America’s future, however, the states were reluctant to give-up their autonomy and quasi-independence, with the smaller states in particular quite nervous about their future. However, headway was made when James Madison arranged a conference between Virginia and Maryland to settle problems regarding the joint navigation of the Potomac River. The issue wasn’t settled, but it began to cement the idea of conference between the states. Virginia then tried arranging a conference in Maryland to discuss the trade of the United States, but only five delegates turned up. Yet this turned out for the better, as they concluded that the trade problems could only be solved once the Articles of Confederation were re-drafted, and a conference, this time in Philadelphia, was arranged. When the delegates met, one thing was clear, and that was an emphasis on the American experience. What was produced must be fit for Americans, justified solely by American hopes and aspirations.

They were unanimously nationalists and republicans. The central driving principle behind the convention was a need for American unity and solidarity in the face of economic and political troubles. The problem with the Articles of Confederacy was that they represented states, rather than the whole nation. They agreed on a national government, comprised of two chambers: the Senate and House of Representatives. However, disagreements soon arose. The large states wanted direct elections for both houses with representation for both being based upon population, whereas the smaller states wanted equal representation. Eventually, a compromise solution was reached with representatives being chosen by population, and two senators per state were chosen by state government, thus benefitting both large and small states. Another quarrel broke out over trade and slavery, but this too was resolved with compromise. On the 15th of September 1787, the delegates signed the constitution, leaving the arduous task of ratification ahead of them.

In the drive for ratification, two separate parties arose, one in support of the new constitution, the federalists, and one party against it, the anti-federalists. John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison wrote a series of essay published under the pseudonym ‘Publius’ that became known as the Federalist Papers, and circulated these to encourage people to ratify the constitution. However, the anti-federalists published their own set of anti-federalist papers. The chief issue of concern was that the anti-federalists feared that the new government would become a tyrannical one. They argued that a lack of bill of rights could lead to all sorts of abuses, and demolish the basis for individual liberty and freedom. Arguing against the bill of rights, however, in the federalist papers, Alexander Hamilton feared that such a bill would leave unmentioned rights unprotected. However, the states began to ratify one by one, and Madison promised that a bill of rights would be passed as a constitutional amendment when the new government met. This was apparently enough, as Virginia voted to ratify, and the new constitution was accepted.

With the new power of direct taxation, combined with a well-organised executive branch of the government, the United States could now raise a standing army, and even a navy. This meant that, soon, America would no longer be subservient to France and Spain, and would even be able to directly challenge Spain for control of the American West. The popular representation allowed for in the constitution meant that authorities would be subjected to elections. The politicians represented the people, and had the power to protect the people. The constitution also allowed for increased prosperity and pursuit of happiness. In short, even the anti-federalists were happy. In the history of the formation and ratification of this constitution then, we see a number of core underlying principles that were fundamental to the entire enterprise. The constitution was first and foremost a nationalistic document, something which was initially alarming to some, especially the anti-federalists. In the face of its economic and political problems, America needed unity, and it needed a strong national government. More than that, it was inherently a democratic and republican document. The Americans recognised all too well the fallen nature of man, and so came up with a system of government with checks and measures, and separation of powers to prevent tyrannical abuses of power.

Lastly, the constitution was founded on the notion of individual freedom and liberty. The chief concern of the anti-federalists was a lack of bill of rights, which they feared could lead to abuses of citizens’ rights. The bill of rights was eventually passed in later, after ratification, as an amendment, and served to outline a core set of human rights protected by law. Although one issue that remained a sticky subject was slavery, and was not fully resolved during the constitutional convention in Philadelphia. This issue would come back later to form the backdrop for the American Civil War, yet for now, this issue was put to one side. It would not be until 1806 that the Atlantic Slave Trade was halted, yet this does not change the fact that liberty and freedom were key values to the men involved in drafting the constitution, and as such became incorporated into it.

Bibliography: -
Hugh Brogan, The Penguin History of the USA, 2nd edition, (1999)
John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, The Federalist Papers
Patrick Henry, George Clinton, Robert Yates, et al., The Anti-Federalist Papers
The US Constitution

More on the Principle of Causation

2011-10-28T06:32:00.001+01:00

I just thought I'd do another little blogpost, this time solely on the first premise of Kalam. Johnnyp76 is still adamant, that it is fallacious, despite totally failing to show how. Indeed, despite having his arguments torn to shreds, he just keeps repeating the same thing over and over again.

Properties and Compositional Fallacies
Johnnyp76s argument, as you may recall, is that nothing begins to exist. However, I have already shown why this is fallacious. This argument commits a fallacy of composition (a fact that he has not yet addressed) and that is:
1. Matter is neither created nor destroyed.
2. Things within the universe are made of matter.
3. Therefore, things within the universe are neither created nor destroyed.

Now, consider the following argument:
1. Human cells are invisible to the naked eye.
2. Human beings are made of human cells.
3. Therefore, human beings are invisible to the naked eye.

This argument is quite clearly fallacious, and, in the same way, so is the argument of Johnnyp76. A point that Johnnypy76 just has NOT dealt with is that things possess necessary and essential properties that make those things what they are. Johnnyp76 complains that when does a chair stop becoming a chair? Because we cannot clearly define what makes a chair a chair, then there are no properties to be defined. This argument is even more absurd. There are clearly distinguishing features that allow me to identify a chair, and that also allow me to differentiate between a chair, and say a person. If objects and beings do not have essential properties that set them apart from other things, then that would make everything identical... but everything is clearly not identical.

Of course, objects and beings DO have essential properties. For example, the properties essential to personhood are as follows. P is a person if and only if:
i. P is a rational being.
ii. P is a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed.
iii. Others regard (or can regard) P as a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed.
iv. P is capable of regarding other beings as beings to which states of consciousness can be attributed.
v. P is capable of communication.
vi. P is self-conscious; that is P is capable of regarding him/her/itself as a subject of states of consciousness.

An essential property of being human would be:
-has human DNA.
-is a mammal.

It certainly would not be hard to come up with a more accurate list of properties, but the point remains, just because you can't readily or even precisely identify every property, the claim that properties are just abstractions is patently false. There is a clear discernible difference between a car and a slab of metal.

Efficient Causes
The biggest problem that the universe is made up of efficient causes and effects, even if we grant the proposition that properties are meaningless abstractions. For instance, if we posit a stationary ball, if it were to be put into motion by something else, then that is an example of efficient causality. It was CAUSED to move. We thus have a new effect, which was caused to occur. This is the sense in which Kalam takes the words CAUSE and BEGINS TO EXIST, in terms of efficient causality. William Lane Craig is quite clear that when Kalam says cause, it means 'whatever brings about its effect.' This is true whether it is being caused ex materia or ex nihilo. It is metaphysically impossible for an effect not to have a cause. This goes doubly so when we are talking about creatio ex nihilo. Johnnyp76 needs to show that an effect coming into being uncaused is metaphysically possible, yet this he cannot do, which presumably explains why he chooses to parade around in front of us with these jackanory objections.

Of course, Johnnyp76 hasn't even shown how I can exist both before and after my actual life time. His argument that the materials that made me up existed then is simply fallacious, for in what sense can a piece of moss or a dinosaur be said to be me? In what sense can a chunk of matter that has no properties in common with the chunk of matter that now makes up my body be said to be me? Indeed, this is simply Johnnyp76 assuming physicalism to be true in the face of all kinds of evidence. I hate to be the one to break it to you Johnny, but if your worldview does not fit the facts, then it is time to change your worldview to fit the facts, not the other way around.

What is Dawkins' Cowardice Level? IT'S OVER 9000!

2011-10-20T19:15:00.003+01:00

Another letter I have written to the Guardian (which, again, I doubt will get published.)

Dear Guardian,

I see that Richard Dawkins is continuing his unrelenting drive in defaming professor William Lane Craig again: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/20/richard-dawkins-william-lane-craig?CMP=twt_fd

I don't care if this does not get published, just make sure Dawkins gets this. If this is published, then so much the better for me I guess. Here is the full text of my letter: -

"Dear Richard,

Who am I? Well, nobody really. I'm from one of the larger towns on the Isle of Wight, which is not really saying much. Calling a town on the Isle of Wight large is like trying to find the most handsome man in a burns unit. I attend the University of Chichester and I am currently on my 2nd year of a BA (Hons) in History. Whilst you might deign that reading this is beneath you and your ivory tower, might I invite you to consider what I say? I doubt it. If you are unwilling to listen to the foremost scholars of today, then I doubt you'd pay attention to a 22 year old student with Asperger's Syndrome and Dyspraxia, hunched over in a corner typing away whilst listening to Polish death metal, fuelled by a combination of microwaveable pasta and Mountain Dew. Still, I can hope, can't I? After I complete my BA, I intend to study an MA, and perhaps obtain tenure somewhere, whilst I work on a PhD, and am currently writing a book, so maybe you'll hear of me after all? I have been carefully following your comments in regard to the debating tour of William Lane Craig, and I notice that your excuses and ad hoc rationalisations to justify your enfeebled cowardice have grown somewhat. How many is it now? 11 excuses? Let's have a look shall we?

1) You haven't heard of William Lane Craig before. Oh really? I guess that is why you wrote an endorsement for Victor Stenger's God: The Failed Hypothesis. A book which deals with some of Craig's argument (admittedly in a lacklustre and slapdash manner). Then there is the fact, Craig has debated AC Grayling (despite Grayling's assertions to the contrary,) Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and so on. Quentin Smith, an atheist philosopher, has written the following:
"William Lane Craig is a leading philosopher of religion and philosopher of time… More articles have been published on Craig's defence of the Kalam argument than any other contemporary argument for God's existence".

Jeffrey Jay Lowder, co-founder of the secular website Infidels.org, has come out in Dr. Craig's defence, saying that whilst he personally finds Craig unconvincing, Craig is neither nasty nor dishonest. What matters is the arguments. Dr. Craig has written hundreds of peer reviewed articles and authored over 30 books in the field of philosophy. I'm willing to bet you have not consulted any philosopher at all.

2) You'll only debate bishops. I guess that is why you have debated such esteemed intellectuals such as Ted Haggard, and Bill O'Reilly. In fact, you are scheduled to appear on the Bill O'Reilly show for a second time, despite maintaining elsewhere that appearing on shows like the Bill O'Reilly show is unproductive and a waste of time. Secondly, you have debated mathematician John Lennox and former biologist now theologian Alistair McGrath. They're not bishops now are they? Seems as if you've been telling us fairy stories. You know, I'm sort of tempted to join the priesthood now. That is, if Russian Orthodox clergy count. Something tells me you would quickly invent another convenient escape clause.

3) It'll look good on his CV, not yours. Au contraire, my dear narcissistic professor. Craig has debated intellectuals far more esteemed than yourself. He has debated Quentin Smith, Peter Atkins (and is scheduled to debate Atkins for a second time), Stephen Law, Richard Carrier, et al. The latest skull on his trophy rack belongs to that ponderous buffoon Lawrence Krauss, whose onanistic cry-baby rant on your website I found particularly amusing. Whereas atheist philosopher Daniel Came had some rather choice words for your refusal to take Craig on:
"The absence of a debate with the foremost apologist for Christian theism is a glaring omission on your CV and is of course apt to be interpreted as cowardice on your part".

You're an afterthought. I guess that must sting even more than your humiliation at the hands of John Lennox. Aww, poor baby. You're not the centre of public attention after all. Whatever shall you do?

4) You don't debate creationists. Good for you. Craig isn't a creationist. He believes the world is several billion years old, and the universe older still. He has gone on air specifically stating that he is not a creationist. I am not either, just in case you are wondering. Of course, this does not change the fact you debated some creationist woman whose name escapes me (Wendy something or other) and at some point was going to debate Kirk Cameron (the banana man's sidekick) until he later declined to show up. Honesty it seems, is a harsh mistress.

5) You won't debate people whose only claim to fame is being a professional debater. Perhaps you should check Dr. Craig's CV then?

Education:
Wheaton College — B. A. Communications, high honors 1971
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School — M. A. Philosophy of Religion, summa cum laude 1975
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School — M. A. Church History, summa cum laude 1975
University of Birmingham, England — Ph.D. Philosophy 1977
Universität München, Germany — D. Theol. Theology 1984

Employment:
Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion Trinity Evangelical Divinity School 1980-1986
Associate Professor of Religious Studies Westmont College 1986-1987
Visiting Researcher Université Catholique de Louvain 1987-1994
Research Professor of Philosophy Talbot School of Theology 1996-present
Visiting Professor of Philosophy Wheaton College 2003-present

I could go on.

6) You're busy. Indeed, busy promoting your new book The Magic of Reality on the Bill O'Reilly show. Ah, the irony. You're also retired aren't you? Surely, you could fit in the time to crush Craig? Ah, but then you'd be exposed as the pseudo-intellectual know-nothing you really are, and you couldn't have that now, could you?

7) You've already debated him in Mexico. You mean the 6-man panel debate where you spent all of but 1 minute and 4 seconds actually addressing Craig, and where you personally said to him that you did not consider it a debate with him?

8) You have no intention to support Craig's "relentless drive for self-promotion." But you do intend to self-promote your new book... again, on the Bill O'Reilly show. Tu quoque indeed. Although I consider it ironic that you claim Craig is "self-promoting" when he has not requested this debate. He is merely a guest speaker, these events have been set up independently, by various organisations. You are simply being hypocritical here, not to mention playing fast and loose with the truth, but then again, nobody ever accused you of living in the real world.

9) You have no interest in this. Then why, pray tell, did you write The God Delusion? Riddle me that, oh enlightened one. Of course you are interested in this. You are only saying this now because of all the stringent criticisms that are flying in fast and loose, exposing the many egregious logical errors, fallacies, and factual discrepancies present in your cry-baby polemical screed of a book.

10) Andrew Copson, spokesman for the British Humanist Society, said that the reason he and you did not want to debate Craig 1-vs-1 was because he was a "slippery" character who constructed his arguments and debates in such a way as to make his arguments impossible to respond to.
Never mind that Copson, the snivelling little weasel that he is, said that he hoped atheists would attend so that they could "refute" Dr. Craig "from the floor." Nevermind also, that most of Dr. Craig's debates take place at secular universities. At his debate with Sam Harris at Notre Dame in America, the local secular and humanist society bought up a load of tickets to stack the audience with their own numbers. Never mind also that atheists admitted that Craig beat Hitchens and Harris. Consider the following comment from the atheist blog Common Sense Atheism:
"Frankly, Craig spanked Hitchens like a foolish child."

Christopher Hitchens said the following:
"I can tell you that my brothers and sisters in the unbelieving community take him very seriously. He's thought of as a very tough guy: very rigorous, very scholarly, very formidable. I say that without reserve, I don't say it just because I'm here... Normally I don't get people saying, 'good luck tonight and don't let us down' but with him I do."

Sam Harris:
"I'm very happy to be debating Dr. Craig, the one Christian apologist who seems to have put the fear of God into many of my fellow atheists."

11) Dr. Craig's views are "unpleasant." Wasn't it you who said you just care what is true? So why now, all of a sudden, are you smoke-screening your cowardice by employing other such appeals to emotion? I find it hilarious that you of all people should call Craig an apologist for genocide, when you claim that there is no such thing as good or evil and support infanticide. Your own comments on the wholesale slaughter of 185,000,000 people at the hands of 52 atheist state leaders in 25 different atheist states weren't rather endearing either, if you don't mind me saying. For the record, I don't agree with Craig here, (imagine that, a Christian criticising Dr. Craig!) for the simply reason that no such genocide took place. Having looked into the matter myself, such a context is completely alien to the 2nd millennium BC Ancient Near East (you know, the culture in which the accounts were written.) Properly understood, it was a driving out (as Craig notes) but it was stronger than that, the context of the language implies that the Israelites were speaking hyperbolically, and the word translated to "children" is not dependant on age. Not to mention the people in being driven out were predatory warrior tribes who sacrificed their own children to idols, and all sorts of fun things like that. Those poor innocent murderous Canaanites. You've really got the moral high ground there. Not that I would expect you to know such things. Your care for factual accuracy is about as low as the ankle socks of a particularly small beetle, standing in a ditch, in a quarry, in the low country.

If Craig were as wrong as you assert he is, then it would be ridiculously easy to demonstrate it. Furthermore, if Craig really were an apologist for genocide, what better way to ruin his career than to expose him? Of course, you know full well that Craig is right, and isn't an apologist for genocide at all. This is just your way of trying to pull focus from your own inability to debate religion. If you had good arguments, you'd air them against Craig. But you don't, which explains the whole contrived excuses routine that you've conjured up in lieu of substantive rebuttal. You also claimed that you weren't aware of Craig's views on the Canaanites in Mexico, when in 2008 you wrote an article attacking his views on the Canaanites. To save face, you then claimed you had "forgotten." If by, 'forgotten,' you really mean, 'been caught with your trousers down,' then yes, I suppose you are right.

I'll be honest, Richard. You're not a man of science and reason. You do not value truth, and aren't interested in civil discourse. All you care about is promoting your quaint though ludicrous notions about religion. No need to let evidence penetrate the penumbra of your otherwise impenetrable quixotic delusions. You've already decided that there is no god but science, and you are its prophet, reason and logic be damned. William Lane Craig was sent here to test us... along with philosophy, history, and facts. In reality, you are nothing more than a sententious, acrimonious, supercilious, pusillanimous, calumnious, censorious, vituperative, querulous, embittered, obsessed, and bombastic moron who spouts nothing but intolerance, bigotry, non-sequiturs, caricatures, straw men and vitriol. A brain dead, vapid, condescending, piss-poor excuse of a debater who could not argue his way out of a wet paper bag. An arrogant, self-absorbed, blow-hard who takes himself too seriously, and a morally retarded intellectual cripple. And if that seems a bit much to you Richard, what I was doing, as anybody with a modicum of intelligence would be able to recognise, was taking an exaggerated form of your rhetoric and implied values, to satirise your rhetoric and implied values. It is a shame to have to break character and point this out, but it should save you participating in a long, tedious exchange of e-mails. Although coincidentally, as well as it being a joke, it also happens to be true.

You are singularly incapable of responding to a single criticism of your beliefs. You have to resort to ad hominems, offence and bluster, because that is all you have got. In fact, Richard it is you who finally convinced me that atheism was false. I was teetering on the edge of nihilism when by chance I happened across your documentary The Root of All Evil? and not long after that I happened across your book The God Delusion (which someone had ironically placed in the fiction section of my local WH Smith's) and luckily for me I had a familiarity with history, since your claims that religion is the cause of most world conflict, or that a convincing case could be made that Jesus never existed were patently false. 'How could such a man belief this absurdity?' I asked myself. 'Hasn't he ever studied History?' I then felt compelled to seek out Christian apologetics, and see what they had to say. After doing a little research of my own, I found Christianity to be true. So you see Richard, I really must thank you. Had your arguments not been so terribly dire and lacklustre, I would not have been compelled to see what the other side were saying. Your beliefs are stupid, offensive, poorly-researched and badly thought-out. I am willing to bet that I could crush you and the pernicious myths that you hold dear like a bug, with zero preparation whatsoever, and I haven't even so much as completed my BA (Hons) in History yet, let alone an MA or PhD. Craig would presumably crucify you, but then again, you probably figured that out a long time ago, otherwise you wouldn't still be spinning lies about him in the press now, would you? If you are actually reading this, as opposed to jamming your fingers in your ears, closing your eyes, and chanting "THERE IS NO GOD!" over and over again as you rock back and forth under your chair, huddled up in the foetal position and sporting a tin foil hat, then that is something I suppose.

До свидания, товарищ.

Occupy Wall Street: You're Doing It Wrong

2011-10-19T19:15:00.000+01:00

The Occupy Wall Street style movements continue, and I have, as of yet, still not seen anyone associated with aforementioned band of disorganised rabble-rousers promote a point of view that has any familiarity with basic economics. People are angry, which is understandable. However, people don't seem to know what it is they are actually angry with. Who/what is to blame for the current economic crisis? Well, allow me to tell you. Allowing government control over markets has opened the door wide open for lobbying. Corrupt politicians accept money from corrupt corporations to enact regulations favourable to the corporations doing the donating, thus creating monopolies, and choking the opposition. Whereas if the government had little to no control over the market, such Lobbying would not take place. After all, why would corporations give money to politicians if they can do nothing to benefit them? Allowing governmental control over trade is also deleterious to small businesses and companies. This is not just a result of lobbying. For instance, if one corporations gets exposed as doing all sorts of horrendous things and there is a public uproar that the government step in a do something, whilst the new regulations will stop this corporation, it will make it harder for businesses that do not. The last aspect of all of this, government bail outs. When banks, and corporations go under. It does not affect taxpayers in any way. When the government steps in and bails these banks and corporations out, then it affects us, because governments get their money from taxpayers. Now, what system does this most sound like to you? The Occupy Wall Street crowd seem to think capitalism is to blame. This is, of course, the wrong answer. Government control over trade regulations, government intervention in corporate affairs, and government bail outs are a form of class war against working people, and the lower classes. However, far from being capitalism, these things are the trademarks of socialism. Socialism is when the means of trade, salaries, the means of production, etc. are controlled by the government. As such, this requires a big government with maximal control, which opens the door for lobbying (and possibly outright fascism, which is an extreme authoritarian political ideology where the government is a single party totalitarian government.) In capitalism, the market is free from government control. Trade regulations, prices, salaries, et al. are not set by the government. In such a systems, banks and corporations who fail economically are left to die. The shareholders lose out, but the people do not suffer. The assets of these corporations are picked up and new corporations rise. So, how did we get into this mess? Easy: socialism and big government. If you want to blame someone, blame the politicians who obsequiously agreed to rescue the banks and corporations from the consequences of their own poor decisions. Blame those who, despite their palpable failure, are determined to do exactly the same thing over and over again. In order for us to progress economically, we need to limit government control over the market.

Now, a second target of the Occupy Wall Street are "the rich." I keep hearing complaints about the top 1% or top 10%. The top 10% of earners in the UK pay for 53.3% of our income tax, with the top 1% paying 24.1%. Without these people, our economy would collapse. Of course, these people complain about being "in poverty" and continue to attack "the rich" when they have smart phones, broadband internet connections, places to live, cars, Netflix subscriptions, DVD and blu-ray players and movies, computer and video games and consoles, HD TV's, Sky television, etc. A sizeable portion of them also waste money on things such cigarettes, alcohol, fast-food, marijuana, and the like. A lot of these people use sites like Facebook (which has it's origins in a stolen idea and a long of history of a "screw our users and their 'privacy', we only care about advertising profits" mentality), purchase smart phones manufactured by such "small" and "noble" corporations like "Sony," and own vehicles from large (but certainly not corrupt in anyway) auto-makers like "GM." And all these celebrities/musicians lending their support? They all work for corrupt and greedy Hollywood studio's or the RIAA. In fact, it was stupid people spending money they did not have on things they did not need which is part of the reason why we are currently having a recession. It all started with credit companies and the like giving money out on credit to people with poor credit ratings. Whilst the credit companies can of course be blamed, it was the chubby-fingered idiot who took out a load of money on credit so they could go on holiday to Málaga, despite not being able to afford to pay it back. The main target should be corrupt politicians. As long as politicians are meddling with the market, this will lead to all sorts of disastrous economic crises. Socialism is a singular failure; communism is even more so. Furthermore, the less the government controls, the less money they need, therefore the lower our taxes will be. Corrupt corporations will suffer the full results of their own failings and will go under without corrupt politicians to bail them out, and it won't affect the taxpayer's at all.

Occupy Wall Street?

2011-10-17T02:29:00.012+01:00

I did write a brilliantly crafted letter to the Guardian, noting the inconsistencies of the Occupy Wall Street "movement" however, despite saving it to drafts, it still disappeared the moment I sent it. So now I have to type out a new response from memory.

Whilst this is likely to be as unwelcome to the Occupy Wall Street crowd as a stream of sewage coming unbidden into one's home, I nonetheless felt compelled to write it. The main problem I have is that Occupy Wall Street isn't a coherent movement, but a loose randomly assorted collection of rabble-rousers. They don't really seem to know what it is they are angry about, other than vague statements and propositions such as "ending capitalism" and some kind of gripe with "the rich." The second problem lies in the fact that for all their talk of anti-capitalism and anti-corporations, they still parade around with expensive video equipment, camera phones and the like. There's definitely no shortage of dirt-poor people who are truly suffering for reasons mostly or completely outside of their control but many people who consider themselves to be "in poverty" and complain all the time about "the rich" are people with iPhones, broadband internet connections, places to live, nice cars, Netflix subscriptions, blu-ray players/movies, video games/video game consoles, HD TV's, Sky television, etc. A sizeable portion of them also waste money on things such cigarettes, alcohol, fast-food, pot, and the like. It's ridiculous. Poverty to these people is having to buy a generic brand of fizzy drink (soda.) A lot of these people use sites like Facebook (which has it's origins in a stolen idea and a long of history of "screw our users and their 'privacy', we only care about advertising profits"), purchase smart phones manufactured by such "small" and "noble" corporations like "Sony," and own vehicles from large (but certainly not corrupt in anyway) automakers like "GM." And all these celebrities/musicians lending their support? They all work for corrupt and greedy Hollywood studio's or the RIAA.

Secondly, they keep griping on about "the rich" not paying enough taxes, when the top 10% of earners in the UK pay roughly 53.3% of all income tax. If you impoverish, exile or otherwise disincentiveise the people who pay more than half our taxes, our economy will collapse. A second factor behind the credit crunch was stupid people taking money out on credit to buy things they could not afford, and could not afford to pay it all back. Whilst the credit companies who loaned this money to these slapdash chubby-fingered morons are partially to blame, again it is the morons who thought it would be a good idea to book a holiday, and spend tons of money they did not have. I remember an interview on TV where a family admitted to booking their annual holiday and then said to the interviewer that they had no idea how they were going to pay for it. Gee, how about BY NOT GOING ON HOLIDAY?! Moving on, further inconsistencies lie in the fact that they recognise that the government is corrupt and the corporations control government, yet think the solution is MORE government intervention. Furthermore, they keep blaming capitalism for the economic crisis. One of the main reasons we are in this mess is because of governments bailing out corporations, banks, and even entire countries. Government bail outs are a form of class war against working people, it is just not capitalism. Government interference and regulation is prima facie socialism. If you want to be angry at someone, be angry at the politicians who obsequiously agreed to rescue the financiers from the consequences of their malinvestments. Blame those who, despite their palpable failure, are determined to do exactly the same thing over and over again.

However, despite these stringent criticisms, I do not disagree with their right protest, and I even agree with them that the government is corrupt and in need of reform. The Occupy Wall Street protesters just happen to be mistaken, and about a great many things. I sincerely hope that the Occupy Wall Street protesters become more acquainted and familiarised with economics and come together as a group with a coherent message. Then again, my words will presumably fall upon deaf ears. Whilst there are no shortage of liars, people in general just tend to prefer to hear what they want to hear, rather than allow the light of logic, reason, and evidence to penetrate the penumbra of their quaint though ludicrous notions about economics. I have to suffer the poorly thought-out, badly-researched, stupid, and offensive opinions of the hoards of ponderous buffoons who hold to these pernicious mindsets on a daily basis.

I look around, and I weep. Although perhaps the most absurd lunacy is how Tea Party activates get lampooned as crazies and knuckle-dragging morons despite being more organised, more clued up about economic principles and markedly less violent. The bizarre thing is, I am not an even an American, yet I find myself siding with the Tea Party. Less government spending is the only way we are going to go forward economically. Lower government spending means lower taxes. A cursory glance at history is enough to reveal the deleterious effects of socialism and communism and the sheer havoc they have wrought on the economies of the countries these systems have been inflicted upon. The problems we are facing right now are the faults of socialist governments, like the UKs own centre-left Labour Party under Gordon Brown (Brown has even written books on socialism.) I implore my fellow would-be revolutionaries to at least think things through because capitalism simply isn't to blame.

This is a little something extra. Now left wing loonies and other politically and economically illiterate individuals who support Occupy Wall Street have actually tried, once again, badmouthing the Tea party. It has been widely noted how violent and nefarious the goings on at Occupy Wall Street are, however, some are even denying it and calling it Tea Party bullshit. Oh really? Challenge accepted.

Occupy Wall Street protesters causing problems for locals:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/08/nyregion/occupy-wall-street-begins-to-chafe-its-neighbors.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all

Protester defecating on a police cruiser (amongst others.)
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2046586/Occupy-Wall-Street-Shocking-photos-protester-defecating-POLICE-CAR.html

Occupy LA speaking calling for the death of the "bourgeois."
http://hotair.com/archives/2011/10/12/occupy-la-the-bourgeose-wont-go-without-violent-means

Occupy Wall Street protesters admit to being paid:
http://dailycaller.com/2011/10/06/organizer-admits-to-paying-occupy-dc-protesters-video/
http://theweek.com/article/index/220175/occupy-wall-street-are-protesters-being-paid
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/228475/20111010/occupy-wall-street-protests-protestors-paid-hired-jobs-volunteer-chicago-hispanic.htm

Occupy Wall Street has the support of the Iranian government:
http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Iran-Wall-Street-protests-to-topple-capitalism-2214434.php

Yeah, the same Iranian government who tried assassinating a Saudi Arabian ambassador on US soil. It gets better, they even have the support of the American Nazi Party: http://anp14.com/news/archives.php?report_date=2011-10-16

Public sex, drug usage, noise pollution, etc. Residents calling for NYPD intervention:
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/99069159/Document

If you are going to slander the Tea Party and extol the non-existent virtues of the Occupy Wall Street crowd then at least have the decency to check the damn facts.

Contra Johnnyp76

2011-10-16T22:22:00.004+01:00

Even though I have already refuted his arguments, Johnnpy76 seems to think otherwise. This is going to be a step-by-step refutation of pretty of everything he has ever said in response to me and against the Kalam argument.

Inductive Fallacies and the Problem of Induction
Whilst Johnnyp76 has said he meant to say the problem of induction in his last reply to me, this does not change much, for they both refer to the same thing. The only difference is, an inductive fallacy is a logical fallacy, and the problem of inductive is a philosophical issue of what role, if any, induction can be used in epistemological justification. What is an inductive fallacy? An inductive fallacy occurs when you take a sample of something, and then make general inferences. There are many forms of this fallacy, with hasty generalisation probably being the most common form. A fallacy of this form can be construed as follows:
• Some Xs have property Y
• Therefore all Xs have property Y

An example of this fallacy would be concluding that all swans are black having only ever seen a single black swan, and no swans of any other colour. The problem of induction is a question within philosophy that asks if inductive reasoning can lead to knowledge. What is the rational justification for generalising about the properties of a class of objects based on some number of observations of particular instances of that class? It is hard to see how Kalam succumbs to either. The first premise is based not just on intuitive plausibility, and empirical verification, but is also based on the metaphysical impossibility of something coming into being uncaused. If something can come into being uncaused out of nothing, then it becomes inexplicable why anything and everything does not do so.

All that aside, there is one fact that destroys this entire line of argument with respect to Johnnyp76. Things beginning to exist uncaused, and out of nothing, is incompatible with determinism. That is to say, if something can just pop into being from non-being without any cause at all, then in what sense can events such as these be said to be determined? The reason why I bring this up is because Johnnyp76 is a hard determinist. Then again, that probably explains why he maintains that nothing begins to exist. This leads me on to the next topic of discussion.

Causality, Composition, and Equivocation
Do things begin to exist? Johnnyp76 is adamant that they do not, because matter is indestructible. The argument can be construed as follows:
1. Matter does not begin to exist.
2. Things within the universe are made up of matter.
3. Therefore, the universe did not begin to exist.

Now, this argument seems rather ironic to me, in that it commits the fallacy of composition (a fallacy Johnnyp76 implies that Kalam is guilty of.) He has stated that you cannot make an inference about the universe based on things within the universe. In other words, a fallacy of composition. A fallacy of composition occurs when you take an attribute of part of the whole and then apply it to the whole. For instance:
1. Human cells are invisible to the naked eye.
2. Humans are made up of human cells.
3. Therefore, humans are invisible to the naked eye.

So, even if we grant his entirely absurd notion that things don’t really begin to exist, then we can’t use this to infer that the universe did not begin to exist. Now, you can deny that things within the universe not beginning exist can be made as an argument that the universe began to exist, but then such an argument (that nothing begins to exist) becomes irrelevant. For if the universe began to exist, then it doesn’t matter whether or not things within it begin to exist or not. Now, he could be bringing this up to undercut the validity of the intuitive warrant for the first premise, but how this makes the notion of something coming into being from nothing a metaphysical possibility is anybody’s guess.

However, of course things DO begin to exist. For instance, did I begin to exist? If the answer is no, then because I exist now, then that means I have always existed.
1. Nothing begins to exist.
2. I exist.
3. Therefore, necessarily, I have always existed.
Since I exist now, this means I existed prior to my birth. I existed during the Jurassic period, and I will continue existing after my death. I guess Johnnyp76 believes in an after life after all. If this does not seem evidently absurd to you, then consider this: there are essential properties that make me ‘me.’ For exampled, personhood, being human, etc. In the Jurassic era, the matter that now makes up my physical body could have belonged to a dinosaur, or a piece of moss. However, it gets worse, for in what sense can I be said to be identical to the matter that makes me up? After all, the cells in our body are replaced entirely every seven years or something like that. My cells die; they are replaced; yet I do not stop being ‘me.’

I think the most devastating rebuttal to Johnnyp76s ‘argument’ here, however, is that even if we grant that things do not begin to exist in the material sense, there are still efficient causes and effects. An efficient cause is that which causes change and motion. In this sense, things begin to exist all the time. In fact, this is the sense in which Kalam refers to ‘cause’ and ‘begins to exist.’ This applies to things that come into being ex material or ex nihilo, as there is always an efficient cause. Thus Johnnyp76 is guilty of the fallacy of equivocation.

Personhood and Divine Timelessness
Johnnyp76 thinks that personhood and atemporality are contradictory. That’s not the main problem; the main problem lies in the fact he seems to think Craig offers no arguments for this. Craig deals with this issue in his book exclusively on the nature of Divine Eternity and God’s relation to time, Time and Eternity. Another good book on the subject is God, Eternity, and Time by Christian Tapp and Edmund Runggaldier.

The argument is as follows:
1. Necessarily, if God is timeless, He does not have the properties x, y, z.
2. Necessarily, if God does not have the properties x, y, z, then God is not personal.
3. Necessarily, God is personal.
4. Therefore, necessarily, God is not timeless.

There two refutations of this argument. One, the properties in question are not necessary conditions of personhood, and two, a timeless God can possess these relevant properties after all.

Daniel Dennett gives the following criteria of personhood. P is a person only if:
i. P is a rational being.
ii. P is a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed.
iii. Others regard (or can regard) P as a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed.
iv. P is capable of regarding other beings as beings to which states of consciousness can be attributed.
v. P is capable of verbal communication.
vi. P is self-conscious; that is P is capable of regarding him/her/itself as a subject of states of consciousness.

Now whilst the necessity of verbal communication is questionable (after all, what if the subject lacks vocal chords?), an acceptable substitute is that P is capable of communicating. All of these criteria paint a picture of a person being a conscious entity. The only way for this argument to succeed is for the defendant to show that any of these attributes related to personhood require a being be temporal if it is personal. However, what good reasons are there to think that consciousness entails temporality? Johnnyp76s statement that they just are is simply a bare assertion.

Materialism and the Philosophy of Mind
The last subject that Johnnpy76 tries his hand at is the philosophy of mind, and defending naturalism and materialism. Now, Johnnyp76 is a hard determinist, he believes in physicalism or materialism of the mind. As such, he also denies the existence of free will, and all of the other facts about human beings reasonable people take for granted. Of course, if his position IS true, then Johnnyp76 doesn’t really believe any of this, since, if such position IS true, then he doesn’t have ANY beliefs at all. The reason for this is because, if physicalism is true, we are just mindless automatons composed of matter, and not really persons at all, a position that Johnnyp76 himself embraces by denying the freedom of the will and asserting hard determinism.

Let us get started on refuting naturalism then, shall we? Starting with the philosophy of mind, there are very many arguments one could use to show the falsehood of physicalism. Argument 1: In acts of introspection, one is aware of 1) one’s self as an unextended centre of consciousness; 2) various capacities of thought, sensation, belief, desire, and volition that one exercises and that are essential, internal aspects of the kind of thing one is; and 3) one’s sensations as being such that there is no possible world in that they could exist and not be one’s own. This can be represented in the following two ways.

One:
(1) I am an unextended centre of consciousness (justified by introspection.)
(2) No physical object is an unextended centre of consciousness.
(3) Therefore, I am not a physical object.
(4) Either I am a physical object or an immaterial substance.
(5) Therefore, I am an immaterial substance.

Two:
(1) My sensations (and other states of consciousness) are either externally or internally related to me.
(2) If I am a physical object, then my sensations are externally related to me such that there is a possible world in that those sensations exist and are not so related to me.
(3) There is no possible world in where my sensations exist without being mine (justified by introspection.)
(4) Therefore, I am not a physical object and my sensations are internally related to me.
(5) If a sensation is internally related to me, then it is a mode of my self.
(6) If an entity x is a mode of some entity y, then x is an inseparable entity dependant for its existence on y such that (a) x is modally distinct from and internally related to y and (b) x provides information about the nature of the thing y of which is it a mode.
(7) Therefore, I am thing whose nature is to have sensations (and other states of consciousness.)

Argument Two: The indexicality of thought provides evidence for the truth of substance dualism. A complete, third person physical description of the world will fail to capture the fact expressed by “I am Randomicity912.” No amount of information non-indexically expressed captures the content conveyed by this assertion. The first person indexical “I” is irreducible and ineliminable, and this feature of “I” is not innocuous, but rather, is explained by claiming that “I” refers to a nonphysical entity – the substantial self with at least the power of self-awareness. Moreover, if mental predicates are added to the third person descriptive language, this still fails to capture the state of affairs expressed by statements like “I am thinking that P.” Finally, the system of indexical references (i.e., “I,” “here,” “there,” “this,” “that”) must have a unifying centre that underlies it. This unifying centre is the same entity referred to by “I” in expressions like “I am thinking that P,” namely, the conscious substantial subject taken as a self-conscious, self-referring particular. This argument can be represented as follows:

(1) Statements using the first person indexical “I” express facts about persons that cannot be expressed without the first person indexical.
(2) If I am a physical object, then all facts about me can be expressed in statements without the first person indexical.
(3) Therefore, I am not a physical object.
(4) I am either a physical object or an immaterial substance.
(5) Therefore, I am an immaterial substance.

Argument Three: Substance dualism can also be argued on the grounds that libertarian freedom is true, which probably explains why Johnnyp76 denies the reality of Free Will. This argument can be formulated as follows:
(1) Human beings exercise libertarian agency.
(2) No material object (one which is such that all of its properties, parts, and capacities, are at least and only physical) can exercise libertarian agency.
(3) Therefore, human beings are not material objects.
(4) Human beings are either material objects or immaterial substances.
(5) Therefore, they are immaterial substances.

Argument Four: Naturalism can be refuted by the fact that is internally incoherent and self-contradictory. This can be formed as:

(1) States of mind have a relation to the world we call intentionality, or aboutness. The intentionality referred to here is propositional in nature. Our possessing this kind of intentionality means that we are capable of having, entertaining, believing, and desiring certain states of affairs propositionally described.
(2) Thoughts and beliefs can either be true or false.
(3) Human beings can be in the condition of accepting, rejecting, or suspending belief about propositions.
(4) Logical laws exist.
(5) Human beings are capable of apprehending logical laws.
(6) The state of accepting the truth of a proposition plays a crucial causal role in the production of other beliefs, and the propositional states is relevant to the playing of this causal role.
(7) The apprehension of logical laws plays a causal role in the acceptance of the argument as true.
(8) The same individual entertains thoughts of the premises and then draws the conclusion.
(9) Our processes of reasoning provide us with a systematically reliable way of understanding the world around us.
(10) Unless statements (1)-(9) are true, then it is incoherent to argue that one should accept naturalism based on evidence of any kind.
(11) Unless statements (1)-(9) are true, then there are no scientists, and nobody is using the scientific method.
(12) Therefore, naturalism is incoherent, cannot be rationally justified, and is most definitely false.

Argument Five: If science is true, then we as human beings are in states with determinate propositional content, but if naturalism is true, we should never be in such propositional states.

(1) Some mental states have determinate content. In particular, the states involved in adding, subtracting, multiplying, dividing, in squaring numbers and taking their square roots, are determinate with respect to their intentional content.
(2) Physical states are indeterminate with respect to international content. Any physical state is logically compatible with the existence of a multiplicity of propositionally defined, intentional states, or even with the absence of propositionally defined mental states entirely.
(3) Therefore, the mental states involved in mathematical operations are not and cannot be identical to physical states.

Argument Six: Materialism is incompatible with meaning. This can be represented simply as:

(1) If materialism is true, then meaning is indeterminate.
(2) Meaning is determinate (a presupposition of science and reason.)
(3) Therefore, materialism is false.

Argument Seven: Another argument is that the supervenience relation employed by non-reductive materialists cannot be admitted into supervenient materialist’s ontology. This can be represented as:

(1) For physicalists, all facts must be materialistically acceptable. That is, they are facts about physical things, or about things that are ontologically distinct from the physical, but strongly supervene on the physical.
(2) There must be some fact – the explanation – in virtue of which B-properties supervene on A-properties; called the S-facts. There are two options for materialistically respectable facts:
(a) They themselves could supervene on A-properties. But then there is an infinite regress problem, for now we have to explain this new supervenience relation, which in turn needs to be explain, and so on ad infinitum, so this is no good.
(b) Or, the S-facts could not just be further A-properties, that is, facts about the physical entity. But then these facts do no bridge the explanatory gap between the B-facts and the a-facts.

Argument Eight: Argument from qualia. Qualia are the subjective conscious experiences we have when we ‘feel’ something. There are many variations of this argument, with the best-known example being the Mary’s room argument, which gives the example of a colour scientist, named Mary, who knows every physical fact about colour and even every physical fact about the experience of colour in other people. However, she has been confined to a room that is black and white since birth, and is only allowed to observe the outside world through a black and white monitor. When she leaves the room and sees colour for the first time, and in doing so learns what it is like to see that colour. This can be represented as:
(1) Before her release, Mary was in possession of all the physical information about colour experience of other people.
(2) After he release, Mary learns something the colour experiences of other people.
(3) Therefore, before her release, Mary was not in possession of all the information about other people’s colour experiences, even though she was in possession of all the physical information.
(4) Therefore, there are truths about other people’s colour experience that are not physical.
(5) Therefore, physicalism is false.

Argument Nine: the Chinese Room argument. Suppose that artificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. Suppose that this computer performs its task so convincingly that it comfortably passes the Turing test: it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a live Chinese speaker. To all of the questions that the person asks, it makes appropriate responses, such that any Chinese speaker would be convinced that he or she is talking to another Chinese-speaking human being. Does the machine literally "understand" Chinese? Or is it merely simulating the ability to understand Chinese? Suppose that I am in a closed room and have a book with an English version of the computer program, along with sufficient paper, pencils, erasers, and filing cabinets. I could receive Chinese characters through a slot in the door, process them according to the program's instructions, and produce Chinese characters as output. As the computer had passed the Turing test this way, it is fair to deduce that I would be able to do so as well, simply by running the program manually. There is no essential difference between the role the computer plays in the first case and the role I play in the latter. Each is simply following a program, step-by-step, which simulates intelligent behaviour. And yet I don't speak a word of Chinese. Since I do not understand Chinese we must infer that the computer does not understand Chinese either. Without "understanding" or “intentionality” we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking". Because it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the word, therefore Strong AI is mistaken. This can be formulated as follows:

(1) If Strong AI is true, then there is a program for Chinese such that any computer system that runs that program, that system thereby comes to understand Chinese.
(2) I could run a program for Chinese without thereby coming to understand Chinese.
(3) Therefore, Strong AI is false.

Argument ten: the incompatibility of naturalism and evolution. This argument states that if both naturalism and evolution are true at the same time, then we have no rational basis for accepting the validity of our reasoning processes, thus making naturalism self-defeating.

(1) The human brain is an organ that arose via evolution.
(2) Evolution results in the preservation of traits that enhance survivability.
(3) If naturalism is true, then mind and brain are equivalent.
(4) The mind, being identical to the brain, is therefore geared towards our survival, not in the production of true beliefs.
(5) Therefore, if naturalism and evolution are true at the same time, we have no way of knowing which of our beliefs are actually true. Thus, we have no grounds for accepting the validity of our reasoning processes.
(6) Evolution is true, and our reasoning processes are valid.
(7) Therefore, naturalism is false.

Argument eleven: the quantum-theoretic argument against naturalism.

(1) Naturalism is the view that the sum and substance of everything that exists is exhausted by physical objects and processes and whatever is causally dependent upon them.
(2) The explanatory resources of naturalism are therefore restricted to material objects, causes, events and processes.
(3) Neither nonlocal quantum correlations nor (in the light of nonlocalisability) the nature of the fundamental constituents of material reality can be explained or understood if the explanatory constraints of naturalism are preserved.
(4) These quantum phenomena require an explanation.
(5) Therefore, naturalism (materialism, physicalism) is irremediably deficient as a world-view and consequently should be rejected not just as inadequate, but fundamentally false.

Argument twelve: the incompatibility of naturalism and scientific realism.

(1) Scientific realism, representational naturalism and essential reliability entail that scientific methods are reliable sources of truth about the world.
(2) From the preference of simplicity, it follows that simplicity is a reliable indicator of the truth about natural laws.
(3) Mere correlation between the simplicity and the laws of nature is not good enough: reliability requires that there be some causal mechanism connecting simplicity and the actual laws of nature.
(4) Since the laws of nature pervade space and time, any such causal mechanism must exist outside spacetime.
(5) Consequently, ontological naturalism is false.

Argument thirteen: the incompatibility of naturalism and objective morality, i.e. the axiological argument for God.

One:
(1) If naturalism is true, then there are no objective moral values and duties.
(2) Objective moral values and duties exist.
(3) Therefore, naturalism is false.

Two:
(1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
(4) Objective moral values and duties exist.
(2) Therefore, God exists (and naturalism is false.)

I am sure I could go on, but for now these will suffice.

A Historiographical Approach to Assessing Miracle Claims

2011-10-09T05:16:00.005+01:00

This is a draft of my history dissertation. Even though I don't start it until next year, I thought I would upload this now.

"The historian's one task is to tell the thing as it happened... He may nurse some private dislikes, but he will attach far more importance to the public good, and set the truth high above his hate... For history, I say again, has this and only this for its own. If a man will start upon it, he must sacrifice to no God but Truth. He must neglect all else." – Lucian of Samosata, The Way to Write History.

Introduction
This might seem an odd choice of topic for a history dissertation, but it is a subject that has major implications for the historian. Whilst is has become fashionable to dismiss miraculous sounding claims with a hand wave, it is the business of the historian to tell history wie es eigentlich gewesen ist (the way it really was.)[1] As such, it also falls to the historian to investigate ALL historical claims, be they miraculous or not. This is the principle argument of this dissertation: miracle claims can only be dismissed or accepted after a careful and considered historical investigation. However, more than that, I believe that consistent usage of such methodology can be used to show that some miracle claims are viable historical hypotheses. In this dissertation, I shall look at several areas of historical research. The first area of consideration is the philosophy of history, where I shall look at the theory behind history. I shall lay down a set of criteria for assessing historical hypotheses, whilst addressing postmodernist arguments against the possibility of historical knowledge. I shall also address arguments against the possibility of miracles.

I shall consider the application of textual criticism, as well as criteria of authenticity for evaluating individual elements within ancient documents. I shall lay down a means of assessing oral traditions, whilst offering a critique of form criticism and its conclusions. Once I have laid down a critical methodology, I shall use the resurrection of Jesus as a test case, which, very controversially, I argue can be shown to be a viable historical hypothesis, and that it should be treated as such. After outlining what facts can be reasonably determined, I shall compare the resurrection hypothesis against rival hypotheses, determining which hypothesis best explains the facts, before concluding. If I am successful, then I hope to demonstrate that historians can reasonably know things about the past, that there are no good reasons for dismissing miracle claims a priori, that there are objective means of assessing ancient documents and oral tradition and can be used to assess miracle claims in addition to regular mundane historical claims. Most controversially of all, I argue that the resurrection of Jesus can be reasonably inferred from the data we have, using the criteria and methodology I have implemented.

Historiographical Considerations and the Philosophy of History
The two issues that I aim to discuss here are what American philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig refers to as the problem of historical knowledge and the problem of miracles.[2] Probably the most important question for a historian is: what is historical knowledge? A second question is: how do we obtain historical knowledge? Whereas a third, more pertinent question, especially in light of the attacks of postmodernism is: can we obtain historical knowledge? These are questions that any historian should be prepared to answer and as such, I shall do my best to answer them here. The first question is easy enough: historical knowledge is knowledge of a past event or events, determined through vigorous historical analysis. The second and third are trickier in light of the attacks of post-modernism. For the postmodernists deny that knowledge of the past can be obtained. History has been beleaguered by two views of historical relativism: historical anti-realism, the view that all we can know are re-constructions of the past, and historical subjectivism, the view that no historical narrative can claim to be superior to another. Whilst postmodernist historians differ in their levels of scepticism, perhaps the most radical is Keith Jenkins who maintains that history is dead, and that objective historical knowledge is an implausible idea.[3] As a whole there are two main arguments against historical realism, the view that facts about the past can be known.

The first is the argument that we lack direct access to the past, and therefore we can only know re-constructions of the past. A comparison is often made with scientists conducting experiments in a lab. Whilst the scientists have direct data at hand, the historian has no such luxury. The second argument is the lack of neutrality. Because not only historians, but the authors of the texts historians are reliant upon, are products of their culture, whatever conclusions they come to will be coloured by such a socio-cultural milieu. Whilst such arguments are worthy of consideration, they fail in demonstrating the superiority of postmodernism. Regarding the first argument, even if we admit the reality of past events, then we are still left with the fact that events of the past are no longer occurring today. It is argued that since the historian is separated from the past, then he or she has not way of checking to see if their historical reconstruction is true or not. As aforementioned, appeals are made to scientists who study data in the lab. However, such a comparison backfires for the postmodernist. For certain fields, such as palaeontology, geology, and cosmology are very much concerned with past events. Scientists in these fields study things such as the origin of the cosmos, the history of the earth and the origin of life, yet this does not prevent them from developing accurate theories.

However, let us consider the idea that all we can do is offer re-constructions of the past that cannot be tested. Under the postmodernist view, no reconstruction can be said to be truer than other. However, this leads to a bizarre form of pluralism, whereby even radical historical hypotheses can be said to be true, such as holocaust denial and so forth. There is a concrete body of evidence, and it is the role of the historian to develop historical hypotheses that best explains these facts. There can be no possible reconstruction where WWII never happened, thus it seems that constructionism is false. The postmodernist might gripe that we have no objective means of assessing historical hypotheses, leading us to the second objection: the problem of lack of neutrality. This second objection is equally flawed, for the same is true of every profession. Everybody is affected by the culture they grow up in, however, to claim that this prevents us from knowing anything in history would prevent us from knowing anything at all. Secondly, it matters not how a historian comes to their views, but in how their views are tested. This leads me into how to assess historical hypotheses.

Historian C. Behan McCullagh outlines the following criteria in his book Justifying Historical Descriptions[4]:
1. The hypothesis, together with other true statements, must imply further statements describing present, observable data.
2. The hypothesis must have greater explanatory scope (that is, imply a greater variety of observable data) than rival hypotheses.
3. The hypothesis must have greater explanatory power (that is, make the observable data more probable) than rival hypotheses.
4. The hypothesis must be more plausible (that is, be implied by a greater variety of accepted truths, and its negation implied fewer accepted truths) than rival hypotheses.
5. The hypotheses must be less ad hoc (that is, include fewer new suppositions about the past not already implied by existing knowledge) than rival hypotheses.
6. The hypothesis must be disconfirmed by fewer accepted beliefs (that is when conjoined with other accepted truths, imply fewer false statements) than rival hypotheses.
7. The hypothesis must so exceed its rivals in fulfilling conditions (2)-(6) that there is little chance of a rival hypothesis, after further investigation, exceeding in it meeting these conditions.

This I think constitutes a vigorous and critical method of analysing historical hypotheses. This method is an argument to the best explanation, whereby competing hypotheses are compared to these criteria. For example, explanatory scope refers to how much data is explained by a hypothesis, the more data a hypothesis explain, the better. That covers mundane claims, but what then about miraculous claims? The standard response is to approach them if they are already false. However, this does not strike me as being any way to conduct historical enquiry. Surely, one must be open to all possibilities, only coming to conclusion after detailed and critical analysis? The major arguments used against the possibility of miracles are those of David Hume, Benedict de Spinoza, et al., and have not changed much since.[5] The principle objection to miracles is that because miracles are violations of the laws of nature, they are therefore impossible. This is based on a mode of thinking that was in vogue during the Enlightenment. The universe runs according to specific laws which cannot be broken; the ‘Newtonian World Machine’ so to speak.

Spinoza argued that the laws of nature flowed from the ‘divine will’ whereas Hume argued that since we have a ‘full proof’ of the unchanging laws of nature, no amount testimony in favour of a miracle, not even a full proof, is enough to establish a miracle. There are several problems with either way of thinking. One problem is that such views are predicated upon outdated ways of thinking, for the laws of nature are not ‘immutable’, as they are descriptive and not proscriptive. We just happen to know how the universe works, the real reason why the universe behaves the way it does is a mystery. Another problem is that it assumes that miracles are ‘violations’ of nature. Let’s say I catch a bouncing ball. That ball WOULD have hit the floor had I not intervened. Would you say that this were a ‘violation’ of nature since I interrupted the natural workings of the universe thusly? This, I think straightforwardly analogous to miracles, if they occur. They are simply an interruption in the way the things usually occur, and are no more or less impossible than my catching a bouncing ball.

However, the main problem lies in the fact that these objections make theological assumptions. For Spinoza assumed deism, and the doctrine of divine simplicity,[6] as did Hume. That makes the fact that it is primarily atheists who use these arguments today rather ironic. Whilst I personally believe there are better arguments for theism than atheism[7], such theological questions are of no concern to the historian. The only position one can take in dealing with historical hypotheses, is one of agnosticism. Whilst demonstrating a particular miracle has occurred might theoretically, lead to the conclusion that a God exists, but we cannot assume such things prior to investigation. Hume, ironically, laid out several criteria that we could use to identify miracles, which he just assumed have never been met, namely: if a sufficient number of educated witnesses who had a great deal to lose by lying testified, were of sufficient moral character and weren’t already pre-disposed towards believing in such things, then that would count as testimony that a miracle had occurred. Hume’s last argument is that the multiplicity of miracle claims ‘cancel each other out,’ which is one so bizarre that it hardly merits a response. The number of miracles has no bearing on the truth or falsity of a particular claim.

What means, then do we have for assessing miracle claims? Instant a priori dismissal is an outdated mode based on antiquated ways of thinking about the world. One popular slogan that often gets passed around on the Internet is “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” On the face of it, this might actually seem like a reasonable view, however, the main problem lies in its thorough subjectivity. The simple problem lies in how we determine the meaning of the word ‘extraordinary.’ What counts as an ‘extraordinary claim’ and what counts as ‘extraordinary evidence?’ If we define ‘extraordinary’ as something that is inconsistent with our current worldview, then the whole thing becomes rather circular. In order to validate claims that are inconsistent with our worldview, we need evidence that is inconsistent with our worldview. A more nuanced interpretation would be to suggest that it simply means require a greater standard of evidence for a claim we personally find miraculous or incredible. However, then this becomes a case of special pleading, question begging and, again, circular reasoning. For it affords us to grant our personal suppositions, that an event is improbable, as a properly basic belief without rational justification. If it simply means claims that have no evidence or evidence against them require sufficient evidence to overturn such a status, then it simply becomes ‘claims require evidence.’

Historian Richard Carrier spends roughly over a page in the atheist screed The Christian Delusion arguing that it’s obvious common sense that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and that it is simply irrational to believe otherwise.[8] He invites us to imagine several scenarios: his owning a car, his owning a nuclear missile, his owning an interstellar spacecraft, and Jesus being resurrected from the dead. If he claimed to have a car, then he would not need to present much evidence, as plenty of people like himself own cars. He would need a lot more evidence for owning a nuclear missile because there is evidence that people like Carrier do not own nuclear missiles. Carrier then notes that claiming to own an interstellar craft requires even more evidence, as there is no evidence that anybody owns such a craft. However, he goes on to argue that we need even more evidence for the resurrection, because whilst we do not have evidence of interstellar crafts, miracles are still less probable than interstellar travel on our current evidence. Carrier’s arguments here boil down to suggesting that we require less evidence to prove that X is correct, if X has precedent. However, there are several problems with this.

The first is that there were times when completely mundane things, such as cars, did not exist. Cars, at the time of their invention, would have required as much evidence as interstellar spacecraft. Secondly, X having precedent does not give us warrant to assume that X is the case in specific situations. For example, there is good evidence that cars exist, and that a lot of people own a car. According to Carrier, this is good evidence that he owns a car. However, this is not the case, for we would need to take more information in to account, such as Carrier’s finances and so on. Carrier could be too poor to own a car for all I know. Another problem is how he just assumes that there exists strong evidence that miracles are unlikely, and that interstellar space travel, whilst unlikely, is more likely than miracles. This just seems to me as nothing more than special pleading. For what evidence do we have that interstellar travel is unlikely, but less likely than miracles? We don’t have any evidence against miracles, just, as far as we know, no evidence in favour of miracles and absence of evidence is not evidence of absence by a long shot. The only honest position prior to investigation one can take is one of agnosticism. It seems as if Carrier’s approach is to label claims he personally finds to be incredulous as improbable, which isn’t a valid argument.

However, even if we have no evidence of miracles, how would this affect our assessment of a specific miracle claim? Prior to the invention of a car, nobody owned a car, and so people could have dismissed claims of the invention of the motorcar out of hand using Carrier’s methodology. However, the only way to know if there is evidence AGAINST X, is to first analyse the data surrounding X. Carrier’s suggestion that something being unprecedented is evidence AGAINST something’s occurrence or plausibility simply does not work as already demonstrated. Using generalities to make inferences about specific cases is simply an invalid approach to history, and one that neglects detailed background information. In reality, Carrier’s approach compels one to make a snap-judgment about the veracity of a claim before looking at the evidence and introduces bias such that an objective analysis of the data becomes difficult if not impossible. In essence, it is therefore nothing more than an argument from personal incredulity, and thus has no place in honest historical enquiry.

There simply is no good a priori reason for assuming miracles are either impossible or improbable. In the absence of evidence, the only position we can take is agnosticism. If you’re going to flatly rule a particular explanation out prior to looking at the historical, then that is neither fair nor objective.
“An epistemology that does not allow for the possibility that evidence, whether from eyewitness testimony or from other source, can establish the credibility of a UFO landing, a walking on water, or a resurrection is inadequate.”[8]
A miraculous claim, like any other, is still a claim that demands to be critically assessed. A miracle event, as with any other event, can only be considered reasonably true or reasonably false after critical historical analysis. However, Biblical scholar, Hector Avalos, argues against using McCullagh’s criteria to support miracle claims. He spends some time in his book The End of Biblical Studies arguing against philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig, who applies McCullagh’s criteria to the resurrection of Jesus. Avalos’ three main complaints are that Craig misuses McCullagh’s criteria, that disproof by counter-examples can be made, and that Craig is a ‘selective supernaturalist.’ Whilst two of these criticisms are directed against Craig personally, they still are relevant to the discussion here.

Avalos claim’s that McCullagh’s criteria are mostly used only to differentiate between rival naturalistic hypotheses, not between naturalistic and supernaturalistic hypotheses. As discussed earlier, a priori dismissing the possibility of miracles is no way to conduct honest enquiry. Secondly, he quotes McCullagh disagreeing with Craig’s conclusion that the resurrection passes his criteria, yet McCullagh himself is open to the possibility:
“One example which illustrates the conditions most vividly is discussion of the Christian hypothesis that Jesus rose from the dead. This hypothesis is of greater explanatory scope and power than other hypotheses which try to account for the relevant evidence, but is less plausible and more ad hoc than they are. That is why it is difficult to decide on the evidence whether it should be accepted or rejected.”[9]
Notice how McCullagh does not dismiss it simply for being a miracle claim. Whether or not he is right in his evaluation of the resurrection hypothesis is another matter entirely. Avalos also complains that McCullagh’s plausibility criterion is ‘subjective’, citing McCullagh’s discussion of the mysterious death of William II of England. The three explanations given are 1, accident, 2 witchcraft and 3 conspiracy. Avalos partially quotes McCullagh stating that one’s view of hypothesis 2 depend upon one’s view of the occult. Avalos scoffs, saying that if we believe in Krishna, then explanations involving Krishna can be used without further evidence. However, Avalos completely neglects to mention McCullagh’s discussion of Christopher Brooke, a medieval historian specialised on the life of William II does not reject the witchcraft hypothesis because it appeal to the supernatural, but because there is no evidence William II was a devil-worshipper and there were no Luciferians in England in the 12th century.[10]

In regards to Avalos’ second complaint, he brings up alleged apparitions of Mary at Medjugorje, in former Yugoslavia. He claims that these appearance of the virgin Mary pass McCullagh’s criteria. How this amounts to a disproof is not clear, for if such appearances genuinely could pass McCullagh’s criteria, then we would have good grounds for affirming their historicity. As to whether or not these sightings actually pass McCullagh’s criteria, these shall be discussed later. Regarding the last point, Avalos notes that Craig, whilst a Christian, does not believe that the resurrection of the dead people in Matthew 27:50-54 was a historical event. Avalos asks why Craig believes in Jesus’ resurrection, but not theses, and criticises Craig for being a ‘selective supernaturalist.’ How this is so is not clear, as Craig notes the reason for this conclusion is because of the apocalyptic imagery in the specific verse, but that there is no such apocalyptic language in the resurrection narratives.[11] In other words, the evidence does not warrant us to believe it was a historical event. Avalos’ other criticisms are either directed exclusively against Craig, or equally dishonest.

Test Case: The Resurrection of Jesus
As a test case, I shall analyse the claim that Jesus rose from the dead, but before I do, I shall quickly address source criticism and what results they reveal when applied to the Biblical sources. The primary mode of assessing ancient documents is textual criticism. It is a discipline that involves itself with the study of manuscripts and identifies interpolations and makes ancient texts clearer in general by resolving textual problems and making conjectural emendations if need be. First we need to take into account how many manuscripts we have, how close they are to the writing of the original, and how many variations exist within the text. For example, Celsus’ de Medicina authored in the 1st century AD has twenty 15th century manuscripts based on a lost manuscript that was first discovered in 1426, and has two 9th century and one 10th century manuscript.[12] Ovid’s Metamorphoses authored in the 1st century AD has three fragments dating to the 9th century, and twenty-five manuscripts from the 13th century.[13] Pliny’s Natural History authored in the 1st century AD has five early fragments from the 5th century and larger manuscripts date to the ninth century.[14] Quintilian’s Institutio Oratio authored in the 1st century AD has two manuscripts that date to the 9th century and one that dates to the 10th century.[15] Tacitus’ Annals authored in the 2nd century has a manuscript of books 1-6 from the 9th century and a manuscript of books 11-16 from the 11th century as its earliest manuscripts.[16]

In relation to the New Testament, we have approximately 5,745 Greek manuscripts, roughly 10,000 Latin manuscripts, around 1,000 Coptic manuscripts, hundreds possibly thousands of Syriac manuscripts, and between 15-20,000 Gothic, Ethiopian, Armenian and other versions of the New Testament. In addition to this, the New Testament is quoted over 1,000,000 times by early Church Fathers.[17] In terms of dating the manuscripts, the New Testament again stands head and shoulders above the nearest competitor. The earliest manuscripts for the synoptic Gospels date between 125-200 AD, with the earliest manuscripts for the Gospel of John dating to the 3rd century. The earliest complete copies of the entire New Testament date to the 4th century.[18] What then of textual variations and discrepancies? There roughly 400,000 within the New Testament. Whilst this may seem a lot at first, over half of these are spelling differences, typos, and a significant amount involve the usage of synonyms. As it stands, less than 1% of these variants actually involve additions or errors that affect the meaning of text, and do not affect any major part.[19] Prominent textual critic Bart Ehrman and historian Richard Carrier both argue that the New Testament documents are “hopelessly corrupt.”[20] However, the problems they raise are either overstated or simply outright wrong.

For example, Carrier argues 1 Thessalonians 2:14-16 and 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 are interpolations, when not only do these passages not affect any major portion of the New Testament text, but there is a good amount of evidence that they are not interpolations at all.[21]
“The situation for the New Testament is hardly as bleak as this! Of the 138,000 words of the original text, only one or two might have no manuscript support. And in the places where conjecture may be necessary, this does not mean that we have no idea what the original text said… Frankly, when skeptics try to make the claim that we simply have no clue what the original New Testament text said, one has to wonder what drives their dogmatic skepticism, because it certainly isn’t the evidence.”[22]

One case bought up in particular is the ending of the Gospel of Mark. The earliest manuscripts do not contain verses 9-20 of Chapter 16, but instead end on 16:8. In this shorter ending, the women disciples of Jesus find the tomb empty, but discover an angel there who tells them Jesus has been risen and to go and tell Peter and the other disciples. The shorter ending ends with the women disciples running off afraid, and says that they told nobody about what they had seen. Some people think this is a big problem, however, it is not. There are some very good reasons for believing that Mark did not originally end at 16:8. The Gospel of Mark, like the other Gospels, is in the genre of laudatory biography and, as such, it is therefore unlikely that it would not end on a positive note. Mark’s Gospel as whole emphasises the fulfilment of early promises and predications in the passion narrative, especially those of Jesus. We should therefore expect the same with the resurrection appearances. If Mark intended to convey that the women disobeyed the angel’s command, then he would have introduced the situation with an adversative as he does with other situations of disobedience, such as Mark 1:45, 7:36, 10:14, 10:22, 10:48, 15:23, or 15:37.

Mark’s Gospel ends with an unusual conjunction. Whilst we have examples of sentences being ended with this word, we do not have evidence of entire works ending on such a word. Essentially, it would be like ending a work with the word “because.” It suggests a lost ending. A point of comparison between Mark 16:8 can be found in Mark 1:44, where a leper is told to be silent to others, but to tell the appropriate person. This suggests that the women were only silent to the general public, but went straight to tell the intended audience, the male disciples. Mark 15:40-16:8 builds a cumulative case for the validity of the women’s witness to the Easter message, therefore it makes no sense that the women would not pass the message on as instructed. The longer ending is not authentic, but there is no reason to suppose that Mark’s Gospel originally ended at 16:8, therefore it seems reasonable to conclude that the original ending of Mark’s Gospel was lost and somebody who noticed this tacked on a pastiche of material from the other Gospels. How this poses a problem is anybody’s guess.

We also need to look at oral tradition. The study of oral tradition in relation to the New Testament was more or less taken over by a mode of thinking known as Form Criticism, led by Rudolph Bultmann. Bultmann et al. used Form Criticism to pronounce much of the Gospels as theological embellishments of the Church, with not much being traceable to the historical Jesus. However, their methodology is fundamentally flawed. New Testament scholar, Richard Bauckham, in his book Jesus and the Eyewitnesses has noted the following assumptions made by form critics that have turned out to be false. They assumed that traditions originated in pure forms, that traditions corresponded to their use in society, that oral tradition is folkloric and were transmitted collectively, they assumed certain notions of the developments of early Christianity, they assumed that the gospel traditions were transmitted purely orally prior to the writing of the Gospels, and they used a literary model for understanding the process of oral tradition.[23]

Ancient societies placed high value on the preservation of ancient traditions. The aim of educational processes was to gear the student towards memorising cultural tradition and cultivate their ability to perform. In Mesopotamia, students were required not only memorise individual elements of standard works, but they had to be able to place the text they had memorised in the correct order. This was also the case in Egypt, where education involved copying, memorisation and recitation of core curriculum. In both cultures, the use of music and song was used as a memory aid for the purpose of education. Recitation was also the primary aim in Ancient Greece. Greek Philosopher, Aristotle, wrote a book entitled On Memory, which outlined a number of memorisation techniques, including, but not limited to, the use of acrostics.[24] The Romans likewise used a variety of memorisation techniques. To become a successful teacher, you had to memorise vast of information. Orators memorised quotations from classical literature and famous speeches, sometimes verbatim, sometimes just the central core and structure was memorised. Texts were memorised for oral performances, either in outline or verbatim. Memorisation was also considered necessary for developing a strong moral character.[25]

When we look the Gospels, we find strong evidence of memory retention techniques, Stunning, memorable words and images. Jesus often used hyperbole and overstatement in his teachings, to make them more memorable. For example, tearing out one’s eye to avoid sin (Matthew 5:29-30) and the log-in-the-eye (Matthew 7:3-5) were two such vivid examples that would have been guaranteed to be more memorable, and thus stick in the minds the listeners and disciples. Wordplay. This one is less obvious, due to the fact that Jesus would have spoken in Aramaic and/or Hebrew, and we would (presumably) read his teachings in our native languages, and so would not notice these. When Jesus rebukes the Pharisees and says that they strain out a gnat and swallow a camel, this is wordplay on these words in Aramaic. As the Aramaic for gnat was galma and the Aramaic for camel was gamla. For non-language dependant examples, however, we have the use of riddles (such as John 2:19-21), paradoxical images (such as Mark 12:41-44) and irony.
Proverbs. Proverbs were short, pithy sayings that were simple and easy to remember. The Old Testament book Proverbs is an example of this, strangely enough. Many of Jesus’ teachings were thus encapsulated in such proverbs. For example, in Mark 3:24, Jesus uses the following proverb: If a kingdom is divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand.” Poetic forms. Roughly 80% of Jesus’ teachings fall into this category. Jesus’ teachings use a lot of both synonymously using the same patterns and words, and the use of strong contrasts. In fact, comparing thesis to anti-thesis was a common Jewish concept that can is also replete in the Old Testament.

However, what of the content? How do we know if something a document reports or if something that originated in an oral tradition is accurate? The first thing we can do is to assess the character of the document. Classical scholar, Richard A. Burridge, in his book, What Are The Gospels, compared the Gospels to ten different ancient biographies: Evagoras by Isocrates (436-338BC), Agesilaus by Xenophon (427-354BC), Euripides by Satyrus (2nd century BC), Atticus by Nepos (99-24BC), Moses by Philo (30BC-45AD), Agricola by Tacitus (56-113AD), Cato Minor by Plutarch (45-120AD), Lives of the Caesars by Suetonius (69-122AD), Demonax by Lucian, (120-180AD) and Apollonius of Tyana by Philostratus (170-250AD). After a detailed analysis of and comparison between both ancient biographies and the four Gospels, he writes:
“We discovered a high degree of correlation between the features of the gospels and those noted in Bioi, indicating a shared family resemblance. All four gospels lack any kind of biographical title, but the range of opening features (genealogy, starting directly into the narrative, preface or prologue) is also found in Bioi, especially the early use of the subject’s name. Analysis of the subjects of the verbs demonstrates that the gospels exhibit the same ‘skew’ effect noticed in Bioi, caused by the concentration on one person as the subject, rather than a range of subjects in the manner of other narrative genres; also the allocation of a reasonably large amount of space to events of Jesus’ death and passion can be compared with the allocation of space in Bioi to the subject’s significant period, including the death in some cases.”[26]

In terms of authorship, who write the Gospels? It is often claimed that they were anonymous, and whilst it is true that the authors are not named within the text itself originally, this is not a mark of true anonymity:
“Anonymous works were relatively rare and must have been given a title in libraries. They were often given the name of pseudepigraphical author… Works without titles easily got double or multiple titles when names were given to them in different libraries.”[27]
We have strong external attestation from early Christian authors. Whereas in the case of the Epistle to the Hebrews, which IS a genuinely anonymous work, we find early Church writers suggesting a few possible authors. Perhaps the most important piece of testimony comes from Papias of Hierapolis. Whilst his work is now lost to us, it is preserved in quotations in the work of Eusebius et al.[28] Papias states that the Gospel of Mark was written by an interpreter of Peter, and that Matthew was originally written in ‘the Hebrew language.’

Papias’ statements are often overlooked or outright ignored, but Papias was by no means a stupid man. What is left of his work bespeaks the care of his investigation, and New Testament scholar Richard Bauckham has delivered a decisive defence of Papias, and has made an impressive case for the presence of eyewitness testimony within the Gospels themselves.[29] Papias is by no means alone, and later writer Jerome confirms Papias’ report.[30] Papias, however, is the most valuable witness, however, due to his incredible proximity to the source of traditions themselves. However, the most important evidence comes from internal stylistic evidence. For example, there are a number of stylistic elements that reflect that the Gospel of Matthew was written by a tax collector, such as the good Greek style, as well as the usage of unique monetary and tax collector terminology, as well as monetary terms that reflect an author who was familiar with money. The Gospel of Matthew is also topically ordered and systematic, again implying that the author was a good organiser, which is what we would expect from a tax collector such as Matthew. Lastly, the Gospel of Matthew indicates a strong familiarity with the geography of Judea, as well as Jewish customs and history. All of these point to an author who was Jewish.[31] The other three Gospels evince similar internal stylistic indications of their respective authors too.[32]

Some scholars, however, adopt a certain hypothesis known as Markan priority. This hypothesis states that Mark was written first, and that Matthew and Luke copied from Mark heavily, utilising a common source between them named Q, as well as sources unique to themselves. However, there are problems with some of the assumption made by defenders of Markan priority. For example, two arguments in favour of Markan priority are Mark’s being shorter and its simpler style. Albert Lord notes that there were oral parallels of texts that tell the same story, but in a longer and shorter variation. This demonstrates that shorter does not equate with earlier.[33] It is also noted that authors rewrote material in their own style, and whilst some preferred elegance others preferred colloquial speech.[34] David Neville notes that E. P. Sanders has observed that despite being argued by a variety of scholars, the QM hypothesis has been found wanting by most scholars. Neville himself notes that whilst Markan and two-Gospel hypotheses are able to solve the “synoptic problem,” Markan priority is simply just largely assumed without taking into account of alternate viewpoints and dealing with their defender’s arguments.[35] William Farmer has written many books arguing in favour of Matthean priority.

Other scholars who argue against Markan priority include: Bo Reicke, B. C. Butler, D. J. Chapman, Eta Linnemann, Hans-Herbert Stoldt, and John Rist. Linnemann in particular noted that in a sample of 35 pericopes, only 22.17% of the words are identical among all three synoptic Gospels.[36] Even secular and classical scholars have found the Markan/QM hypothesis wanting, including: Northrop Frye, Albert Lord and George Kennedy. Members of the International Institute for the Renewal of Gospel Studies also do not hold to Markan priority, including: Lamar Cope, David Dungan, Allan McNicol, David Peabody, and Philip Shuler. The second problem lies in the testimony of Papias. Papias is often dismissed, but his testimony gives us warrant to suppose there was a version of Matthew written in Aramaic, prior to the Greek version. Papias’ explanation of Mark’s Gospel being based on the preaching of Peter provides a much better explanation.[37] Other problems include the fact that 1st century AD Palestine was an oral culture where writing desks did not exist yet. In such an oral culture, works would have been produced from memory and on notes. In fact, note taking was extremely prevalent in the ancient world.[38] However, scholar Richard Bauckham, whilst arguing that the Gospels are eyewitness testimony, still assumes Markan priority, so Markan priority is not a count against the character of the Gospels at all.[39]

Now we can scrutinise what these sources have to say. What reasons do we have trusting them? How can we be sure if they are reporting something accurately? Questions like these can be answered by adopting certain criteria of authenticity.[40] The main criteria of authenticity are:
1. Criterion of Multiple Attestation. If something is attested in multiple sources.
2. Criterion of Embarrassment. If something causes embarrassment for the author.
3. Criterion of Dissimilarity. If something is unique.
4. Criterion of Linguistic and Socio-Cultural Background. If something fits into the cultural background of the society a work was produced in.
An element within the Gospels does not need to meet all of these criteria, or even one of them, but these are useful tools in ascertaining whether or not something within the Gospels is accurate. In order to show that something is specifically inaccurate, one would need to employ negative criteria of authenticity. In order for us to proceed with our investigation, we first need to see what facts can be ascertained. Applying these criteria to the Gospels can therefore be used to show which parts are likely factual and not invented.

Jesus’ Self-Understanding. Whilst this is hotly contested, Jesus’ self-understanding that he was Israel’s messiah and the incarnation of God is one aspect of the Gospels that strongly passes these tests of authenticity. One such example is the story where Peter acts a spokesman for the rest of the disciples and declares that Jesus is the Messiah in Mark 8:29-30 and Matthew 16:16. Certain scholars argue that this is an invention and never really happened. It is supposed that this story was meant to paint an elevated picture of Peter. However, in the same story Jesus rebukes Peter, saying “Get behind me Satan!” when Peter opposes Jesus’ passion prediction in Mark 8:33 and Matthew 16:23. If this were intended to make Peter, et al. look good, why include such an embarrassing element? Other attestation includes Jesus’ usage of the title ‘son of man’ and frequent references to God’s kingdom. The son of man title is perhaps the strongest evidence that Jesus thought of himself as divine as it meets the criterion of multiple attestation, dissimilarity and socio-cultural background. It is Jesus’ most used description of himself, yet it is not widely used in either Jewish or later Christian writings. The reason why this counts as evidence that Jesus thought himself divine is the context. It refer to a passage in the Old Testament, Daniel 7:13-14. This passage in the Old Testament describes one, like a son of man, coming with the clouds of heaven, approached God and was given eternal dominion over all men. These and other sayings of Jesus reveal that he clearly thought himself not only as Israel’s messiah, but that he was the divine son of man described in Daniel.[41]

Jesus’ Crucifixion. This is perhaps the most widely accepted fact, for not only does this story occur in all four Gospels, as well as elsewhere in the New Testament, but is also recorded by Jewish historian Flavius Josephus and Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus.[42] Whilst it is generally admitted that one of the two passages by Josephus is an interpolation, in nonetheless contains genuine reference to Jesus.[43] Furthermore, it passes the criterion of embarrassment as well as dissimilarity. Crucifixion was the most shameful method of death available at the time. It was an obscene status degradation ritual designed to humiliate the victim in every way. Not only did it signify a loss of power and having someone assert their authority over you, but also crucifixion also led to other humiliating things, such as self-defecation.[44] Jews in particular believed that people who were hung on trees (such as crucifixion victims) were cursed, as is evidenced in the Old Testament.[45]

As deSilva notes:
“No member of the Jewish community or the Greco-roman society would have come to faith or joined the Christian movement without first accepting that God’s perspective on what kind of behaviour merits honor differs exceedingly from the perspective of human beings, since the message about Jesus is that both the Jewish and Gentile leaders of Jerusalem evaluated Jesus, his convictions and his deeds as meriting a shameful death, but God overturned their evaluation of Jesus by raising him from the dead and seating him at God’s own right hand as Lord.”[46]
The reason why it passes the criterion of dissimilarity is because the idea of crucified messiah would have simply been nonsense to the people at the time, and so, as such, is completely unparalleled in the ancient world.[47] We therefore have good grounds for believing that Jesus was crucified, which in turn directly implies he was also subject to trial by the authorities.

Jesus’ Burial and The Discovery of the Empty Tomb. Jesus’ burial is another aspect of the Gospel accounts that can be reasonably determined to be factual. Scholar Byron McCane, in his essay Where No One Had Yet Lain, he argues that:
• The processes of burial and mourning were meant to honour the dead and the denial of these honours was a further dishonour.
• Based on Jewish custom, the Jewish leadership in Jesus’ day would have wanted Jesus buried, not left on the cross.

He writes:
“Ordinarily, death is an event which disrupts the functioning social order, for the death of any particular individual tears away a member of a social network and forces the network to reconstitute itself. Death rituals – i.e., burial customs and rites of mourning – are social processes which the wounds which death inflicts on the social group. By burying the dead and mourning their absence, members of a society affirm that someone significant had been lost. When the Romans did not permit the burial of crucifixion victims, then, they were doing more than merely showing off the power of Rome: they were also declaring that the deaths of these victims were not a loss to Roman society. Far from it, the deaths of condemned criminals actually served to strengthen and preserve Rome, protecting and defending the social order of the Empire.”[48]
And:
“For Jews, one of those values was the importance of belonging to an extended family group. The foundational narrative for Jewish culture was a story about a man whose descendents were to be more numerous than the starts in the sky, and respect for the family was enshrined in the moral charter of Judaism: “honor your father and mother.” Jews in Jesus’ day typically lived in extended family groups, and routinely identified themselves in legal documents, inscriptions, and literature as “X, son (or daughter) of Y.” At life’s end, they thought it best to be buried with their nearest kin. To be buried away from the family tomb – by design, not by fate – was to be cast adrift from these cultural patterns, and dislodged from a place in the family. To be unmourned by one’s nearest relatives was to be effaced from the cultural landscape. It was worse than unfortunate, it was a shame.”[49]

Whilst it was customary to leave crucifixion victims on their crosses to be eaten birds, sometimes the Romans did allow them to be buried, and since it was prohibited in Judaism to leave a man hanging on a tree[50], then it makes sense that the Jewish authorities would have petitioned to bury Jesus. Burying Jesus away from the family tomb was their way of dishonouring Jesus themselves, and was not against the precepts of Judaism. Furthermore, the admission in the Gospels narratives that Joseph of Arimathea, a member of the Sanhedrin, buried Jesus rather than His family or disciples, is again another extremely embarrassing feature of the Gospel story. The accuracy of the burial tradition logically implies the accuracy of the empty tomb tradition. For if it was well known that Jesus was buried, then it would have been a simple matter of checking Jesus’ tomb and exhuming the body of Jesus when the disciples began proclaiming His resurrection. Yet, the earliest Jewish polemic was that they had simply stolen the body.

Quite simply, if the body were still in the tomb, then Christianity would have been crushed like a bug. The final reason to suppose that the empty tomb narrative is accurate, however, is the admission that the women disciples were the first to witness the empty tomb. In ancient times, the testimony of women was effectively worthless. If this were an invention, it would make more sense to have Peter and the other male disciples arrive first. There is one other aspect related to this, however, that often gets rejected and that is the guard at the tomb. It is supposed the disciples invented the account of the guards to counter claims of theft of the body. However, again, we have good reason to suppose the tomb guard is historical. Since Jesus was a criminal in the eyes of the Roman and Jewish authorities, dishonour would not have stopped with his dishonourable death and burial:
“Rites of mourning were not observed for these criminals, either. Family members were supposed to keep their grieving to themselves… From the Hebrew Bible through the rabbinic literature, dishonorable Jewish burial meant two things: burial away from the family tomb, and burial without rites of mourning.”[51]
Such a guard would not only have been there to prevent robbery, but to prevent rites of mourning, which is again, something that would have been an embarrassment to admit.

The Resurrection Appearances. This last aspect is another contentious area, yet I believe I can reasonably determine that the disciples genuinely believed they had seen the risen Christ, and had some kind of experience which led them to believe this. The first point is that resurrection would have been a hard sell to Jews and pagans had it been false. Whilst some Jews believed in resurrection, it was believed that resurrection would occur once at the end of time:
“Within the context of late Jewish apocalyptic thought, to claim the resurrection of a single individual before the end of the world was to introduce quite a new element… Neither the disciples nor anyone else expected the resurrection of one person alone. Without a new, compelling reason they would not have asserted the individual resurrection of Jesus alone.”[52]
Pagans, on the other hand, would have the idea of bodily resurrection obscene. In pagan thought, the highest good was the emancipation from “corporeal defilement.”[53] Matter was seen as evil, and the body something to be escaped after death. The idea of your body being physically raised would therefore have been repulsive to the pagans. This is further evident in the fact that certain heresies that arose in the 2nd century onwards tried accommodating Christianity to pagan belief, such as Docetism, which denied that Jesus was really human, and Gnosticism, Despite the fact they tried accommodating Christianity with classic pagan beliefs, these movements died out and were opposed by orthodox Christian groups. If the disciples were simply making the appearances up, then why pick such a mode of vindication? Why not claim Jesus was assumed into heaven like Elijah and Moses?[54] It would have also been simpler to say that Jesus had merely returned to life from death rather than be resurrected.[55]

More evidence that points to the disciples being honest in their convictions lies in the fact that they were not expecting a resurrection. Despite believing Jesus to be the Messiah, it states throughout all four Gospels that they did not know what Jesus meant when he was making his passions predictions. Now, apart from the fact we have warrant to believe this is accurate due to the fact resurrection was traditionally believed to be reserved for the end of time, but also because it makes the disciples look ignorant. Furthermore, when Jesus is arrested, the disciples flee, and even Peter denies Jesus three times. When the women disciples report they have seen the risen Christ, they are initially sceptical and don’t believe them. This paints the disciples in an incredibly negative light. Furthermore, as aforementioned, having the women encounter the risen Christ first would make no sense if this were being invented from scratch. Thus it is safe to say that we can be reasonably sure that the disciples did not expect Jesus to be resurrected.

Lastly of all, the disciples remained bold proclaimers of this message. The reason why this is significant was because the Christian message was offensive, absurd, and would have resulted in the disciples and early believers in Christ getting persecuted, which did end up happening:
“The message about this Christ was incompatible with the most deeply rooted religious ideology of the Gentile world, as well as the more recent message propagated in Roman imperial ideology.”[56]
“That there was an intrinsic incompatibility between Christianity and classical values was apparent from the time Romans became aware of the presence of the new religion. Christians were criticized on a variety of grounds, but principally because they had rejected the gods of their ancestors and the civic values of Greco-Roman world. Their religion was new; they had turned away from the traditions of their immediate ancestors, the Jews. Because of their refusal to attend the festivals, they were seen as atheists and misanthropists. In popular belief they even practiced incest and cannibalism. In short, they did not fit into the system that had been sanctioned by centuries of classical use.”[57]
“Logically enough, the official response to Christianity was often repression. The new religion had none of the characteristics that would have given it an approved status.”[58]
Whilst the statewide persecution enacted by certain Roman emperors did not occur until the 2nd century and later[59], the early Christians would have faced intense social discrimination and persecution.
“The group would exercise measures designed to shame the transgressor (whether through insult, reproach, physical abuse, confiscation of property – at worst, execution) so that the transgressor would be pressured into returning to the conduct the group approved (if correction were possible) and so that group members would have their aversion to committing such transgressions themselves strongly reinforced.”[60]
Therefore, to suggest that the disciples, or anyone, would make this up is completely ludicrous and literally flies in the face of everything we know about ancient society. If the disciples invented the Gospel accounts, then they would confirm to existing socio-cultural values, not fly in the face of them. Thus we can reasonably determine that the disciples were honest in their convictions, and that a good deal of the Gospel accounts are factually correct and reliable. The kicker is that Paul of Tarsus used to actively persecute the Church, and Jesus’ brothers James and Jude were sceptical of Jesus’ but later converted after their visionary experiences.

Whilst a better defence of these facts could be made, this is the unfortunately the best treatment that could be offered in such a limited space. Indeed, much tighter defences have been made.[61] Either way, we are therefore presented with a core of basic facts.
1. Jesus was executed via crucifixion.
2. Jesus was buried and his tomb was later found empty by a group of his women followers.
3. The disciples, despite being distraught and despairing, witnessed what they believed to be the risen Christ.
4. Former sceptics and enemies of Christianity came to believe after similar experiences.
Which hypothesis best explains these facts? There are a number of hypotheses that rival the resurrection hypothesis.

One hypothesis is that Jesus survived the crucifixion and awoke in the tomb. He emerged from the tomb and convinced his followers that he had been resurrected. We shall call this hypothesis the apparent death hypothesis. One hypothesis is that Jesus either had a twin brother or lookalike who pretended to be the risen Jesus after he was crucified. We shall call this the evil twin hypothesis. Another hypothesis is that the women followers visited the wrong tomb by mistake, and when they discovered the empty tomb, they erroneously believed that Jesus had been resurrected. We shall call this the wrong tomb hypothesis. Another hypothesis is that someone stole the body. We shall call this the stolen body hypothesis. Another hypothesis is that Jesus’ body WAS produced, but had rotted so that nobody recognised it. We shall call this the decomposition hypothesis. Another hypothesis is that the disciples’ belief in the risen Jesus was the result of collective hallucinations. We shall call this the hallucination hypothesis. Another hypothesis is that the disciples belief arose from a psychological phenomenon known as cognitive dissonance. We shall call this the cognitive dissonance hypothesis. Finally, the resurrection hypothesis is that Jesus was the messiah who was resurrected from the death for specific redemptive purposes by God.

How well then, do these respective hypotheses fair when compared to McCullagh’s 7 criteria? Virtually any hypothesis is capable of passing the first criterion, providing it is a serious hypothesis that intends to explain the data. As such, all the hypotheses pass this first criteria. What then of explanatory scope? The apparent death, evil twin and resurrection hypotheses offers explanations for all the facts, but the other hypotheses only explain some of the facts, not all of them. For instance, the stolen body and wrong tomb hypotheses explain the empty tomb, but not the resurrection appearances and the hallucination hypothesis explains the resurrection appearances but not the empty tomb. It is when we come to the next four criteria is where things get interesting. Explanatory power is how probable a hypothesis renders the facts. In other words, if a hypothesis were true, how probable is it that we should see the data that we currently see? How well does it explain the data? This is where the resurrection hypothesis starts to dominate. If Jesus truly did rise from the dead, then this would adequately explain the empty tomb and the disciples belief in a resurrected Jesus despite his earlier crucifixion, and the conversion of sceptics and enemies, and their persistent belief despite persecution. How well do rival hypotheses match up?

This is where attractive sounding naturalistic hypotheses start to flounder. Let us consider the apparent death hypothesis. Jesus would have been tortured for hours, nailed to and then hung from a wooden cross for hours, taken down and then left for dead in a tomb. How on earth would this adequately explain the belief in the risen Jesus? For nobody would have mistaken such an enfeebled Jesus for a resurrected being. If the disciples were gullible and stupid (an unwarranted supposition) then at the very least they might have concluded he had simply been resuscitated (as in risen from the dead without being glorified) but not resurrection (being risen from the dead and being transformed into a glorious form.) The same thing goes for the evil twin hypothesis. Why would somebody mistake an ordinary human being for a glorified being? The decomposition hypothesis fails because there is no record of such a controversy. The Gospels admit that the disciples were accused of stealing the body, so if a body was produced then why not admit that? The stolen body hypothesis fails in that the Gospels are chock full of embarrassing details, and the disciples would have faced persecution and ridicule for their beliefs. Quite simply, why would they die for a lie? The stolen body fails for a similar reason, in that it is not very likely that the disciples would have died for a false belief, and if they had stolen the body, why not make an easier to swallow claim, such as that Jesus was assumed or resuscitated? The wrong tomb hypothesis likewise fails in that it is more likely the disciples would have posited that Jesus were assumed like Moses, et al. rather than resurrected.

This is where the hallucination and cognitive dissonance hypotheses completely die, as the Gospel accounts do not match the criteria for either phenomenon in any way. Hallucinations have the following criteria, expectation plays a key role, visions are not seen by everybody present, visions are seen differently, emotional excitement present in people witnessing hallucination, being informed beforehand of an event occurring, conforms to past experience and background knowledge and such phenomena are limited in duration.[62] In the Gospels, the risen Jesus is described as appearing to at least 500 individuals, in group settings, and for protracted periods of time. The Gospels claim that this risen Jesus spent roughly 40 days with the disciples and other early followers of Jesus, and not only could they physically touch him, but he allegedly spoke to them and even ate food.[63] Furthermore, key aspects such as expectation were missing, especially in the case of Paul of Tarsus, and sceptics like James. Cognitive dissonance on the other hand is a phenomenon where discomfort is caused by holding conflicting ideas simultaneously, and therefore people alter and change their beliefs, attitudes, or by trying to come up with justifications, denying or blaming.[64] In a case study of a UFO cult, a group of investigators noted that when their prediction of an alien visitation failed, one of the group later claimed to have received instructions from the aliens saying that the event was delayed.[65] This is not analogous to the Gospel accounts in any way and furthermore, we are again met with the problem that the if the disciples were simply making it up, why have the women disciples be the first witnesses to the resurrection, and why resurrection instead of other modes of vindication that would have been easier to believe?

What then of plausibility? Remember the definition of plausibility is that it be implied by more accepted truths. In light of Jesus’ self-understanding, the discovery of the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances and the conversion of Paul and James, the resurrection is incredibly plausible. It is strongly implied by these truths. Whereas the other hypotheses are not. Nothing about these facts implies an apparent death, an evil twin, a decomposition, a wrong tomb, hallucinations, or cognitive dissonance. They are only implied if one assumes naturalism, which is unwarranted. In terms of ad hoc, the only new supposition that the resurrection hypothesis invites us to assume is the existence of the Judeo-Christian God. Whereas, the other hypotheses require to assume all sorts of things in order to make them work. In order for the apparent death hypothesis to work, we have to assume that a man can survive hours of the most brutal torture imaginable and was then capable of lifting a one-ton stone from the front of his tomb. The medical consensus is that Jesus would have died from his injuries.[66]

The evil twin hypothesis requires us to assume the existence of an otherwise unknown doppelganger, and that either Jesus or his lookalike willing got crucified whilst the other stole the body and posed as the risen Jesus, or that someone who just happened to look like Jesus, was capable of pulling off such a hoax, and just so happened to be in a position to pull of such a hoax. Furthermore, we have to assume that an ordinary human being could persuade the disciples as well as Paul and James that they were the resurrected Jesus. The decomposition hypothesis requires us to assume that the Jews had no way of identifying remains. This is actually contrary to what we know about ancient Jews and Jewish custom.[67] Furthermore, we have to assume that such a controversy would not leave any trace in the written record. The wrong tomb requires us to assume that not only did the women disciples go to the wrong tomb, but so did the male disciples. We also have to assume that body of Jesus would not have been produced had the disciples merely gotten the wrong tomb. Some have tried to suggest that Jesus was temporarily buried, but there is no such evidence.[68] The hallucination hypothesis requires us to suppose that 500 people hallucinated a walking, talking, eating Jesus whom they believed they could touch, for 40 days. The cognitive dissonance hypothesis requires us to assume that cognitive dissonance could lead to the disciples inventing beliefs that were so hard to swallow, rather than easier to swallow beliefs.

As for the sixth criteria, which hypothesis is disconfirmed by fewer accepted beliefs? The resurrection hypothesis is only disconfirmed if we hold to either atheism and/or naturalism. Whereas all the other hypotheses are disconfirmed by a large variety of accepted facts. The apparent death hypothesis is disconfirmed by the fact that Jesus would not have survived crucifixion, would not have been able to lift the stone from the tomb, and would not have been able to convince his disciples he was resurrected. The evil twin hypothesis is disconfirmed by the fact that there is no mention of such a lookalike, and the sheer intricacy such a conspiracy would involve. The decomposition hypothesis is disconfirmed by the fact that the Jews possessed means of identifying remains after decomposition and there is no mention of such a controversy. The wrong tomb hypothesis is disconfirmed by the fact that both groups would not have got the tomb wrong, and that the authorities would have produced Jesus’ body had it still been in the tomb. The hallucination hypothesis is disconfirmed by the fact that 500 people do not have the same hallucination for 40 days, and hallucinations are audio-visual only, require expectation and only takes on elements of the hallucinator’s background experience. The cognitive dissonance hypothesis is disconfirmed by the fact that there is no such coping mechanism for cognitive dissonance that involves such whole cloth invention. In terms of the seventh criteria, it is clear that the resurrection hypothesis is the only one that passes.

Conclusions
Whilst the conclusions reached will no doubt be controversial and contentious, I believe that they are sound. I have laid out what I consider critical historical methodology and applied them to the Gospels to ascertain which facts, if any, could be learned. I found that the Gospels are largely reliable document that have been carefully preserved, far outstripping any other ancient document. I subjected the Gospel accounts to certain criteria of authenticity and found much can be positively affirmed to be historical to a reasonable degree of certainty. After drawing up a basic set of facts, I then evaluated a number of rival historical hypotheses and found that the resurrection hypothesis passes the critical historical criteria laid out earlier. Even if my conclusion that the resurrection of Jesus turns out to get refuted, then we at least have a possible means of evaluating it as a historical hypothesis, instead of dismissing it because it does not fit in with your personal worldview. The outdated notion that miracle claims can automatically be dismissed without investigation is precisely that: outdated. As such, it falls to critically minded historians to subject them to rigorous, but honest, historical enquiry. Who knows, what they find might surprise them? This is certainly an area I would like to continue research on.

Appendix A: Marian Apparitions
Despite Hector Avalos’ assertions, the appearances of Mary at Medjugorje, former Yugoslavia does not come anywhere close to fulfilling McCullagh’s criteria:
1. There at least 4 generally agreed upon facts that can be used to imply Jesus’ resurrection. There are no such facts surrounding Mary.
2. The doctrine of the assumption of Mary was not developed until the 5th century AD, whereas belief in Jesus’ resurrection has been an integral part of Christianity since its beginning.
3. There are no sources that directly state Mary was assumed, whereas we have numerous sources that state Jesus was resurrected.
4. Roughly 500 people were said to have seen the risen Christ, whereas we have no such witnesses for the assumption of Mary.
5. The belief in the assumption of Mary has been around for hundreds of years prior to the reported sightings of Mary. Whereas, Jesus’ resurrection was proclaimed after the disciples’ visionary experiences.
6. Mary made no radical personal claims, whereas Jesus did.
7. In light of these points, the doctrine of the assumption of Mary does not exceed rival explanations.
8. We have little if any reason to accept the veridicality of the Marian apparitions at Medjugorje. Kenneth Samples journeyed to Medjugorje to interview the witnesses, and was present during one of these so-called apparitions. Whilst the Catholic woman he was with said she could see Mary, he saw nothing.
9. It was concluded by the Catholic Church that supernatural appearances were NOT occurring here.

For more, see: Elliot Miller and Kenneth Samples, The Cult of the Virgin: Catholic Mariology and the Apparitions of Mary, Grand Rapids: Baker, (1992), p107-108, 110,114-115, 153-154, 156-157

Appendix B: Non-Canonical Gospels
Much ado has been made about certain non-canonical Gospels that have been discovered. Yet, despite receiving much hype, even from some scholars, these non-canonical Gospels are non-canonical for very good reasons. When the Church selected which books belonged in the canon, they had three criteria they applied when discussing books:
1. Apostolicity. They were written by an apostle, or a similarly authoritative source.
2. Orthodoxy. They do not contain heretical material.
3. Catholicity. They are accepted by a large number of churches and individual Christians within those churches.
Using modern analysis we can determine that the non-canonical fail these criteria. The Gospel of Thomas was a 2nd century proto-Gnostic writing that was derived from a deviant form of Syriac Christianity. It is heavily dependent on Tatian’s Diatesseraron, which was a harmonisation of the four Gospels composed around 175AD and shows other signs of dependence on a late form of Syriac Christianity. The Gospel of Judas has been unanimously declared as being the work of Gnostics during the 2nd century or later. Another source, The Secret Gospel of Mark turned out to be a fraud created by late biblical scholars Morton Smith! None of these sources offer us anything new, and their worth is highly dubious.

See: J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel, (2006), p135-166 and Craig A. Evans, Fabricating Jesus, IVP, (2007), p52-99, 240-245

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William D. Edwards, Wesley J. Gabel, and Floyd E. Hosmer, On The Physical Death of Jesus Christ, The Journal of the American Medical Association 255 (11, 1986), p1455-1463
Bart Ehrman, Misquoting Jesus, Harper Collins, (2007)
Bart Ehrman, The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture, Oxford University Press, (1996)
Bart D. Ehrman, The Lost Gospel of Judas Iscariot, Oxford University Press, (2006)
Craig A. Evans, Fabricating Jesus: How Modern Scholars Distort the Gospels, IVP, (2007)
Craig A. Evans, Jewish Burial Traditions and the Resurrection of Jesus, Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus, 3/2 (06, 2005), p233-248
Leon Festinger and J. M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, p203-211
Leon Festinger, H.W. Riecken, and S. Schachter, When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the World, University of Minnesota Press, (1956)
Ruth Finnegan, Literacy and Orality, Basil Blackwell, (1988)
R. W. Funk, R. W. Hoover, and The Jesus Seminar, The Five Gospels: What Did Jesus Really Say?, San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, (1997)
Harry Y. Gamble, Books and Readers in the Early Church, Yale University Press, (1997)
Harry Y. Gamble, The New Testament Canon, Philadelphia: Fortress, (1985)
Birger Gerhardsson, Memory and Manuscript, Uppsala Gleerup-Lund, (1961)
Bruce L. Gordon and William A. Dembski, eds., The Nature of Nature: Examining the Role of Naturalism in Science, ISI Books, (2011)
William Graham, Beyond the Written Word, Cambridge University Press, (1987)
Martin Hengel, Crucifixion, Fortress, (1977)
Martin Hengel, The Four Gospels and the One Gospel of Jesus Christ, Trinity Press International, (2000)
David Hume, Enquiries Regarding Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd edition, P. H Nidditch, ed., Oxford: Clarendon, (1975)
Keith Jenkins, The Post Modern History Reader, New York: Routledge, (1997)
J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus: What The Da Vinci Code and Other Novel Speculations Don’t Tell You, Kregel, (2006)
Tony M. Lentz, Orality and Literacy in Hellenic Greece, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, (1989)
Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach, IVP, (2010)
Eta Linnemann, Is There A Synoptic Problem?, Grand Rapids: Baker, (1992)
John W. Loftus, ed., The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails, Prometheus Books, (2010)
Bruce Malina and Richard Rohrbaugh, Social Science Commentary on the Gospel of John, Fortress, (1998)
Bruce Malina, The New Testament World, John Knox, (2001)
Bruce Malina and Richard Neyrey, Portraits of Paul, John Knox, (1983)
Bruce Manning Metzger, The Canon of the New Testament, Oxford: Clarendon, (1987)
Sharon Lee Mattila, A Question Too Often Neglected, New Testament Studies 41, (1995), p199-217, p214
Bryon McCane, Roll Back the Stone, Trinity Press International, (2003)
C. Behan McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, Cambridge University Press, (1984)
Elliot Miller and Kenneth Samples, The Cult of the Virgin: Catholic Mariology and the Apparitions of Mary, Grand Rapids: Baker, (1992)
D. Brendan Nagle and Stanley M. Burstein, The Ancient World: Readings in Social and Cultural History, 3rd Edition, Pearson: New Jersey, (2006)
David Neville, Mark’s Gospel: Prior or Posterior?, Sheffield Academic Press, (2002)
Stephen B. Oates, Biography as History, Waco: Markham Press Fund, (1991)
Elaine Pagels and Karen King, Reading Judas, Viking, (2007)
Arthur Patzia, The Making of the New Testament, Downer’s grove: IVP, (1995)
John Pilch and Bruce Malina, Handbook of Biblical Social Values, Hendrickson, (1998)
Nicholas Perrin, Thomas: The Other Gospel, John Knox, (2007)
Stanley Porter and Gordon L. Heath, The Lost Gospel of Judas, Eerdmans, (2007)
Robert Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder, eds., The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave, Prometheus Books, (2005)
Bo Reicke, The Roots of the Synoptic Gospels, Fortress, (1986), p46-47
L. D. Reynolds, ed., Texts and Transmission: A Survey of Latin Classics, Clarendon Press, (1983)
James Robinson, The Secrets of Judas, Harper, (2006)
J. A. T Robinson, The Priority of John, London: Meyer and Stone, (1985),
E. Randolph Richards, The Secretary in the Letters of Paul, J. C. B. Mohr, (1991)
FP Retief, and L Cilliers, The History and Pathology of Crucifixion, South African Medical Journal 92 (112, 1993), p938-941
E. P. Sanders, and Margaret Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels, Trinity Press International, (1989)
Carol J. Schluter, Filling Up The Measure: Polemic Hyperbole in 1 Thessalonians 2:14-16, Sheffield Academic Press, (1994)
Donald Senior, The Gospel of Matthew, Nashville: Abingdon, (1997)
Whitney Shiner, Proclaiming the Gospel, Trinity International Press, (2003)
Jocelyn Small, Wax Tablets of the Mind, Routledge, (1997)
Benedict de Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Samuel Shirley, trns., Brad S. Gregory, ed., Leiden: E. J. Brill, (1989)
Jan Vansina, Oral History: A Study of the Historical Methodology, Aldine, (1961)
Geza Vermes, The Changing Faces of Jesus, New York: Viking, (2001)
William O. Walker, Interpolations in the Pauline Letters, Continuum Publishing Group, (2001)
Daniel Wallace, Matthew: Introduction, Argument and Outline, http://bible.org/seriespage/matthew-introduction-argument-and-outline
Daniel Wallace, Mark: Introduction, Argument and Outline, http://bible.org/seriespage/mark-introduction-argument-and-outline
Daniel Wallace, Luke: Introduction, Outline and Argument, http://bible.org/seriespage/luke-introduction-outline-and-argument
Daniel Wallace, John: Introduction, Outline, and Argument, http://bible.org/seriespage/gospel-john-introduction-argument-outline
William Walker, ed., The Relationships Among the Gospels: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue, Trinity University Press, (1978)
Michael Wilkins and J. P. Moreland, eds., Jesus Under Fire, Zondervan, (1996)
Robert Wilken, The Christians As The Romans Saw Them, Yale University Press, (1985)
Ben Witherington, The Acts of the Apostles: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary, Paternoster, (1998)
Leonard Zuzne and Warren H. Jones, Anomalistic Psychology: A Study of Extraordinary Phenomena of Behaviour and Experience, Erlbaum Associates, (1982)

Endnotes
1 This is a reference to 19th German historian Leopold von Ranke.
2 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition, Crossway, (2008), p207, 247
3 Keith Jenkins, The Post Modern History Reader, New York: Routledge, (1997),
p6, 8, 10, 17, 19, 20
4 C. Behan McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, Cambridge University Press, (1984), p19
5 David Hume, Enquiries Regarding Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd edition, P. H Nidditch, ed., Oxford: Clarendon, (1975) and Benedict de Spinoza, Tracatus Theologico-Politicus, Samuel Shirley, trns., Brad S. Gregory, ed., Leiden: E. J. Brill, (1989)
6 Whilst Spinoza was a pantheist, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was a deistic work.
7 For example, see: Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., Contending With Christianity’s Critics, B&H Publishing, (2009), William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, John Wiley and Sons, (2009), William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd Edition, Crossway, (2008), and Bruce L. Gordon and William A. Dembski, eds., The Nature of Nature: Examining the Role of Naturalism in Science, ISI Books, (2011)
8 Richard Carrier, Why the Resurrection is Unbelievable, from John W. Loftus, ed., The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails, Prometheus Books, (2010), p298-299
8 John Earman, Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles, Oxford University Press, (2000), p4
9 Hector Avalos, The End of Biblical Studies, Prometheus Books, (2007), p187-194
10 C. Behan McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, Cambridge University Press, (1984), p22
11 William Lane Craig, Resurrection and the Real Jesus, Paul Copan, ed., Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up?, Grand Rapid: Baker, p165
12 L. D. Reynolds, ed., Texts and Transmission: A Survey of Latin Classics, Clarendon Press, (1983), p46-47 and W.G. Spencer, Celsus: de Medicina, Harvard University Press, (1971), pxiii
13 L. D. Reynolds, ed., Texts and Transmission: A Survey of Latin Classics, Clarendon Press, (1983), p276-277
14 L. D. Reynolds, ed., Texts and Transmission: A Survey of Latin Classics, Clarendon Press, (1983), p307-308 and H. Rackham, Pliny: Natural History, Vol. 1, Harvard University Press, (1979), pxii
15 L. D. Reynolds, ed., Texts and Transmission: A Survey of Latin Classics, Clarendon Press, (1983), p332-333 and Jeffrey Henderson, Quintillian: The Orator’s Education, Harvard University Press, (2001), p19
16 L. D. Reynolds, ed., Texts and Transmission: A Survey of Latin Classics, Clarendon Press, (1983), p406
17 J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel, (2006), p71-82
18 Craig A. Evans, Fabricating Jesus, IVP, (2007), p26, 28, 32-33
19 J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel, (2006), p104-105
20 Richard Carrier, Pauline Interpolations, Richard Carrier Blogs, (June 2011), http://richardcarrier.blogspot.com/2011/06/pauline-interpolations.html
21 See: Carol J. Schluter, Filling Up The Measure: Polemic Hyperbole in 1 Thessalonians 2:14-16, Sheffield Academic Press, (1994) for a full coverage of arguments for and against interpolation of 1 Thessalonians 2:14-16. For a substantive treatment of 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 passage, see: William O. Walker, Interpolations in the Pauline Letters, Continuum Publishing Group, (2001)
22 J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel, (2006), p109
23 Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, Eerdmans, (2006), p246-249
24 David M. Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, Oxford University Press, (2005), p8, 9, 27-29, 71-72, 95, 98.
25 Whitney Shiner, Proclaiming the Gospel, Trinity Press International Press, (2003), p4-5, 25, 103-108, 151-153. Jocelyn Small, Wax Tablets of the Mind, Routledge, (1997), p82
26 Richard A. Burridge, What Are The Gospels?: A Comparison With Graeco-Roman Biographies, Eerdmans, (2004), p235
27 Martin Hengel, The Four Gospels and the One Gospel of Jesus Christ, Trinity Press International, (2000), p48
28 Papias, Exposition of the Oracles of the Lord, quoted by Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica, Book III, Chapter 39.16, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01.vii.ii.vi.html
29 See: Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, Eerdmans, (2006)
30 Jerome, Lives of Illustrious Men, Chapter 3, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf203.v.iii.v.html
31 For more on these points see: Donald Senior, The Gospel of Matthew, Nashville: Abingdon, (1997), W. F. Albright and C. S. Mann, Matthew, New York: Doubleday, (1971), and Daniel Wallace, Matthew: Introduction, Argument and Outline, http://bible.org/seriespage/matthew-introduction-argument-and-outline
32 See: Daniel Wallace, Mark: Introduction, Argument and Outline, http://bible.org/seriespage/mark-introduction-argument-and-outline, Ben Witherington, The Acts of the Apostles: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary, Paternoster, (1998), Daniel Wallace, Luke: Introduction, Outline and Argument, http://bible.org/seriespage/luke-introduction-outline-and-argument, Craig Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of John’s Gospel, IVP, (2007) J. A. T Robinson, The Priority of John, London: Meyer and Stone, (1985) and Daniel Wallace, John: Introduction, Outline, and Argument, http://bible.org/seriespage/gospel-john-introduction-argument-outline
33 Albert B. Lord, The Gospels as Oral Traditional Literature, from William Walker, ed., The Relationships Among the Gospels: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue, Trinity University Press, (1978), p42
34 E. P. Sanders, and Margaret Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels, Trinity Press International, (1989), p72
35 David Neville, Mark’s Gospel: Prior or Posterior?, Sheffield Academic Press, (2002), p284, 337-338
36 Eta Linnemann, Is There A Synoptic Problem?, Grand Rapids: Baker, (1992), p129
37 Bo Reicke, The Roots of the Synoptic Gospels, Fortress, (1986), p46-47
38 George Kennedy, Classical and Christian Source Criticism from William Walker, ed., The Relationships Among the Gospels: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue, Trinity University Press, (1978), p131
39 Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses, Eerdmans, (2006), p42, p222
40 Robert H. Stein, Criteria for the Gospels’ Authenticity from Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., Contending With Christianity’s Critics, B&H, (2009), p88-103 and Craig A. Evans, Fabricating Jesus, IVP, (2007), p46-51 See also: Michael J. Wilkins, Who Did Jesus Think He Was?, from Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., Contending With Christianity’s Critics, B&H, (2009), p167-181
41 For more see: Craig A. Evans, Fabricating Jesus, IVP, (2007), p123-157, J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel, (2006), p169-193, Ben Witherington III, Jesus the Seer, from Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., B&H, (2009), p104-112 and William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd Edition, Crossway, (2008), p287-329
42 Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book XVIII, Chapter 3.3, http://www.ccel.org/j/josephus/works/ant-18.htm, Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book XX, Chapter 9.1, http://www.ccel.org/j/josephus/works/ant-20.htm and Tacitus, Annals, XV.44, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0078%3Abook%3D15%3Achapter%3D44
43 The consensus amongst the scholarly community is that, whilst some parts of this passage are obvious interpolations, other parts are distinctly authentic, which include the reference to Jesus. From 1937 to 1980, out of 52 scholars reviewing the subject, 39 found portions of this passage to be authentic. Since 1980, 10 out of 13 books on the subject argue that this passage is partially authentic whilst the other three argue it is a complete forgery. Coincidentally, these three books all argue that Jesus never existed. Notable scholars that accept partial authenticity of the Testimonium Flavium include: - John P. Meier, Steve Mason, Paula Fredrikson, E.P. Sanders, Geza Vermes, John D. Crossan, Louis H. Feldman, Paul Winter, S.G.F. Brandon, Morton Smith, James H. Charlesworth, Carlo M. Martini, Wolfgang Trilling, A.M. Dubarle, Robert Van Voorst, R.T. France, F.F. Bruce, Craig L. Blomberg, Ben Witherington III, James D.G. Dunn, Darrell L. Bock, Alice Whealey, Luke T. Johnson, J. Carleton Paget and Graham Stanton. These scholars represent a wide swath of academia, not just some narrow subset of conservative believers. Even Jeffrey Jay Lowder, co-founder of Secular Web, agrees with partial authenticity: http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/jeff_lowder/jury/chap5.html Furthermore, there are non-interpolated manuscripts without the suspect language: Agapios, Kitab al-'Unwan ("Book of the Title,") and James H. Charlesworth, Jesus Within Judaism, http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~humm/Topics/JewishJesus/josephus.html
44 Martin Hengel, Crucifixion, Fortress, (1977), p22 and Bruce Malina and Richard Rohrbaugh, Social Science Commentary on the Gospel of John, Fortress, (1998), p263-264
45 Deuteronomy 21:23, NCV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Deuteronomy%2021:23&version=NCV
46 David deSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship and Purity, IVP, (2000), p51 and Martin Hengel, Crucifixion, Fortress, (1977), p19
47 A small group of conspiracy theorists believe Christianity started as a mishmash of pagan deities, and is typically held by people who argue that Jesus ever even existed. Such view has been totally rejected by contemporary scholarship. See: J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel, (2006), p249-258
48 Byron C. McCane, Where No one Had yet Been Laid: The Shame of Jesus’ Burial, from B.D. Chilton and C.A. Evans, Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, Brill (1998), p433
49 Byron C. McCane, Where No one Had yet Been Laid: The Shame of Jesus’ Burial, from B.D. Chilton and C.A. Evans, Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, Brill (1998), p444
50 See note 45.
51 Byron C. McCane, Where No one Had yet Been Laid: The Shame of Jesus’ Burial, from B.D. Chilton and C.A. Evans, Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, Brill (1998), p431-452
52 Gerald O’Collins, The Resurrection of Jesus Christ, Judson Press, (1973), p31
Resurrection was the specific belief in a physical return from death to life, and then a subsequent transformation into a glorified form. Not to be confused with resuscitation, which is just simply coming back from death to life.
53 Murray Harris, Raised Immortal, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, (1985), p116
54 In some extra-biblical Jewish tradition, it was believed Moses was assumed into heaven like Elijah and Enoch were. The document that is the source of this tradition, The Testament of Moses, is even referred to in Jude’s Epistle in the New Testament.
55 Again, resurrection was not the same thing as coming back to life from death. Resurrection involved being raised physically from the dead but also included a transformation into a glorified state.
56 David deSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship and Purity, IVP, (2000), p46
57 D. Brendan Nagle and Stanley M. Burstein, The Ancient World: Readings in Social and Cultural History, Third Edition, Pearson, New Jersey (2006), p314-315
58 D. Brendan Nagle and Stanley M. Burstein, The Ancient World: Readings in Social and Cultural History, Third Edition, Pearson, New Jersey (2006), p318
59 The earliest account of Roman state persecution comes to us from Cornelius Tacitus, who reported that Nero set Christians on fire and used them as torches. See note 42, Tacitus, Annals.
60 David deSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship and Purity, IVP, (2000), p36
61 See: Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach, IVP, (2010), and William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 3rd Edition, Crossway, (2008), p333-399
62 Leonard Zuzne and Warren H. Jones, Anomalistic Psychology: A Study of Extraordinary Phenomena of Behaviour and Experience, Erlbaum Associates, (1982), p133-135
63 The resurrection appearances are described in Matthew 28, Mark 16, Luke 24, John 20, and further appearances are described in Acts 1:1-11; 9:3-9; 22:6-11; 26:-12-18; 7:55; and also in 1 Corinthians 15:3. The creedal statement in 1 Corinthians 15:3 is important because it dates so early. Gary Habermas notes:
“These “authentic” Pauline epistles are preferred even over the Gospels because of the critical belief that we know the author and dates of composition for these writings, whereas we do not know the authors and are somewhat less specific regarding the dates of the Gospels…. The key text in this regard is certainly 1 Cor 15:3ff… In the case of 1 Cor 15:3ff., critical scholars agree that Paul’s reception of at least the content of this proclamation, and probably the creed itself, go back to the mid-AD 30s, when he spent two weeks with Peter and James, the brother of Jesus. But these two apostles had the material before Paul did, and the events behind the reports are earlier still. This is probably the chief argument that persuades the majority of scholars today that the proclamation of Jesus’ resurrection originated in the earliest church. Virtually all critical scholars think this message began with the real experiences of Jesus’ earliest disciples, who thought they had seen appearances of their risen lord.” – Gary R. Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus Time Line, from Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., Contending With Christianity’s Critics, B&H, (2009), p115, p125
64 Leon Festinger and J. M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, p203-211 and P. gosling, P. M. Denizeau, and D. Orbele, Denial of Responsibility: a new Mode of Dissonance Reduction, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, p722-733
65 Leon Festinger, H.W. Riecken, and S. Schachter, When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the World, University of Minnesota Press, (1956)
66 “Jesus of Nazareth underwent Jewish and Roman trials, was flogged, and was sentenced to death by crucifixion. The scourging produced deep stripelike lacerations and appreciable blood loss, and it probably set the stage for hypovolemic shock, as evidenced by the fact that Jesus was too weakened to carry the crossbar (patibulum) to Golgotha. At the site of crucifixion, his wrists were nailed to the patibulum and, after the patibulum was lifted onto the upright post (stipes), his feet were nailed to the stipes. The major pathophysiologic effect of crucifixion was an interference with normal respirations. Accordingly, death resulted primarily from hypovolemic shock and exhaustion asphyxia. Jesus' death was ensured by the thrust of a soldier's spear into his side. Modern medical interpretation of the historical evidence indicates that Jesus was dead when taken down from the cross.” – William D. Edwards, Wesley J. Gabel, and Floyd E. Hosmer, On The Physical Death of Jesus Christ, The Journal of the American Medical Association 255 (11, 1986), p1455-1463
“Death, usually after 6 hours--4 days, was due to multifactorial pathology: after-effects of compulsory scourging and maiming, haemorrhage and dehydration causing hypovolaemic shock and pain, but the most important factor was progressive asphyxia caused by impairment of respiratory movement. Resultant anoxaemia exaggerated hypovolaemic shock. Death was probably commonly precipitated by cardiac arrest, caused by vasovagal reflexes, initiated inter alia by severe anoxaemia, severe pain, body blows and breaking of the large bones. The attending Roman guards could only leave the site after the victim had died, and were known to precipitate death by means of deliberate fracturing of the tibia and/or fibula, spear stab wounds into the heart, sharp blows to the front of the chest, or a smoking fire built at the foot of the cross to asphyxiate the victim.” – FP Retief, and L Cilliers, The History and Pathology of Crucifixion, South African Medical Journal 92 (112, 1993), p938-941
67 Carefully observing where Jesus is buried and then returning on the Sunday morning to confirm and even mark, for identification, his corpse, is in keeping with Jewish burial customs. After all, m. Sanh. 6.5-6 implies that bodies are still identifiable, long after decomposition of the flesh. How was this done? We don’t know, but evidently the Jewish people knew how to mark or in some way identify a corpse, so that it could be retrieved some time later. We should not allow our ignorance of such customs, or our condescension, to lead us to discount such tradition as implausible.” – Craig A. Evans, Jewish Burial Traditions and the Resurrection of Jesus, Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus, 3/2 (06, 2005), p233-248. See also: Dale Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, T and T Clark, (2005), p318 and Byron McCane, Roll Back the Stone, Trinity Press International, (2003), p11, 14, 47, 54.
68 Richard Carrier, in his chapter Jewish Law, the Burial of Jesus and the Third Day in the volume, The Empty Tomb appeals to two separate passages in Josephus’ Antiquities as if they were referring to the same thing to try and support his belief that Jesus was only temporarily buried and then moved to a graveyard reserved for criminals. He uses a passage speaking about blasphemers, and then tries to link it to another passage discussing unruly and rebellious children, despite the fact that they are completely separate. He also incorrectly attributes the passages to Jewish Wars and gets one of the verses wrong. Such an appeal is fraudulent and dishonest.

I Don't Hold to the Infallibility of Richard Carrier: Why I Don't Take Sceptics Seriously About NT Textual Corruption

2011-09-29T04:35:00.002+01:00

This is actually something I wrote ages ago. Whilst being a historian, unlike Ehrman, Carrier is NOT a textual scholar, although he does have some experience and knowledge in this area. His opinion should not be wholly dismissed, but at the same time, we should take his claims with a little more salt than say Ehrman’s. I shall first start with two that he bought up in his debate with apologist, JP Holding, and mentioned again on his own personal blog. [Richard Carrier, Pauline Interpolations, Richard Carrier Blogs, (June 2011), http://richardcarrier.blogspot.com/2011/06/pauline-interpolations.html ]

He claims that 1 Thessalonians 2:14-16 and 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 are both interpolations we don’t have manuscript evidence for. I guess Carrier must be privy to some information that the rest of the academic community is unaware of, considering the question is not settled as he would have us believe but then, pointing this out would undermine his case. [See: Carol J. Schluter, Filling Up The Measure: Polemic Hyperbole in 1 Thessalonians 2:14-16, Sheffield Academic Press, (1994) for a full coverage of arguments for and against interpolation of 1 Thessalonians 2:14-16. For a substantive treatment of 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 passage, see: William O. Walker, Interpolations in the Pauline Letters, Continuum Publishing Group, (2001).]

Let us first take a look at the 1 Thessalonians passage:
“14 For you, brothers and sisters, became imitators of God’s churches in Judea, which are in Christ Jesus: You suffered from your own people the same things those churches suffered from the Jews 15 who killed the Lord Jesus and the prophets and also drove us out. They displease God and are hostile to everyone 16 in their effort to keep us from speaking to the Gentiles so that they may be saved. In this way they always heap up their sins to the limit. The wrath of God has come upon them at last.”
Carrier claims:
• Paul never blames the Jews for the death of Jesus elsewhere.
• Paul never talks about God’s wrath as having come, but only at the future judgement (see: Romans 2:5, 3:5-6, 4:15.)
• Paul teaches the Jews will be saved, not destroyed (see: Romans 11:25-28.)
• Paul was dead by the time the “wrath had come upon them to the uttermost” (the destruction of Jewish nation and temple in 70AD.
Carrier likewise claims that arguments against interpolation “make no sense” and requires us to “believe too many improbable things.” He also argues that Paul never talks of the Jews as if he were not one of them.

Let us take a look at the evidence. First, is there any reason to suggest that this verse refers to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70AD? Carrier just dismisses other proposed events with a hand wave, yet this does not make a valid argument. Maybe if Carrier had spent more time interacting with the scholarship on this issue, then he would know that some have suggested that the event referred to was the expulsion of the Jews from Rome by Claudius in 48AD. This was not exactly an event of little consequence but had far reaching implications. Indeed, roughly 20-30,000 Jews were massacred and there was a subsequent famine in Judea. How can this not be interpreted as divine punishment? If Carrier wants to argue against such a position then he needs to provide some interesting reasons to accept his claim that the passage exclusively refers to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70AD. You’re going to need to get beyond bare assertions if you want people to take you seriously, Richie C.

Secondly, does this condemnation of the Jews stand in contrast with what Paul had previously said about the Jews? One wonders, what is problematic or contradictory here? Is one to suppose that Paul never got angry with his fellow Jews? As Williams notes:
“A frank recognition of guilt does not preclude love for the guilty.” - David J. Williams, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Peabody: Hendrickson, (1992), p47
There is also the fact that Romans was written 7-10 years after 1 Thessalonians. Are we to suppose that Paul could not have changed his mind? The simplest explanation, however, that this is simply an example of hyperbolic polemic and ancient rhetoric. Lastly, is there any reason to suggest that Paul means all Jews? It seems clear that such an identification is mistaken, Indeed, when one reads the passage, we note that Paul makes the distinction that he is only referring to Jews who persecuted the Church. How can it be inferred he is talking about all Jews, when the Christians of the Judean churches were themselves Jews? This argument thus makes no sense whatsoever. Thus I agree with Jewett:
“…only those desiring a sanitised picture of Paul and the early Church are likely to find Pearson [another critic who makes use of such arguments] convincing on this point.” - Robert Jewett, The Thessalonian Correspondence: Pauline Rhetoric and Millenarian Piety, Fortress Press, (1986), p39
Thus Carrier’s bold bare assertions are woefully inadequate and do not encapsulate scholarly consensus on the matter whatsoever.

What then of the passage from 1 Corinthians? Let us take a look:
“34 Women should remain silent in the churches. They are not allowed to speak, but must be in submission, as the law says. 35 If they want to inquire about something, they should ask their own husbands at home; for it is disgraceful for a woman to speak in the church.”
Carrier is this time aware of the argument in favour of Pauline authorship, by noting the explanation that Paul is quoting his opponents. Does Carrier offer any substantive argument against this argument though? The answer is no, and we are again met with bare assertions that have no place in scholarly discussion of nuanced issues such as these. We actually have several good reasons for thinking Paul is quoting his opponents here. We have a number of examples were Paul DOES use this literary device throughout his epistles, such as 1 Corinthians 6, where Paul quotes opponents in verses 12 and 13 and then offers a refutation.

A second fact is that of a tiny particle in the Greek text that is left out of a number of translations, immediately following this passage. Carrier notes this and quotes the passage in its wider context:
“29 And let the prophets speak by two or three, and let the others discern. 30 But if a revelation be made to another sitting by, let the first keep silence. 31 For ye all can prophesy one by one, that all may learn, and all may be exhorted; 32 and the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets; 33 for God is not a God of confusion, but of peace. As in all the churches of the saints, 34 let the women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but let them be in subjection, as also saith the law. 35 And if they would learn anything, let them ask their own husbands at home: for it is shameful for a woman to speak in the church. 36 What? was it from you that the word of God went forth? or came it unto you alone? 37 If any man thinketh himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him take knowledge of the things which I write unto you, that they are the commandment of the Lord. 38 But if any man is ignorant, let him be ignorant. 39 Wherefore, my brethren, desire earnestly to prophesy, and forbid not to speak with tongues. 40 But let all things be done decently and in order.“
Carrier claims the “What?” does not appear in the Greek text and is the invention of a “modern commentator.” I think many Biblical scholars would be surprised to hear that. Presumably, he means the translation of the particle to mean “What?” as it can also be translated as “or.” Otherwise, one can conclude that Carrier is simply making things up. One fact that Carrier leaves out is that this particle occurs elsewhere in Paul’s writings, in both meanings “or” and “what.”

For example, in Romans 2:3-4:
“3 So when you, a mere human being, pass judgment on them and yet do the same things, do you think you will escape God’s judgment? 4 Or do you show contempt for the riches of his kindness, forbearance and patience, not realizing that God’s kindness is intended to lead you to repentance?”
This is from the NIV, where the particle is untranslated in the 1 Corinthians passage. Two similar passages, one where the particle also remains untranslated in the NIV, are Romans 9:20-21 and 1 Corinthians 6:8-9:
“20 But who are you, a human being, to talk back to God? “Shall what is formed say to the one who formed it, ‘Why did you make me like this?’” 21 [Particle is here] Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for special purposes and some for common use?”
“8 Instead, you yourselves cheat and do wrong, and you do this to your brothers and sisters. 9 Or do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor men who have sex with men.”
In all these examples, it means the same thing. It’s kind of like modern “NOT!” jokes in that regard. In other words, it marks violent disagreement.

What is even odder, though, is how Carrier claims that this “what?” is the only evidence of Paul’s disagreement with the statement in the preceding two verses. I have to ask, is Carrier blind? Even without the particle, it is still clear that Paul is disaffirming the preceding two verses. The flow of the argument alone indicates that Paul is rebuking the position espoused in verses 24-35:
• Paul uses a gentle, instructional, nurturing tone in verses 26-33.
• Paul switches to a legalistic rabbinical style disgrace-oriented passage in verses 34-35.
• Paul then switches to a rebuking, ironic tone in verses 36-38 to demolish a false teaching in the immediate context.
• Paul finishes by switching back to the gentle, instructional, and nurturing tone in verses 39-40.
Lastly, the nature of the rebuke indicates that verses 34-35 are a position that the Corinthians held, and not Paul. In verses 26-32, Paul offers his solutions for orderly worship with universal speaking allowed. In verse 33, Paul concludes that God seeks order and seeks it this way in all churches. In verses 34-35, Paul quotes somebody else’s solution for orderly worship, which mandated that women shut-up. Verses 36-38 are Paul’s argument against this position. He admonishes them by asking why they think themselves so much more spiritual than other churches to the extent that they believe they can propose a different solution to the problem of orderly worship.

What is also odd is how he claims that if these two passages can prove to be interpolations, then it would somehow make the New Testament “hopelessly corrupt.” Excuse me for not following you in your obvious leap in logic by jumping to highly implausible, improbable conclusions based on scanty data. Not even that, there are good reasons for believing both of these passages are not interpolations, which Carrier asserts is just delusional babble. Gee, projecting much there at all, little Richard? Neither of these passages contribute towards undermining or supporting any particular major New Testament theology, so what is the problem? It is not enough just to cite two incidental cases and expect us to run around like Chicken Little, expecting the sky to fall on us at any second. Especially considering that the two examples aren’t even interpolations. Carrier would need to show multiple examples of core elements of the New Testament being corrupted in order for us to seriously entertain his position that the New Testament is “hopelessly corrupt.” Yet instead he chooses parade around with these Jackanory objections that pose no serious challenge to the reliability of the NT textual tradition whatsoever.

Did Jesus Rise From the Dead?

2011-09-25T23:53:00.002+01:00

The main question that is central to truth or falsity of Christianity is: did Jesus rise from the dead? The truth of Christianity literally stands or falls on this, as the apostle Paul so eloquently put it:
“If there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is useless and so is your faith. More than that, we are then found to be false witnesses about God, for we have testified about God that he raised Christ from the dead. But he did not raise him if in fact the dead are not raised. For if the dead are not raised, then Christ has not been raised either. And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ are lost. If only for this life we have hope in Christ, we are of all people most to be pitied. But Christ has indeed been raised from the dead, the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep.”[1]

Thus, if Jesus rose from the dead, then Christian theism is true, but if He did not, then Christianity is false, and we have been following it in vain. Now, some might say, but belief in Jesus’ resurrection isn’t based on evidence, we just take it on faith! This is simply based on a false definition of faith. There most certainly IS evidence that we can survey to determine whether or not Jesus really rose from the dead or not.

Before continuing on to the defence of the resurrection hypothesis, we must first deal with two philosophical issues related to the methodology and practice of history: the problem of historical knowledge and the problem of miracles. Is historical knowledge possible, and what counts as historical knowledge? Can the historian identify miracles as historical events, or rather; can miracle events ever be considered historical? This is the first phase of defending the resurrection, philosophical arguments. Now I have no idea what the average person’s understanding of the theory, methodology and practice is. Their knowledge of History itself may be exceptionally bad, but their knowledge of the philosophy of History is something I will not even pretend to know. If public knowledge of History is anything to go by, then I expect the answer to be: close to nil. This may seem like an abstract subject, yet it is not just important to the question of Jesus’ resurrection, but the subject of History as a whole. What actually counts as historical knowledge has been hotly contested.

This is what philosopher William Lane Craig refers to as the problem of historical knowledge:
“This, however, brings us face-to-face with the problem of historical knowledge; that is to say, how is it possible to learn anything about the human past with any degree of assurance? On the popular level, this expresses itself in the attitude that history is uncertain and irrelevant. It has been said that history is a series of lies that everyone has decided to agree on. On the scholarly level, the problem finds expression in the outlook of historical relativism, which denies the objectivity of historical facts.”[2]
New Testament scholar, Michael R. Licona provides the following description:
“To various degrees, postmodern historians question whether it is even possible to know and describe the past. This is in contrast to realist historians, who maintain that reality exists independently of our knowledge of it and our scientific statements and theories refer to this independent reality.”[3]
There are two main post-modernist views, what I will call the narrative view and what I will call the radical view. The narrative view is held by those like Hayden White, who maintains that historians write narratives that are to be assessed purely on literary and aesthetic ground. The radical view is held by those like Keith Jenkins, who deny that there is actually any narrative-dependent reality, and that facts do not exist independently of the historian. Thus, we are presented with historical relativism, claiming that all we can know are historical reconstructions and that no historical reconstructions can be said to be superior to others.

Whether consciously or not, this is a view that largely pervades the new atheists. For example, when somebody claims that Christianity was plagiarised from pagan religions, or that the doctrine of the Incarnation was invented in the 4th century by a group of Bishops at the behest of a Roman Emperor, they are telling patent falsehoods that stand in contrast to known facts about the past. This historic revisionism is only permissible if historical relativism is true, and is one reason why historic relativism is an invalid approach to history. To illustrate this point further, imagine if the Nazis had won World War II. The belief that Jews were responsible for the downfall of Germany at the end of World War I would no doubt have been written into the history books as if it were actually true, and undoubtedly anybody who said otherwise would have been executed and their work destroyed. If this had been so, would this have made their version of history correct? The answer is, of course, a resounding no.

Furthermore, there is no version of history that could ever be produced where World War II never happened. Thus, the notion that, somehow, we are incapable of knowing anything about the past is completely and absolutely false. This completely destroys hardcore anti-realist models of historiography, but what about less extreme views? For example, it could be argued that whilst certain things can be known about the past, a great deal is not known, and whilst historians cannot produce whatever historical narratives they like, there is still a great variety of possible narratives that are all on equal footing. Following in this line of argumentation is that quaint though ludicrous notion that history is an art, and not a science. Whereas the scientist analyses lab data obtained by observing experiments, the historian does not have the past events on hand to directly witness, and so is forced to produce a literary narrative, rather than say a historical hypothesis. Furthermore, it is argued that a historian, no matter how objective they aim to be, is always being affected by their unconscious cultural biases, and so whatever narratives they produce will be affected by these hidden biases.

This view is, I think, more valid, in the sense it is a position that actually merits a response, however is also incorrect. As the historian, like the scientist, still has data to analyse. The fields of archaeology and textual criticism are equally concerned with evidence as are the fields of geology and evolutionary biology, and all fields are as equally removed from the events they seek to explain. The scientists has rocks and fossils, the historian has ruins and manuscripts. Obviously, interpretation of the evidence is involved, but we are not permitted to run with it in whatever direction we like. Furthermore, whilst a historian is affected by their personal biases, it for this very reason that there exists peer review. In history, evidence is collected and analysed, and a hypothesis to explain these facts is then offered. The question then is then, how do we determine if a historical hypothesis is true? Obviously, we have no means of directly accessing the past, so what methods do we use in lieu of time travel?

Perhaps the most satisfactory criteria I have read comes from historian C. Behan McCullagh[4]:
1) The statement, together with other statements already held to be true, must imply yet other statements describing present, observable data.
2) The hypothesis must have greater explanatory scope than its rivals. That is, it implies a greater variety of observational statements.
3) The hypothesis must have greater explanatory power than its rivals. That is, it must make the observational statements it implies more probable.
4) The hypothesis must be more plausible than its rivals. That is, it must be implied by a greater number of accepted truths than any other, and more strongly than any other whereas its negation must be implied by fewer beliefs than any other, and less strongly than any other.
5) The hypothesis must be less ad hoc than any other incompatible hypothesis about the same subject; that is, it must include fewer new suppositions about the past that are not already implied to some extent by existing beliefs.
6) It must be disconfirmed by fewer accepted beliefs than its rivals. That is, when conjoined with accepted truths it must imply fewer observation statements and other statements that are believed to be false.
7) It must exceed its rivals in characteristics 2 to 6 to the degree that there is little chance of a rival hypothesis, after further investigation, soon exceeding it in these respects.
Using these principles, we can than assess which hypothesis is the best explanation of the facts we are trying to explain. The hypothesis that meets all criteria can be said to be the most probably true. What then of miracle claims? How do they fit into the evidentiary scheme of things in the field of History? I would think that miracles claims, like any other claims, would need to be analysed, and evidence for or against the claim would need to be accumulated and scrutinised before any sort of judgement could be made. Yet, there are those who assert otherwise.

There are a variety of arguments against identifying events as miracles, each of them so incredibly poor that it strains credulity to imagine that someone actually think them to be valid arguments. Perhaps the most common objection is the claim that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” This statement is as useless as it is banal, incoherent and self-refuting. For what is meant by “extraordinary claims” and “extraordinary evidence?” If an extraordinary claim is any claim that we do not yet have evidence for, then this applies to every unproven hypothesis. If it instead refers to claims that we personally find extraordinary and improbable, then it is simply nothing more than personal incredulity, and so has no place in conducting historical reasoning. What then of “extraordinary evidence?” In what sense can evidence be said to be “extraordinary?” If it refers to absolute proof, then this singlehandedly destroys every human enterprise from history to science, as it then becomes impossible to know pretty much anything at all. If it simply refers to evidence necessary to establish a hypothesis as the best explanation, then it simply becomes “claims requires evidence,” which nobody would dispute.

In reality, this is nothing more than a slogan proffered in lieu of a good rival hypothesis. Indeed, no matter how much evidence is presented, critics and sceptics can simply complain that, somehow, it just isn’t “extraordinary” enough. ECREE is not a logical principal at all but a subjective shibboleth that Carl Sagan pulled out of his backside. ECREE compels one to make a snap-judgment about the veracity of a claim before looking at the evidence and introduces bias such that an objective analysis of the data becomes difficult if not impossible. In essence, it is therefore nothing more than an argument from personal incredulity. All ECREE does is create a framework to hide the moving of the goalposts - ECREE is not a means of evaluating evidence; it is a means of avoiding evidence that one does not like. Ironically enough, proponents of ECREE are often forced to rely on extraordinary claims themselves. For example, there are those who assert that Jesus could have been a space alien, or that 500+ people all suffered from identical audio-visual and sensory hallucinations at the same time, rather than seriously entertain the resurrection hypothesis.

Fortunately, not all critics and sceptic are this monumentally stupid. There exist other complaints against identifying miracles as historic events. Perhaps the prime example, offered by thinkers such as David Hume and Benedict de Spinoza, is that miracles are “violations of nature” and as such are impossible. Furthermore, even if absolute proof could be given of a particular miracle claim, then it could still not be identified as a miracle, due to the proof of the regularity of nature. This is certainly a more plausible objection, but one that has, unfortunately for sceptics, been long since refuted. The most obvious point of contention being, the laws of nature are descriptive, not proscriptive. The law of gravity does not cause objects to be attracted to one other proportionally to their mass. The real reason why the universe behaves in the way it does is still entirely a mystery, and is taken by many as evidence of the divine. Furthermore, if we assume the existence of God, as Spinoza and Hume did, then what reason do we have to suppose that God is incapable of interfering in the universe that He Himself made? The answer, it seems, is: none. As contemporaries of Hume and Spinoza argued, the laws of nature merely describe how the universe behaves in the absence of divine interference, in the same way the law of motion describes the movement of a bouncing ball if it were not interrupted by, say, a human being catching it before it stopped bouncing.

Hume also offered four more arguments against miracles. Hume argued that no miracle claim has ever been attested to by a sufficient number of educated, honest men of such social standing that they would stand a great deal to lose by lying, that people crave miraculous stories and are gullible enough to believe any absurd story, that miracles have only been reported to occur amongst “barbarous” peoples, and that miracles are said to occur in all religions, thus effectively cancelling each other out. It does not take a genius to realise that such arguments are not arguments at all. For starters, his first claim is simply a bare assertion coupled with circular reasoning, in that he assumes that which he seeks to prove. His second claim is simply a red herring coupled with the genetic fallacy. His third argument is an ad hominem coupled with the genetic fallacy and his last argument is simply a non sequitur, as it does not matter that all religions claim miracles. The fact that all religions claim miracles has no impact whatsoever on the claims of a particular religion. In principle then, there is just no good a priori reason to reject miracle claims out of hand. Only after a careful analysis of the facts can such judgement as to the truth or falsehood of a miracle claim can be made. Assuming miracles are impossible prior to this is simply circular reasoning.

This leads us to the second phase of defending the resurrection, the historical evidence. What are the facts that we need to explain?
1. Jesus died by crucifixion.
2. Jesus was buried, and His tomb was discovered empty by a group of His followers.
3. The disciples had experiences that they believed were literal appearances of the risen Christ, and went from doubters to bold proclaimers.
4. Sceptics, such as Paul and James became believers.
We have already seen the evidence for Jesus’ crucifixion from the reports of historians such as Tacitus, but what evidence have we got for the other facts? Jesus’ burial, the empty tomb and the disciples’ belief are widely supported by a number of facts. The first factor is that these facts are multiply attested by early, independent sources. 1 Corinthians 15 contains perhaps the earliest Christian material. As New Testament scholar Gary Habermas writes:
“In the case of 1 Cor 15:3ff., critical scholars agree that Paul’s reception of at least the core of this proclamation, and probably the creed itself, go back to the mid-AD 30s, when he spent two weeks with Peter and James, the brother of Jesus. But these two apostles had the material before Paul did, and the events behind the reports are earlier still. This is probably the chief argument that persuades the majority of scholars today that the proclamation of Jesus’ resurrection originated in the earliest church. Virtually all critical scholars think this message began with the real experiences of Jesus’ earliest disciples, who thought they had seen appearances of their risen Lord. It did not arise at some later date. Nor was it borrowed or invented.”[5]

The section in question, reads as follows:
“For what I received I passed on to you as of first importance: that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures, and that he appeared to Cephas, and then to the Twelve.”[6]
This is paralleled in the book of Acts, and the Fours Gospels. We can reasonably assume, that belief in the risen Christ was part of the Church since its very beginning. When we come to these other facts, they are considered historical for a number reasons. Regarding Jesus’ burial, as well as the conversion of Paul and James in that they are actually rather embarrassing. In Paul’s letters, he frequently mentions that he used to persecute the Church, and constantly berates himself for it. The admission in the Gospel narratives that James, Jesus’ own brother, did not believe in Him whilst He was alive is extremely embarrassing. The Gospels explicitly mention that the disciples did not believe Jesus really had risen from the dead when the women followers first told them, with Thomas being the last holdout, and that they fled Jesus when He was captured. These are not things that someone would be apt to admit about themselves if they were true. No sane person would INVENT these things about themselves. It may not be obvious, however, how the burial of Jesus conforms to this principle.

Whilst this is a point I will discuss in detail later, it is a fact of extreme relevance to us here. Jesus’ death by crucifixion was the most shameful death the Roman Empire had to offer. Likewise, not only were crucifixion victims humiliated in their method of execution, they were humiliated in their method of burial too. This is the central premise of an article by Byron McCane:
• The processes of burial and mourning were meant to honour the dead and the denial of these honours was a further dishonour.
• Based on Jewish custom, the Jewish leadership in Jesus’ day would have wanted Jesus buried, not left on the cross.

As McCane notes:
“Ordinarily, death is an event which disrupts the functioning social order, for the death of any particular individual tears away a member of a social network and forces the network to reconstitute itself. Death rituals – i.e., burial customs and rites of mourning – are social processes which the wounds which death inflicts on the social group. By burying the dead and mourning their absence, members of a society affirm that someone significant had been lost. When the Romans did not permit the burial of crucifixion victims, then, they were doing more than merely showing off the power of Rome: they were also declaring that the deaths of these victims were not a loss to Roman society. Far from it, the deaths of condemned criminals actually served to strengthen and preserve Rome, protecting and defending the social order of the Empire.”[7]
And:
“For Jews, one of those values was the importance of belonging to an extended family group. The foundational narrative for Jewish culture was a story about a man whose descendents were to be more numerous than the starts in the sky, and respect for the family was enshrined in the moral charter of Judaism: “honor your father and mother.” Jews in Jesus’ day typically lived in extended family groups, and routinely identified themselves in legal documents, inscriptions, and literature as “X, son (or daughter) of Y.” At life’s end, they thought it best to be buried with their nearest kin. To be buried away from the family tomb – by design, not by fate – was to be cast adrift from these cultural patterns, and dislodged from a place in the family. To be unmourned by one’s nearest relatives was to be effaced from the cultural landscape. It was worse than unfortunate, it was a shame.”[8]

Whilst it was customary to leave crucifixion victims on their crosses to be eaten birds, sometimes the Romans did allow them to be buried, and since it was prohibited in Judaism to leave a man hanging on a tree, then it makes sense that the Jewish authorities would have petitioned to bury Jesus. Burying Jesus away from the family tomb was their way of dishonouring Jesus themselves, and was not against the precepts of Judaism. Furthermore, the admission in the Gospels narratives that Joseph of Arimathea, a member of the Sanhedrin, buried Jesus rather than His family or disciples, is again another extremely embarrassing feature of the Gospel story. The accuracy of the burial tradition logically implies the accuracy of the empty tomb tradition. For if it was well known that Jesus was buried, then it would have been a simple matter of checking Jesus’ tomb and exhuming the body of Jesus when the disciples began proclaiming His resurrection. Yet, the earliest Jewish polemic was that they had simply stolen the body. Quite simply, if the body were still in the tomb, then Christianity would have been crushed like a bug.

We now come to the impossible faith defence, some of which has already been briefly alluded to in defence of the minimal facts above. Some claim, rather oddly, that Christianity fitted Roman, and thus classical values, like a glove. The reason Christianity took off, they claim, is that it appealed to the average Roman citizen’s values. It does not take an expert to realise how completely absurd this claim is:
“That there was an intrinsic incompatibility between Christianity and classical values was apparent from the time Romans became aware of the presence of the new religion. Christians were criticized on a variety of grounds, but principally because they had rejected the gods of their ancestors and the civic values of Greco-Roman world. Their religion was new; they had turned away from the traditions of their immediate ancestors, the Jews. Because of their refusal to attend the festivals, they were seen as atheists and misanthropists. In popular belief they even practiced incest and cannibalism. In short, they did not fit into the system that had been sanctioned by centuries of classical use.”[9]
“Logically enough, the official response to Christianity was often repression. The new religion had none of the characteristics that would have given it an approved status.”[10]

We can get much more specific than this. As noted, Jesus crucifixion and burial were meant to shame Him. This is an important aspect of ancient life that often gets overlooked. Jesus lived in what anthropologists refer to as an ‘agonistic society.’ That is to say, the culture of Jesus’ day revolved around honour and shame. Honour was your reputation, and your right to be treated as having certain worth, whereas shame was the opposite, an emotion associated with loss or lack of honour. Both were dependent on other people making assessments of you. In the ancient world, things that we today would personally consider insignificant could be of tremendous value to one’s honour. The accrual of honour was good, whereas the accrual of shame was bad. An example of this can be taken from Japanese culture, where soldiers would kill themselves for failing in battle out of shame.

When we come to the crucifixion, as noted, it was the most shameful method of death available at the time. It was an “utterly offensive affair, ‘obscene’ on the original sense of the word”[11] and a “status degradation ritual”[12] designed to humiliate the victim in every way. Not only did it signify a loss of power and having someone assert their authority over you, but crucifixion also led to other humiliating things, such as self-defecation. Crucifixion was so offensive that pagan writers were simply too revolted to write about it. The Gospel accounts therefore are among the most detailed written depiction of crucifixion from written times. The shamefulness of crucifixion also took on a new dimension in Judaism:
“But don't leave his body hanging on the tree overnight; be sure to bury him that same day, because anyone whose body is displayed on a tree is cursed by God. You must not ruin the land the LORD your God is giving you as your own.”[13]
This was recognised by Christians and non-Christians alike:
“For the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God.”[14]
“For the joy set before him he endured the cross, scorning its shame, and sat down at the right hand of the throne of God.”[15]
“For they proclaim our madness to consist in this, that we give to a crucified man a place second to the unchangeable and eternal God…”[16]

As noted by DeSilva:
“No member of the Jewish community or the Greco-roman society would have com o faith or joined the Christian movement without first accepting that God’s perspective on what kind of behaviour merits honor differs exceedingly from the perspective of human beings, since the message about Jesus is that both the Jewish and Gentile leaders of Jerusalem evaluated Jesus, his convictions and his deeds as meriting a shameful death, but God overturned their evaluation of Jesus by raising him from the dead and seating him at God’s own right hand as Lord.”[17]
Talking about crucifixion in ancient society would be like someone today walking into an expensive restaurant, pulling down their trousers and defecating on somebody’s food. Critics from Celsus to Lucian of Samosata noted with great malicious pleasure to the disgracefulness of Jesus’ death. Even the lower classes expressed similar sentiments, as evidence by a piece of graffiti depicting a man supplicating before a crucified figure with an asses head, and the caption “Alexamenos worships god.”[18]

The second to factor to consider is that Christianity began as a Jewish sect, in the region of Judea known as Galilee. The reason why this is important is because, in the ancient world, there were stereotypes associated with certain geographic regions. Whilst today, such as sentiments are noted as racist, xenophobic and bigoted, the ancients had no such noble sentiments, and such derogatory stereotypes were assumed to be Gospel truth. The Jews were regarded as a superstitious, spiteful and hateful race by the Greeks and Romans, and so knocking on their door and asking them to worship a crucified Jew would have caused them to have laughed in your face. Romans naturally considered their belief system superior to all others, and beliefs regarded as superstition were seen as undermining the social order.[19] Christianity therefore should not have spread beyond the Jews and the small handful of Gentile converts to Judaism. However, it gets worse for Christianity.

Even in Judea, there were prejudices, and the geographic region of Galilee, which was generally considered a land of yokels and farmers largely ignorant of the Torah.[20] Furthermore, Galilee was also well-known for producing fighters, many of whom were notorious leaders of Jewish rebellions against Rome.[21] Thus, this would have given the Romans reasons to be very suspicious of Jesus and would have led to the educated Jews dismissing Jesus as a country bumpkin. Furthermore, Jesus hailed from Nazareth, a town of absolutely no significance and despite being born in Bethlehem, this would have placed yet further stigma on Jesus. Lastly of all, Carpentry, which was Joseph and Jesus’ profession, and Jesus’ virgin birth would have also caused problems. Carpentry was regarded as a dishonourable and proscribed occupation, whereas tales of His virgin birth led to rumours about Him being an illegitimate bastard child, which critics such as Celsus were keen to exploit.

In addition to Jesus’ death, His resurrection would have been a tremendous stumbling block too. Whilst this might not seem apparent and even bizarre to modern readers, resurrection was NOT something people back then would have looked forward too. The reason for this was because pagan gentiles believed that the ultimate hope of life after death lay in the immortal soul escaping the physical body after death. Matter, and thus the physical world was seen as evil, and that “man’s highest good consisted of emancipation from corporeal defilement.”[22] Resurrection on the other hand was the return to life of your physical body, and subsequent transformation into a more advanced, ‘glorified’ body. Jews, however, did expect a resurrection, however, they expected it and the end of time:
“Within the context of late Jewish apocalyptic thought, to claim the resurrection of a single individual before the end of the world was to introduce quite a new element… Neither the disciples nor anyone else expected the resurrection of one person alone. Without a new, compelling reason they would not have asserted the individual resurrection of Jesus alone.”[23]
Thus a resurrection occurring prior to the end of time would have been as absurd to a Jew as the notion of resurrection was to a gentile. Of course, this is assuming all Jews accepted belief in resurrection. There is some indication that this belief was not as widespread as previously assumed, which would have made the notion of resurrection even harder to accept amongst Jews.

There were further problems with Christianity than this. When it came to religious traditions, the Romans valued antiquity. Traditions handed down from past generations were regarded as the ideal standards to follow in order to live up to the standards of great personages of the past.[24] Whilst the Romans recognised the antiquity of Judaism, Christianity was new and Christians were regarded as “arrogant innovators.”[25] Despite being a Jewish sect, and Christian writers claiming to that Christianity emerged from the traditions of Judaism, critics of Christianity were quick to point out that Christians observed none of Judaism’s practices. Another factor that is still a significant factor today is that the ethical demands of Christianity were considerable. Ancient pagan religions typically appealed to human being’s base instincts by offering temple prostitutes, drunken parties and the like. Christianity, like Judaism, placed heavy ethical demands on the individual that most would have simply found unattractive. In addition to these two factors, a related factor was how Christianity claimed that it was exclusively the one true religion and that all others were wrong. Christ was not simply a deity that could be absorbed into the Roman or Greek pantheon, but the one true God that required you to reject all others:
“The message about this Christ was incompatible with the most deeply rooted religious ideology of the Gentile world, as well as the more recent message propagated in Roman imperial ideology.”[26]

There was also a price to following Christianity. Given that Christianity was seen as not only subversive and socially deviant, but offensive, early Christians would have been universally shunned by their families and neighbours. Whilst Christians were eventually being martyred for their faith in Christ, they would have initially faced extreme social ostracisation that was geared towards getting social deviants back into the fold. This would have started with insults, reproach, possibly even physical abuse and would have progressed towards confiscation of property, etc.:
“The group would exercise measures designed to shame the transgressor (whether through insult, reproach, physical abuse, confiscation of property – at worst, execution) so that the transgressor would be pressured into returning to the conduct the group approved (if correction were possible) and so that group members would have their aversion to committing such transgressions themselves strongly reinforced.”[27]
One interesting point is how Christianity is based on claims made about History. As noted, the truth of Christianity is predicated upon an alleged historical event, the falsification of which would render the entire religion bunk. Furthermore, the New Testament is littered with numerous claims that were as equally easily disprovable had they been false. The apostles made a big deal about the witnesses to the risen Christ, claiming that many of the 500+ witnesses were alive and so could have been interviewed. Furthermore, the Gospels claim events, such as an earthquake and darkness at the time of Jesus’ crucifixion that would have been witnessed by many thousands of people. Obviously, not every convert would have checked all of the facts in detail, but people would have critically investigated Christianity, and these things would have been easily exposed had they been false.

Two further problems arise from the fact that the first witnesses to the risen Christ were women, and the disciples themselves were ‘country bumpkins’ so to speak. Women in the ancient world were second-rate citizens, whose testimonies were considered worthless and inadmissible in court. Whereas, the disciples hailing from Galilee, and many of them having simple professions like fishing would have served to cause others to view them as disreputable characters. One’s social status was of great importance to ancient people, and affected your credibility in court amongst other things. Furthermore, as a religion that sought to erase class distinctions, Christianity would not just have been unpopular with the elite, but the lower classes too:
“When ancient Mediterraneans speak of ‘freedom,’ they generally understand the term as both freedom from slavery to one lord or master, and freedom to enter the service of another lord or benefactor.”[28]
Everything that happened was put down to fate and providence and so your situation in life was something that you endured, not fought.[29]

Another problem with Christianity from both a Jewish and Gentile perspective was the fact that Jesus was a man. In Judaism, YHWH was unique and transcendent, whereas in pagan religion, matter was considered evil. Thus, the idea that God became incarnate as a man would have been unthinkable for Jews and Gentiles alike. This was such a powerful issue that some Christians sought to deny that Jesus was really human at all, such as Docetism. Furthermore, certain statements of Jesus would have been unthinkable of a true deity to say in the eyes of Jews and Gentiles alike, such as Jesus’ ignorance of the date of His second coming. Other stumbling blocks included being required to leave your family and social group if needed, which, in a society that revolved around the social group rather than the individual, would have been a massive deal. Far more so than today. There are some things I have left out for sake of brevity, but the picture painted here shows Christianity to be fully and completely incompatible with Jewish and pagan beliefs. This raises the pertinent question: why then, did anybody believe in it all? Mithraism made no hard demands on people, and Islam spread through a successful series of military campaigns. No other religion faced as many disadvantaged, and Christianity certainly had none of the benefits that other religions had.

Before we get around to considering historical hypotheses to explain these facts, there are three last things to get out of the way, and they are: Jesus’ self-understanding, the mode of Jesus’ vindication and the nature of the disciples visions of the risen Christ. It has been assumed by some that Jesus never claimed He was divine, and that Jesus’ ministry and miracles were inventions of the disciples. This is a view primarily championed by the Jesus Seminar. It should be noted, however, that the Jesus Seminar is NOT scholarly, and their work The Five Gospels is NOT scholarship. The Jesus Seminar operates from the assumption that miracles are impossible, and that Jesus was nothing more than a sage who went around telling parables. Not only do they regard the Gospel of Thomas as a reliable source of information, when it is in fact a second century forgery, they also apply criteria of authenticity to sayings of Jesus inconsistently. For example, Jesus’ use of the title ‘Son of Man’ meets the criteria of dissimilarity and the criteria of multiple attestation, yet is rejected as out of hand because it presents a high Christological view of Jesus that the Seminar seeks to deny.

When assessing sayings as authentic, we generally use the following criteria:
• The criterion of dissimilarity. The saying is dissimilar from the teachings of Judaism, and/or later Christianity.
• The criterion of multiple attestation. The saying appears in multiple sources.
• The criterion of embarrassment. The saying was embarrassing for some early Christians.
• The criterion of coherence. The saying coheres with everything else scholars have discovered about Jesus.
In actual fact, there are many sayings of Jesus that meet these criteria that the Jesus seminar simply dismisses out of hand for no reason other than it paints a picture of a Jesus who thought Himself divine. It should be noted, that these criteria should not be taken in isolation, but as a group, and these criteria can only be used to make positive assessments, not negative assessments. In other words, they cannot be used to deny that Jesus said something, only confirm it.

It should also be noted that these are the same criteria that the Jesus Seminar uses, and are in fact also used by a wide number of critical scholars:
“When countering the claims of modern critics, it is often helpful to use common methodologies to provide a level playing field from which we can dismantle their conclusions with their own tools. One such strategy is to employ “criteria of authenticity” that modern critics themselves use to deny the authenticity of events in Jesus’ life.”[30]
Yet, the Jesus Seminar consistently come to conclusions at odds with the results of the application of these criteria. No it seems as if the Jesus Seminar is nothing more than a biased ultra-liberal think-tank who. Not that they are not allowed to take liberal positions, but it is obvious they have less than honourable intentions and instead seek to impose their own views as fact rather than argue from them rationally based on evidence. Here is what actual scholars have to say about the Jesus Seminar:
“Not only is the Jesus Seminar inconsistent in applying its own principles due to a strong bias against seeing Jesus as more than a man, but such bias also leaves them with a Jesus whose death as a criminal is a huge mystery. All historians know that an effect must have a sufficient cause, But in the Jesus Seminar’s reconstructed and tame Jesus, the cause is not sufficient for the effect of his crucifixion.”[31]
“Here is where I think many skeptical scholars, especially among the prominent members of the Jesus Seminar, go wrong. They not only misapply some of the criteria (such as dissimilarity) and ignore or misunderstand others (such as Semitisms and Palestinian background), they tend to assume that sayings and deeds not supported by the criteria must be judged as inauthentic. This severe, skeptical method leads to limited results, results that can be badly skewed, if the starting points themselves are off-base and wrong-headed.”[32]
“According to the Seminar, the historical Jesus by definition must be a non-supernatural figure… Anything that is supernatural is by definition not historical. There’s no argument given; it’s just defined that way… But now the whole quest of the historical Jesus becomes a charade. If we begin by presupposing naturalism, then of course what we wind up with is a purely natural Jesus. This reconstructed, naturalistic Jesus is not based on evidence, but on definition. What is amazing is that the Jesus Seminar makes no attempt to defend their naturalism; it is just presupposed.”[33]
“Here we plainly see a criterion against a high view of Jesus at work. But if the Jesus Seminar is against seeing Jesus as more than a man as an a priori assumption, wouldn’t that unduly bias them about who the real Jesus was? How can they honestly, openly assess the data if it simply not possible for Jesus to predict the future?”[34]
“Their claim to have 200 scholars in the Seminar is grossly inflated: that figure includes anybody who in any way was involved in the Seminar’s activities, such as being on a mailing list. The real number of regular participants is only about 40. And what about the scholarly credentials of the members? Of the 74 listed in their publication The Five Gospels, only 14 would be leading figures in the field of New Testament studies. More than half are basically unknowns, who have published only two or three articles. Eighteen of the fellows have published nothing at all in New Testament studies! Most have relatively undistinguished academic positions, for example, teaching at a community college.”[35]

In order to ascertain what Jesus thought of Himself, we need to take a look at various sayings, and also assess them via the criteria mentioned. One additional criteria that is often overlooked, however, bought up by scholar Craig Evans is the presence of Semitism and Palestinian background. That is:
“… sayings and deeds that reflect Hebrew or Aramaic language (Semitisms), or reflect first-century Palestine (geography, topography, customs, commerce)…”[36]
We must then assess sayings of Jesus to see if they are authentic and if they show that Jesus thought of Himself as divine. Perhaps the most obvious fact about Jesus’ life is that He was believed to be the messiah, but what reasons do we have to suppose Jesus thought this about Himself, and what does this imply about Jesus if He did? The name Christ comes from the Greek Christos, which is the Greek word for the Hebrew title mashiach, meaning “anointed one” and where we get the word ‘messiah’ from. This title being identified with Jesus is evident from the consistent use of the title coupled with the fact that His followers named themselves Christians. This title therefore passes the criteria of multiple attestation and the criteria of Semitic/Palestinian background. Whilst those such as members of the Jesus Seminar would gripe that it does not pass the criteria of dissimilarity, yet as noted, such criteria cannot be used negatively, and it already has passed two criteria.

However, let’s humour them and try to find more reasons why this title goes back to Jesus Himself. When we consider the fact that Jesus’ followers thought of Him as the messiah, and later the risen, resurrected Lord, then it becomes inexplicable just why this is, unless of course Jesus Himself claimed to be the messiah. As William Lane Craig notes:
“Unless Jesus himself made messianic pretentions, it is difficult to explain the unanimous and widespread conviction that Jesus was the Messiah. Why, in the absence of any messianic claims on Jesus’ part, would Jesus’ followers come to think of him as Messiah at all, and why was there no non-messianic form of the Jesus movement?”[37]
Ironically enough, it can be noted that the notion of the messiah being vindicated via resurrection cannot be found within Judaism, and so that such a self-identification DOES pass the criterion of dissimilarity. So it seems as if the complaints of the Jesus Seminar are simply without merit. Then again, nobody ever accused them of being interested in scholarly debate. However, let us look as specific examples from the New Testament itself. A specific verse where Jesus’ acknowledges Himself as the messiah is located in Mark 8:27-30:
“Jesus and his disciples went on to the villages around Caesarea Philippi. On the way he asked them, “Who do people say I am?” They replied, “Some say John the Baptist; others say Elijah; and still others, one of the prophets.” “But what about you?” he asked. “Who do you say I am?” Peter answered, “You are the Messiah.” Jesus warned them not to tell anyone about him.”[38]

Of course, critical scholars would not be critical scholars if they did not dispute the authenticity of this passage. However, this specific incident appears elsewhere, such as in John 6:69:
“We have come to believe and to know that you are the Holy One of God.””[39]
There are other instances in Mark and elsewhere of this kind of statement, such as in Mark 1:24, and Acts 3:14.

Another instance of note is where John the Baptist sends his disciples to ask Jesus if He is the one who is to follow John the Baptist, in Matthew 11:3:
“…“Are you the one who is to come, or should we expect someone else?””[40]
And Luke 7:19:
“…he sent them to the Lord to ask, “Are you the one who is to come, or should we expect someone else?””[41]
Jesus’ reply in Luke 7:22-23 and Matthew 11:4-6 is to tell John’s disciples to report back to John various signs:
“So he replied to the messengers, “Go back and report to John what you have seen and heard: The blind receive sight, the lame walk, those who have leprosy are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the good news is proclaimed to the poor. Blessed is anyone who does not stumble on account of me.”[42]
“Jesus replied, “Go back and report to John what you hear and see: The blind receive sight, the lame walk, those who have leprosy are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the good news is proclaimed to the poor. Blessed is anyone who does not stumble on account of me.”[43]
This reply is directly appealing to various Old Testament prophecies contained in Isaiah 35:5-6; 29:19 and 61:1, the later of which explicitly mentions being God’s anointed one.

Another example of prophetic appeal is made when Jesus rode into Jerusalem on a donkey. This is a conscious fulfilment of a passage in Zechariah 9:9-10:
“Rejoice greatly, Daughter Zion! Shout, Daughter Jerusalem! See, your king comes to you, righteous and victorious, lowly and riding on a donkey, on a colt, the foal of a donkey. I will take away the chariots from Ephraim and the warhorses from Jerusalem, and the battle bow will be broken. He will proclaim peace to the nations. His rule will extend from sea to sea and from the River to the ends of the earth.”[44]
Not to mention when Jesus is executed by the Roman state, a plaque with the words “King of the Jews” is nailed to His cross. This was not a Christian title, and an allusion to Jesus’ messianic claims, so we have good reason for thinking this to be authentic. Some have disputed Jesus’ riding on a donkey, however, on the grounds that the Romans would have immediately arrested Him, and that the passage in question was not considered a messianic prophecy until later Judaism. This is simply an example of critics trying to have their cake and eat it. If it was not considered a messianic prophecy until later Judaism then not only would this explain why He was not arrested, but it would also mean that it passes the criterion of authenticity.
When Jesus, on a separate occasion, cleanses the temple, as well as His proclamation that He will destroy the temple and rebuild it in three days, we are again presented with messianic aspirations. Indeed, Jesus’ threats against the temple were one of things bought against Him when He was tried. The cleansing of the temple by Jesus was again a deliberate act on Jesus’ part to fulfil Old Testament prophecy:
“Every pot in Jerusalem and Judah will be holy to the Lord All-Powerful, and everyone who offers sacrifices will be able to take food from them and cook in them. At that time there will not be any buyers or sellers in the Temple of the Lord All-Powerful.”[45]
Whereas, Jesus’ statement that He would destroy the temple and rebuild it in three times was extremely provocative, as the building of the temple was considered the work of God alone in Jewish thought. When Caiaphas demanded of Jesus if He claimed he would destroy and rebuild the temple, he was therefore asking Jesus if He was assigning divine roles to Himself. The reason why this would be of concern to the Romans was that the Jewish messiah was also said to be the new King of Israel, and so a challenge to their imperial rule. In the words of Darth Vader, Jesus was, to the Romans… “part of a rebel alliance and a traitor.” The Romans, afterall, took sedition very seriously. William Lane Craig has noted how Jesus’ statement about the temple fulfils a messianic meaning given to 2 Samuel 7:12-14:
“'When you die and join your ancestors, I will make one of your sons the next king, and I will set up his kingdom. He will build a house for me, and I will let his kingdom rule always. I will be his father, and he will be my son. When he sins, I will use other people to punish him. They will be my whips.””[46]

In one of the Dead Sea Scrolls, 4Q174, messianic meaning is given to this passage by associating it with other Old Testament writings:
“The kingdom of David is like a fallen tent, but in that day I will set it up again and mend its broken places.”[47]
This is in standing with the placard placed upon His cross, sarcastically calling Him, the King of the Jews. Yet, what reason do we have for supposing that the messiah was a divine figure? The following passage from Isaiah, amongst other descriptions, gives the foretold messiah the title Mighty God:
“A child has been born to us; God has given a son to us. He will be responsible for leading the people. His name will be Wonderful Counselor, Powerful God, Father Who Lives Forever, Prince of Peace. Power and peace will be in his kingdom and will continue to grow forever. He will rule as king on David's throne and over David's kingdom. He will make it strong by ruling with justice and goodness from now on and forever. The LORD All-Powerful will do this because of his strong love for his people.”[48]
This is backed up by other verses such as Malachi 3:1 and Isaiah 40:3:
“The LORD All-Powerful says, "I will send my messenger, who will prepare the way for me. Suddenly, the Lord you are looking for will come to his Temple; the messenger of the agreement, whom you want, will come."[49]
“This is the voice of one who calls out: "Prepare in the desert the way for the LORD. Make a straight road in the dry lands for our God.”[50]
It seems obvious then, Jesus considered Himself to be the messiah, and there is a good indication that this directly implies He also considered Himself to be divine. However, there are two more titles attributed to Jesus that further strengthen that Jesus thought Himself to be divine. The titles ‘Son of God’ and ‘Son of Man’ are often considered non-divine titles. For instance, Rabbi Shmuley Boteach claims that the title ‘Son of Man’, in Hebrew ben Adam simply means a son of Adam, and thus a human title. However, a closer analysis of these titles reveals a deeper meaning that reinforces the divine nature of the messiah.

The title Son of Man is one of Jesus’ favourite self-descriptions, appearing throughout the Gospels, yet it is only found elsewhere in the New Testament once, thus meeting the criteria of dissimilarity as well as multiple attestation. However, what of this title? It is a direct allusion to Daniel 7:13-14:
““In my vision at night I looked, and there before me was one like a son of man, coming with the clouds of heaven. He approached the Ancient of Days and was led into his presence. He was given authority, glory and sovereign power; all nations and peoples of every language worshiped him. His dominion is an everlasting dominion that will not pass away, and his kingdom is one that will never be destroyed.”[51]
In Daniel’s statement, the messianic figure only APPEARS to be like a son of man. In reality this Son of Man is, in actuality, a heavenly figure, who is given the glory and dominion of God Himself! When Jesus is tried, the high priest, Caiaphas asks Jesus if He is the Son of the Blessed. Jesus replies that He is, and that Caiaphas, et al. will see “the Son of Man” sitting at “the right hand of the Power and coming with the clouds of heaven.” Caiaphas then tears his robes and all the Jewish authorities present agree with him when he accuses Jesus of blasphemy. Jesus has not only affirmed that He is the Messiah, God’s unique Son and Anointed One, but that he the Danielic Son of Man, and that He will be seated at God’s right hand, coming on the clouds over heaven. Sceptics and critics have asked why Caiaphas et al. took Jesus statement to be blasphemy as, without any context, it seems over the top and out of proportion with Jesus’ claims. Yet, the answer is that Jesus was assigning Himself titles and asserting roles for Himself solely reserved for YHWH, the One True, Holy and most High God of Israel.

Much more could be said in regards to how Jesus thought of Himself, and indeed, much more has been said by scholars and thinkers far greater than myself. These three titles, coupled with these authentic deeds and sayings of Jesus, are more than enough to establish beyond all reasonable doubt what Jesus thought of Himself. This leads us to the nature of the appearances of the risen Christ, and the mode of Jesus’ vindication. Bizarrely enough, there are those who claim that Christianity originally believed in a “spiritual resurrection” or that Jesus received a new body in heaven whilst his old body rotted in the tomb. When we read the Gospel accounts of the appearances of Jesus have one thing in common: they are explicitly physical in nature. The only possible exception is Paul of Tarsus (formerly Saul), who had a visionary roadside experience, but we shall get to him later. We shall first examine the nature of the immediate appearances to the women followers and to the major disciples. The risen Jesus described in the New Testament is not something revealed to the disciples in a heavenly vision or a dream, but something they claim to have seen before their very eyes. Not only is this entity something they can see, but also something that they, all of them, could even hear. Furthermore, not only could they hear but they could also actually touch this entity.

After encountering an angel who informed them that Jesus was raised from the dead, and that they should tell the other disciples, the women followers of Jesus encounter the risen Christ:
“So the women hurried away from the tomb, afraid yet filled with joy, and ran to tell his disciples. Suddenly Jesus met them. “Greetings,” he said. They came to him, clasped his feet and worshiped him. Then Jesus said to them, “Do not be afraid. Go and tell my brothers to go to Galilee; there they will see me.”[52]
The disciples:
“While they were still talking about this, Jesus himself stood among them and said to them, “Peace be with you.” They were startled and frightened, thinking they saw a ghost. He said to them, “Why are you troubled, and why do doubts rise in your minds? Look at my hands and my feet. It is I myself! Touch me and see; a ghost does not have flesh and bones, as you see I have.” When he had said this, he showed them his hands and feet. And while they still did not believe it because of joy and amazement, he asked them, “Do you have anything here to eat?” They gave him a piece of broiled fish, and he took it and ate it in their presence.”[53]
These traditions meet the criteria of embarrassment, as well as the criteria of multiple attestation. There are also other examples, including Jesus’ appearance to some of His followers walking along the road to Emmaus, and also to Thomas. Finally, the disciples witness the risen Jesus ascending into heaven. We also have other traditions outside of the four Gospels, in Acts and the writings of Paul, where Jesus appears to the Church in Jerusalem forty days after His resurrection (prior to His ascension.) He is also listed as appearing to Stephen, James, and 500 others. These passages clearly point to a risen Jesus was very much a physical being. Furthermore, Jesus’ body now possess certain supernatural qualities, such as the ability appear and disappear at will, and the ability to disguise His appearance.

What then of Paul? What was the nature of his experience? Paul is important as he was previously an enemy of Christianity, and some have argued that his experience being visionary in nature means this was the same for the other apostles. The specific word used in the New Testament is anastasis, appearing in the text of the New Testament 44 times. This word is directly translated into ‘resurrection,’ and a high number of instances are used to directly and explicitly describe a physical bodily, resurrection. This word appears in the writings of Paul, thus giving us reason to suppose he believed in the physical resurrection of Jesus. Paul’s experience is reported in Acts three separate times, in a narrative of Paul’s experience written by Luke, and two accounts of what Paul himself said on two different occasions, in Acts 9:3-9, Acts 22:6-1, and Acts 26:12-18 respectively. In all three accounts, Paul is on his way to Damascus at the behest of the Jewish authorities to hunt down Christians, when an awesome light, said to be brighter than the sun, blinds him and his companions. A voice then speaks to Paul in Aramaic, asking him why Paul is persecuting the speaker. When Paul asks who is speaking, the voice replies that it is Jesus. Jesus then commissions Paul to go into the city where he will receive instructions. However, whilst his companions also hear the voice, they cannot understand what is being said. After the experience is over, Paul finds himself physically blind and unable to see, and so his companions have to lead him into the city.

His experience indicates a physical phenomenon, and not a vision, as not only can he see this light and hear this voice, but so can his companions. Taken together with everything else, Paul’s experience in no way implies a spiritual resurrection, or the idea that Jesus’ old body still lay in the tomb and that He received a new body in heaven. Now, there is one further fact pointing to Jesus’ mode of vindication, and that is the background cultural milieu of 1st century Judaism. In Jewish thought, there are three modes of vindication, found in the Old and New Testaments, as well as intertestamental and later Christian tradition. These three modes are: assumption, resuscitation, and resurrection. Assumption was simply being taken up into heaven, either just before death or afterwards. This occurs in the Old Testament, to Enoch and Elijah. In extra-Biblical Jewish tradition, this also happened to Moses and various intertestamental figures, and is also said to have happened to Mary, the mother of Jesus, in late Catholic tradition. Resuscitation is a return to life from death, however it differs from resurrection in that no transformation takes place. Your original body is raised and repaired, but is not gloriously transformed. This occurs in both Old and New Testaments. For example, the prophets of Elijah, Elisha raise certain people in the dead, and in the New Testament, Jesus and later the disciples, raise people from the dead.

The general understanding of resurrection in Jewish belief was that it was reserved for the end of time, when the faithful would be raised from the dead to be with God. If the disciples wanted to invent an account of Jesus’ vindication, why would they pick resurrection? Indeed, from the Gospel accounts, the disciples can scarcely believe their eyes. In light of the above, why would the disciples either invent the notion of resurrection, or assume their visions to be of a resurrected Christ, unless He really appeared to them resurrected? It literally makes no sense whatsoever. However, as noted, the disciples did NOT expect Jesus to be vindicated. The New Testament is very clear that the disciples deserted the moment He was arrested, and that even Peter denied Jesus three times. However, what reasons do we have for thinking that this is an accurate depiction of the past? It passes all the criteria for authenticity. It passes the criteria of embarrassment and multiple attestations, but, moreover, it fits in with cultural background data we have that they did not expect a dying and rising messiah. Thus we can say that the resurrection hypothesis is strongly attested in the New Testament. To clarify, the resurrection hypothesis is more than simply positing that just some guy randomly came back from the dead, but that Jesus understood Himself as divine, that He undertook a ministry of miracle working where He assumed the authority of God, that He was executed for His messianic aspirations and was ultimately vindicated by God via resurrection from the dead. After His death and resurrection, He then appeared to various groups of his followers, including the twelve disciples, as well as Paul of Tarsus, an enemy of Christianity who converted after his roadside experience.

This is the hypothesis that has been presented by believers in Christ for nearly 2000 years. As a historian, it is my duty to give it as fair a hearing as possible, but not at the expense of ignoring or glossing over others. Given the facts outlined, what is the best explanation of them? Which historical hypothesis that attempts to explain these facts is the most probably true? There are a variety of alternative hypotheses proffered in lieu of the resurrection hypothesis that we must consider. If we can find a viable alternative to the resurrection that meets the criteria outlined earlier in the chapter, then the resurrection hypothesis can be discarded. However, if the resurrection hypothesis meets the criteria, and we have no rival hypothesis, then it can be inferred that the resurrection hypothesis is indeed, the most probably true. The hypotheses currently on the table are:
• The resurrection hypothesis.
• The swoon hypothesis.
• The decomposition hypothesis.
• The stolen body hypothesis.
• The wrong tomb hypothesis.
• The evil twin hypothesis.
• The hallucination hypothesis.
• The cognitive dissonance hypothesis.

The facts that require explaining are:
• Jesus was crucified and buried. Yet His tomb was later found empty.
• Jesus’ disciples, despite being distraught after Jesus’ death, and initially sceptical of the reports that women followers of Jesus had seen Him alive, came to believe that He had been resurrected after experiencing what they believed to be the risen Christ.
• Over 500 people were said to have had these same experiences, in groups, at the same time, and for extended periods of time.
• Former sceptic, James, the brother of Jesus, and former enemy, Paul of Tarsus, were both converted to Christianity, again after experiencing what they believed to be the risen Christ.
• Belief in Christ spread rapidly throughout the Roman Empire and survived despite horrendous persecution, and the fact that the central tenets of Christianity were absurd and offensive to both Jews and Gentiles.
Only by sufficiently explaining these facts by meeting the criteria previously laid can a hypothesis be considered the most probably true.

The first of the alternatives, the swoon hypothesis argues that Jesus did not really die on the cross. It is proposed that Jesus was taken down prematurely, as the Romans believed Him to be dead, when in reality He wasn’t, and that He revived whilst in the tomb. Jesus then emerges from the tomb, and that is how Christianity got started. However, this hypothesis is highly problematic. The first problem lies in the sheer brutality of crucifixion.
“Jesus of Nazareth underwent Jewish and Roman trials, was flogged, and was sentenced to death by crucifixion. The scourging produced deep stripelike lacerations and appreciable blood loss, and it probably set the stage for hypovolemic shock, as evidenced by the fact that Jesus was too weakened to carry the crossbar (patibulum) to Golgotha. At the site of crucifixion, his wrists were nailed to the patibulum and, after the patibulum was lifted onto the upright post (stipes), his feet were nailed to the stipes. The major pathophysiologic effect of crucifixion was an interference with normal respirations. Accordingly, death resulted primarily from hypovolemic shock and exhaustion asphyxia. Jesus' death was ensured by the thrust of a soldier's spear into his side. Modern medical interpretation of the historical evidence indicates that Jesus was dead when taken down from the cross.”[54]
“Death, usually after 6 hours--4 days, was due to multifactorial pathology: after-effects of compulsory scourging and maiming, haemorrhage and dehydration causing hypovolaemic shock and pain, but the most important factor was progressive asphyxia caused by impairment of respiratory movement. Resultant anoxaemia exaggerated hypovolaemic shock. Death was probably commonly precipitated by cardiac arrest, caused by vasovagal reflexes, initiated inter alia by severe anoxaemia, severe pain, body blows and breaking of the large bones. The attending Roman guards could only leave the site after the victim had died, and were known to precipitate death by means of deliberate fracturing of the tibia and/or fibula, spear stab wounds into the heart, sharp blows to the front of the chest, or a smoking fire built at the foot of the cross to asphyxiate the victim.”[55]
The only known survivor comes from an account from Josephus, whereby he saw three of his friend’s being crucified and went to Titus to have them taken down. However, despite being taken down, two of them died “under the physicians hands,” and only the third recovered.[56]

A second problem is that we have to suppose that the Roman soldiers were incapable of diagnosing the signs of death. Now, in our modern cream-puff society, we hardly ever get to see a real dead body. Whereas back in the “good ‘ol days” death was a constant reality that everybody had to deal with. Furthermore, Jesus was placed on and taken from the cross BY HAND, by Roman soldiers. The Romans performed crucifixions regularly, and soldiers had greater experience with death than the average citizen, due to their profession. The signs of death would have been readily identifiable. The third is that if Jesus somehow survived and the Romans somehow misdiagnosed Jesus as dead when He was still alive, He would not have been able to life the stone in front of the tomb. Jesus would have been hanging on the cross for hours, and would have been in no state to do anything, much less push back a giant stone blocking the entrance. The final fact is that even if we discount these problems, nobody would have mistook Jesus for a resurrected being had He emerged from the tomb like that. Jesus was battered, bruised, enfeebled, and yet we are to suppose that the disciples believed Him to be resurrected? Furthermore, where did He go afterwards? Thus, this hypothesis fails to explain the facts.

The decomposition hypothesis proposes that Jesus’ body WAS produced, but that it was just too decomposed to be readily identifiable. The first major problem with this is that there is no mention of such a controversy in Christian and Jewish sources. The earliest Jewish polemic against Christianity pre-supposes that Jesus’ tomb was found empty, by arguing that the disciples had stolen the body. This is simply incompatible with the notion that a body was produced. If the stolen body proposal were simply an invention of the Gospel writers, then the Jewish authorities would have noted that they said no such thing. If a body was produced and the Jewish authorities were claiming it to be Jesus, then this would have forced the early Christian to address these claims, just as they were forced to address claims of Jesus’ body being stolen. Even if the Jewish authorities produced an unidentifiable body, then the burden of proof would have fallen to the Christians to show that it was not Jesus, and so we would have seen evidence in the literature of such a claim. The second problem is that we have good evidence to suppose that ancient Jews had ways of identify remains:
“Carefully observing where Jesus is buried and then returning on the Sunday morning to confirm and even mark, for identification, his corpse, is in keeping with Jewish burial customs. After all, m. Sanh. 6.5-6 implies that bodies are still identifiable, long after decomposition of the flesh. How was this done? We don’t know, but evidently the Jewish people knew how to mark or in some way identify a corpse, so that it could be retrieved some time later. We should not allow our ignorance of such customs, or our condescension, to lead us to discount such tradition as implausible.”[57]
Thus the decomposition hypothesis is thus problematic and implausible. The original anti-apologetic argument is that the body of Jesus was stolen. Whilst back in the day, the Jewish authorities claimed it was the disciples; today we have a range of proposed body snatchers. A list of proposed thieves:
• The Roman or Jewish authorities.
• Necromancers.
• The gardener.
• The disciples.

Positing that the Jewish or Roman authorities stole Jesus’ body is just bizarre and so absurd that it hardly merits serious consideration at all. For what did the Roman or Jewish authorities seek to gain from such a deception, and why did they not then crush the upstart cult by producing the body? This makes no sense whatsoever, in any way. What then, of the proposed solution, that necromancers just happened to break into Jesus’ tomb, or perhaps deliberately sought His tomb out, due to His reputation as a holy man, to use His body parts in their arcane rituals, etc. The first problem that proponents of this claim run in to is that would need to provide some evidence that such a group existed in 1st century Judea and Jerusalem. The second problem is that grave robbers such as necromancers would have picked easier targets if they were just randomly going through graves. It would be far easier to just steal the body of a peasant than somebody buried in a tomb owned by Joseph of Arimathea. The third problem is that Jesus would not have been sought out by such people as a “holy man” to be used in their various rituals, given that Jesus was executed as a criminal via crucifixion and so would have lost such a status outside of his in-group of followers. The last problem is that the whole body would not have been used. It was far easier to remove an arm or leg, rather than making of with an entire cadaver. If by some chance they wanted to use the whole body, then they would have performed their ritual in the tomb itself, as it would have been easier and reduced the risk of detection.

A second proposal is that it was the gardener. In the Gospel of John, Mary mistakes Jesus for the gardener and asks Him where the body went. It is therefore supposed by some critics that she thought the gardener was a likely candidate of the mover of Jesus’ body. Furthermore, some note that the Church Father Irenaeus also mentioned that some had made this argument, which therefore shows that someone must have thought it plausible that the gardener had reason to take Jesus’ body. However, is this reasonable? Mary’s reaction merely implies that, as an employee of the garden, would thus have some knowledge of what had happened. Secondly, the mere fact that somebody made the argument that it was the gardener means nothing in terms of plausibility. The reason given in Tertullian’s day was that the gardener moved the body so that curious crowds would not trample his lettuces, a suggestion that is neither plausible nor practical. Thus we end up with the claim that the Jewish authorities made: the disciples did it! Is there any reason to suppose that this is a reasonable solution? The answer again is no, for would the disciples have suffered or died for something they knew was false? Again, as I have mentioned, the disciples and early Christians faced extensive social persecution and even martyrdom for their beliefs.

One interesting fact is how it is reported that Jesus’ grave clothes were left behind in the tomb. Tomb robbers or thieves, such as the disciples, would not have bothered unwrapping the body before stealing it, especially given the need to operate stealthily and hastily. It also does not make much sense, as why would body-snatching thieves even think of taking off Jesus’ grave clothes? Another fact that has been conceded until now, is the guards placed outside of the tomb. No doubt hyper-sceptical critics would dismiss the tomb being guarded as a “pious fiction” or something similar. The common defence of this aspect of the story is that Matthew’s account indicates that Jewish opponents of Christianity took the presence of guards outside Jesus’ tomb for granted. A further defence involves the fact that the presence of guards would have been yet another shameful thing for Christians to admit. It has been noted that Jesus was executed and buried shamefully and dishonourably. However, the presence of the guard would have been a further shame and dishonour:
“Rites of mourning were not observed for these criminals, either. Family members were supposed to keep their grieving to themselves… From the Hebrew Bible through the rabbinic literature, dishonorable Jewish burial meant two things: burial away from the family tomb, and burial without rites of mourning.”[58]
Whilst they were presumably there to prevent theft of the body, the main purpose of such a detachment, whether they be Roman centurions or Jewish temple guards, were to prevent public mourning rites. It seems to me that the only reason why some dismiss the tomb guard is because it renders the stolen body hypothesis completely implausible.

Another proposal is that the women followers went to the wrong tomb. Instead of going to Jesus’ tomb, they erroneously went to the wrong one. One has to say that this is a view that has not commanded any deal of scholarly attention. Now, on the surface, any wrong tomb hypothesis already suffers from a myriad of problems. We are to suppose that not only did the women go to the wrong tomb, but that the other disciples did as well. Furthermore, if this had been the case then it would have been used as a polemic against Christianity, and Jesus’ body would have been produced. Some have suggested that Jesus was only temporarily buried and later moved to a graveyard reserved for criminals. Whilst this again fails to overcome the aforementioned problems, this also runs into the problem that there is no such evidence of temporary burial in Jewish law or custom.[59] Another hypothesis is that Jesus had an “evil twin” or doppelganger that either operated in cohesion with Jesus or else used Jesus’ death as a chance to have some fun, in order to trick people into believing Jesus had risen. This hypothesis is so riddled with problems that I scarcely know where to begin. First of all, the sheer unlikelihood of someone that just happens to look exactly like Jesus is mind-boggling. Second, how would this “evil twin” pull off the hoax? Jesus’ body would still have been in the tomb, and then there is the question of where he would have gone. Thirdly, an ordinary man who looks exactly like Jesus would not convince the disciples that Jesus had been resurrected. Resuscitated, maybe, but not resurrection.

Some have proposed that the disciples suffered from hallucinations, and that this explains the post-mortem appearances of Jesus. The main problem with this hypothesis is that the disciples did not merely claim to see the risen Jesus, but that He spoke to them, and that they even touched Him! Furthermore, Jesus did not appear to one disciple in isolation, but groups of them, and for very long periods of time. In fact, the risen Jesus was said to have spent roughly 40 or so days with the disciples. The range of people who claimed to have seen the risen Jesus is also quite extensive. We have the women followers of Jesus, the remaining 11 of the 12 disciples, two disciples on the road to Emmaus, James (Jesus’ brother and a sceptic who was not a follower of his brother), Jude (another brother of Jesus, also a sceptic), and Paul (a Pharisee and enemy of Christianity who actively persecuted the church prior to his conversion). Furthermore, we are told that the risen Jesus appeared to roughly 500 people (this may or may not include the previous encounters.) The risen Jesus even was said to have eaten food with the disciples. This is extremely incompatible with the notion of ordinary hallucination. Some, however, have appealed to a phenomenon called “mass hallucination,” which some claim can account for all of these ‘appearances.’ Some have appealed to alleged “miraculous phenomenon” involving people who claimed to have seen the Virgin Mary and claimed that she revealed to them when and where a miraculous event involving the sun would occur. Thousands of people gathered to where the event was said to occur and lo and behold, they witnessed what appeared to be the sun moving and behaving erratically… despite the fact people looking through telescopes observed no change.

Appealing to such events backfires, for the sole reason that they are no comparison to the appearances of Jesus. In this case, there is a perfectly good naturalistic explanation: namely that staring directly at the sun is bad for your eyes, and causes visual phenomenon and disturbances. Secondly, a lot of people were expecting something to happen. Did Paul or James expect to encounter the risen Jesus? Not even the disciples would have expected that Jesus would be resurrected. However, a third problem is that these events happened all at once, whereas the appearances of Jesus occurred over a long period of time, well over a month, and to separate groups. Lastly, as aforementioned, people looking through specialist telescopes observed no movement of the sun, whereas those who witnessed the risen Jesus actually touched Him. However, in order to demonstrate that the appearances of the risen Jesus really were mass hallucinations, then we need to see if they match the necessary criteria for them to be classified as such. Yet from these two examples and from professional criteria, it seems that the post-mortem appearances of Jesus do not fall under the category of collective hallucinations:
“The same hallucination may be experienced by two or more persons. If the event is entirely subjective, as all hallucinations are, how do two or 200 people manage to coordinate and synchronize their lives? Recall our discussion of the role of expectation and misperception in the preceding chapter. It is expectation that plays the coordinating role in collective hallucination. Although the subject matter of individual hallucinations virtually has no limits, the topics of collective hallucinations are limited to certain categories. These categories are determined, first, by the kinds of ideas that a group of people may get excited about as a group, for emotional excitement is prerequisite of collective hallucinations. The most common causes of emotional excitement in groups are religious, and, indeed, phenomena related to religion are most often the subject of collective hallucinations. Second, the categories are limited by the fact that participants in the hallucination must be informed beforehand, at least concerning the broad outlines of the phenomenon that will constitute the collective hallucination. This may take the form of publicly announced prophecy, for example, or someone suddenly looking up and saying. “Lo, in the sky!” or words to that effect. Things in the sky, or at least overhead, are the most commonly seen collective hallucinations: radiant crosses, saints, religious symbols, flying objects, sometimes all these in combination. Once the general type of hallucination is established, it is easy to harmonize individual differences in the accounts. This may take place during the hallucination or in subsequent conversations.”[60]
“The contents of hallucinations can vary over a very wide range of subjects for a given individual. The range of content is prescribed by the hallucinator’s past experiences, and these are heavily influenced by culture. For this reason, a Crow Indian or an Aborigine from New Hebrides would be quite unlikely to hallucinate pixies, fairies, or gnomes clad in medieval European garb. The LSD user in the Western culture will also hallucinate only that to which the culture has exposed him or her. However fantastic a given hallucination, upon examination, it will be seen to contain only elements from the hallucinator’s past experience.”[61]

We are faced with the following criteria:
1. Expectation plays a key role.
2. Visions are not seen by everybody present.
3. Visions are seen differently.
4. Emotional excitement present in people witnessing hallucination.
5. Being informed beforehand of an event occurring.
6. Conforms to past experience and background knowledge.
7. Such phenomena are limited in duration.
Yet none of these criteria are present in the reports of the risen Jesus. There are further problems even than this. For the hallucination hypothesis does not account for either the empty tomb, or the belief in Jesus’ resurrection. If the disciples had suffered collective hallucinations then, besides from the Gospel accounts being very different, then the tomb would still have contained Jesus’ body and a resurrection before the end of time was most definitely part of the disciples’ expectations or background cultural knowledge. Furthermore, it leaves the appearances to those sceptical and critical of Christianity, who did not expect to see a risen, exalted Jesus in any form, let alone a resurrected Jesus. It therefore seems that, whilst attractive on the surface, fails to account for all the facts, and for those it attempts to explain, falls short of the mark. This failure has led to an even more extravagant hypothesis that the disciples, James, Paul, et al. all suffered from a condition known as cognitive dissonance.

What is cognitive dissonance? Cognitive dissonance, like hallucination, is another psychological phenomenon. It was first researched in the 1950s by a fellow named Leon Festinger[62], which led to a significant number of articles by other authors on the subject following his key experiments and publications. The nature of the experiments he conducted were as follows:
• A person arrives at an experiment where they are asked to perform a boring task involving turning pegs.
• After completing the task, they are told to greet the next person and inform them that the task is a very enjoyable one (an obvious lie) since the experimenter is too busy.
• The person is then either paid $1 or $20 in 1959 US dollars.
• The person greets the next participant and tells them that the task is enjoyable.
• After lying, they are then asked if they found the boring task interesting.

People who were paid $1 thought that the task was not interesting, whereas people who were paid $20 thought that the task was interesting. What this means is that when a person performs an action or follows behaviour that conflicts with their attitudes or values, a psychological tension, known as cognitive dissonance is felt. In order to relieve this tension, several strategies can be employed by the people who feel it:
• Changing one of the components of the situation, typically attitude.
• Adding new elements to reduce the level of inconsistency, typically claiming things such as “they probably didn’t believe me when I lied.
• Trivialising elements, such as claiming “honesty isn’t that big of a deal to me.
• A fourth response reported by different authors is denial of responsibility, such as claiming “I had no choice, it was my job to lie.”[63]

The problem with this hypothesis is that cognitive dissonance only leads to a change in attitude or behaviour after an event. It does not lead to people inventing things out of whole cloth. Some appeal to a UFO cult studied by Festinger, et al. who believed that they would be teleported off of the planet by aliens. When the event did not come to pass, one of them claimed to have received a communication from the aliens saying that the event was merely postponed.[64] The first problem is that the UFO cult event does not match identified strategies for dealing with cognitive dissonance. The second problem is that this occurrence is disanalogous for what happened to the disciples. After the event failed and the UFO cult modified its claims, membership declined and members became less devoted, whereas prior to the failed event, members were more plenteous and devoted. In the case of the disciples, prior to the resurrection event, they were less devoted and lesser in number. After the event, the disciples became more devoted and Christianity literally skyrocketed. Lastly, the person who claimed to receive the communication allegedly received their communication in private, whereas Jesus appeared publicly before groups of disciples as well as to enemies and sceptics. This therefore does not adequately explain belief in the resurrected Jesus.

How do these hypotheses then fair in fulfilling the seven criteria laid out earlier? The criteria are:
1. Along with the other data considered to be true, the hypothesis must imply further observational statements.
2. The hypothesis must possess greater explanatory scope, that is cover more data.
3. The hypothesis must possess greater explanatory power, that is render the data the hypothesis implies more probably.
4. The hypothesis must be more plausible, that is be implied by more accepted truths.
5. The hypothesis must be less ad hoc, that is suppose fewer new elements about the past not already implied.
6. The hypothesis must be disconfirmed by fewer accepted beliefs.
7. The hypothesis must exceed rivals hypotheses in criteria 1-6 so as to render any other hypothesis less likely to meet these conditions by a significant order of magnitude.

All hypotheses on the table currently meet the first criterion, as they are all attempting to explain certain data. Certain hypotheses, however, fail criterion two, as they are limited in scope. The hallucination and cognitive dissonance hypotheses only attempt to explain the belief in the risen Jesus and the post-mortem appearances bust says nothing of the empty tomb. The wrong tomb hypothesis only attempts to explain the empty tomb but not the resurrection appearances. When it comes to the third criterion, this is where rival hypotheses begin to flounder. The resurrection hypothesis meets this criteria, as the data we have is what we would expect if the resurrection were true. If the stolen body hypothesis were true, then why would the disciples invent the story of the women being the first to discover the empty tomb? Why would they include so many embarrassing details in the Gospel accounts? If the swoon hypothesis were true, then how would a man who had endured hours of torture (if he even survived) be even capable of removing the stone from the tomb and convincing his disciples that he was resurrected? If the decomposition hypothesis were true, then why is there no mention of such a controversy in the written record? Instead, the earliest polemic against Christianity presupposes the empty tomb. Not to mention the fact that Jews possessed means of identifying remains. If the wrong tomb hypothesis were true, then why was not Jesus’ body produced and how does this account for the post-mortem appearances of Jesus? If the evil twin hypothesis were true, then why did the disciples come to believe in resurrection, rather than resuscitation? If the hallucination or cognitive dissonance hypotheses were true, then the Gospel accounts would be radically different and would not account for enemies and sceptics coming to believe in Christianity. Furthermore, they do not explain the empty tomb.

Regarding the fourth criterion, again rival hypotheses do not meet this criteria. Given Jesus’ self-understanding as well as the socio-cultural and religious context of the day rendering a crucified and resurrected messiah absurd to Jews and pagan Gentiles alike, the resurrection hypothesis becomes highly plausible once on abandons the prejudiced view against miracles even being possible and at least consider them possible. Hypothesis and cognitive dissonance hypotheses are implausible, given that the resurrection appearance accounts do not match known examples of collective hallucination or cognitive dissonance. Stolen body hypotheses are implausible because of just how intricate and elaborate a cover-up would be required to pull it off. Given the socio-cultural and religious background, then belief in resurrection becomes highly implausible given that no Jew believed that anybody would be resurrected prior to the end of time. Jewish heroes were either claimed to be assumed into heaven, whereas other character were resuscitated. Furthermore, groups that could be argued to have motive to steal Jesus’ body would have had to have contended with the tomb guard. The swoon hypothesis is extremely implausible, as we are to suppose that Jesus somehow survived hours of torture, was capable of removing the stone from His tomb and then persuading His disciples that He was resurrected. The decomposition hypothesis is implausible as Jews possessed means of identifying remains, and there is no mention of a body being produced. Such a controversy would have left a mark in the written record, yet we have nothing. The evil twin hypothesis is implausible because it suggests a level of intricacy, deception, and conspiracy that is even greater than stolen body hypotheses. Furthermore, why would the disciples come to believe a man that looks like Jesus is the resurrected Christ, rather than the resuscitated Christ?

Regarding the fifth criterion, the resurrection hypothesis stands head and shoulders above the rest. The only new thing that we have to suppose is the existence of God. Whereas with other hypotheses, we have to assume a variety of new elements. In the hallucination and cognitive dissonance hypotheses, we have to suppose that 500+ people (including sceptics and enemies of Christianity), over a period of 40 days, in groups as well as individually separate from one another, all had exactly the same, or at least very similar experiences that were not a part of their previously existing socio-cultural or religious background knowledge. With the stolen body hypothesis, we have to assume that the apostles knowingly lied, and somehow persuaded hundreds of others that Jesus had really risen from the dead, despite the fact a crucified and resurrected messiah would have been absurd to Jews and pagan Gentiles. The decomposition hypothesis requires us to assume that identification of remains is impossible, and that no single Christian writer addressed the charge, despite addressing stolen body charges. The swoon hypothesis requires us to assume that a man can survive hours of absolutely brutal torture, was capable of lifting a one-ton stone from the front of the tomb and then persuade people he has been resurrected despite being in an enfeebled condition. The wrong tomb hypothesis requires to believe that the Sanhedrin would not produce Jesus’ body in light of the disciples’ claims, and that the disciples would come to believe in a resurrection based on an empty tomb alone. The evil twin hypothesis requires us to believe that Jesus either had a twin, a lookalike, or doppelganger who either operated in collusion with Jesus or acted on their own volition, whereby one is crucified, and the other hides and then appears later and somehow convinces the disciples he is the risen Christ. We are also required to believe that this conspiracy escaped the notice of everybody who knew Jesus personally.

Regarding the sixth and final criterion: the resurrection is only rendered implausible or even impossible if we adopt a naturalistic, materialistic and/or atheistic worldview. If we adopt an agnostic position, then it at least becomes possible. With the other hypotheses, as mentioned above, they are disconfirmed by literally dozens of facts. No known hallucination or cognitive dissonance matches the disciples’ experiences. The concept of a crucified and resurrected messiah was absurd to Jews and pagan Gentiles. Even if the disciples had stolen the body, then they should not have secured such a following. They would have been more likely to invent a more believable hypothesis. There is no evidence that suggests someone can survive a crucifixion and all the other forms of torture used along with it and then proceed to move a one-ton stone from a guarded tomb and then persuade people they are resurrected. Jews possessed means of identifying remains, and there is no record of the Jewish or Roman authorities producing a body and claiming it to be Jesus, yet the Gospels specifically address the charge that the disciples stole the body. There is no shred of evidence of a Jesus look a like, and the level of conspiracy involved is far too intricate and convoluted to have been successful and even if by some chance it had been, nobody would have come to believe in a resurrected Jesus. If the women followers had gotten the wrong tomb, then it defies reason that the disciples could have gotten the tomb wrong too, and that the Jewish or Roman authorities would not have produced Jesus’ body. Thus, when we review these six criteria, the resurrection hypothesis stands alone in meeting them all, thus meeting the seventh and final criterion.

However, Hector Avalos, who is a Biblical scholar and critic of Christianity, has charged those who make use of such criteria (Christian philosopher William Lane Craig is singled out in particular) as misrepresenting them in his book The End of Biblical Studies.[65] As you may recall, such criteria were taken from C. Behan McCullagh’s work. Craig, myself, et al. are therefore all charged with abusing McCullagh’s work and misrepresenting his criteria for evaluating historical hypotheses. Are there are any basis for such accusations? His claims are as follows:
1. Craig misuses McCullagh’s criteria.
2. Disproof by counter-claims can be made regarding other miracle events, such as apparitions of Mary.
3. Craig is a ‘selective supernaturalist.’
Let’s take these one at a time. In support of 1, Avalos cites a debate Craig had with Gerd Lüdemann, where Craig misses one of the criteria. The problem with such an example, is that this is a public debate, where Craig has to cut material down for sake of brevity. Secondly, Craig uses the full seven criteria multiple times in his published work. I can only call this attempt by Avalos here disingenuous, and unbecoming scholarly conduct. Avalos goes on, however, to say that McCullagh’s criteria can only be used to differentiate between rival naturalistic hypothesis, not between naturalistic and supernaturalistic hypotheses. However, this is simply a case of Avalos trying to smuggle in his personal metaphysical beliefs and pass them off as historical criteria. As we have already discussed, there is no reason to a priori dismiss miracle claims. We can only dismiss claims after a careful and considered historic approach and we find the hypothesis to be wanting. Simply dismissing hypotheses out of hand just because they conflict with your personal opinions on reality is simply non-conducive to historical research and behaviour unbecoming of a scholar.

McCullagh himself makes no such distinction that rules out supernatural hypotheses in his work. Avalos, however, points to McCullagh himself disagreeing with Craig’s conclusion that the resurrection meets the criteria. Avalos quotes McCullagh stating that the resurrection hypothesis is of greater explanatory scope and power, but that he believes it is less plausible and is more ad hoc. However, he does not dismiss the resurrection hypothesis out of hand merely because it is supernatural. Furthermore, Craig is well aware of McCullagh’s position and has been since as early as 1994.[66] Avalos even cites one of Craig’s works where he makes such a response, yet despite being published 13 years prior to the publication of Avalos’ work, Avalos does not interact with them at all. Such conduct is truly disgusting and hideously unprofessional. It is no surprise that Avalos’ book was not peer-reviewed but instead published by Prometheus Books, a publisher of purely atheistic books. Avalos also charges McCullagh’s criteria as being subjective, and that Craig’s appeal to the majority of New Testament scholarship in support of the minimal facts is fraudulent. Are there any good reasons for thinking so? Again, the answer is no, as Avalos is once again guilty of gross misrepresentation and wilful neglect of key details.

Regarding his complaint again the criteria, he says the criterion of plausibility is subjective because it relies on one’s worldview. He gives an example of the death of William II where one of the hypotheses is that his death was the result of witchcraft. He cites McCullagh as saying that one’s view of this hypothesis is dependent on one’s view on the occult. Avalos then quips that if one accepted that Krishna works in the world, then this would allow us to consider Hindu miracle claims as plausible. The major problem with this criticism is that Avalos totally neglects to mention that McCullagh goes on to refer to medieval historian and expert on the life of William II, Christopher Brooke.[67] Brooke addresses the witchcraft hypothesis not because it is supernatural, but due to the lack of evidence that William II was a devil-worshippers and the lack of evidence for the presence of Luciferians in England at the time. Brooke then offers the explanation of stories surrounding William IIs mysterious death were embellishments added by ecclesiastical chroniclers who suffered at William II and whom wished divine judgement upon. The only criticism of McCullagh here is that he does not directly distinguish the difference between mere possibility, and actual plausibility. Regarding his claim about Craig’s appeal to NT scholars, this is simply false. Craig refers to a wide swath of academia including those opposed to his own beliefs. Craig then extensively deals with the areas in which other scholars disagree with him. Avalos’ dishonesty is blatantly obvious here. However, Avalos’ claims can simply be demolished with the following quote from McCullagh himself:
“With extraordinarily erudition, Craig sketches the arguments of major thinkers of both past centuries and recent times, and he presents his own reasons for concluding tat traditional Christians doctrines about God and Jesus are credible. His replies to those skeptical of the existence of God, of historical knowledge, of the occurrence of miracles, and in particular the resurrection of Jesus, take debates over those difficult subjects an important stage further. Here is an admirable defender of basic Christian faith.”[68]

What of Avalos’ second claim then, that there is disproof by counter example? It is odd how Avalos appeals to apparitions of Mary, considering these are perfectly consistent with Christianity, especially Catholic and Orthodox Christianity. Avalos would need to provide an example that passes the criteria yet would not be compatible with Christianity. The second problem is that even if Avalos could show that another supernatural hypothesis, it would not mean that the resurrection hypothesis is false, unless a miracle claim incompatible with Christianity could pass the criteria. What then of Avalos’ actual example? Again, Avalos consistently fails to deliver. Avalos cites an apparition of Mary to a group of children in Medjugorje, Yugoslavia who never recanted, and who were medically examined and diagnosed as not suffering from hallucinations. Avalos contends that this apparition meets the criteria and has the same evidentiary support that the resurrection has. However, when one analyses the facts, one finds a lot of holes in Avalos’ claims and statements. One, There at the very least four generally accepted facts relating to the resurrection of Jesus, whereas there are none regarding the assumption of Mary. Furthermore, belief in the assumption of Mary did not arise to the 5th and 6th centuries. Secondly, contrary to the belief of Jesus’ original followers, there is good prima facie evidence for a natural explanation. Thirdly, unlike Jesus, Mary made no such claims about herself. Fourthly, belief in the assumption of Mary most certainly does not exceed rival hypotheses in meeting our historical criteria. Lastly, we have no reason to accept the veridicality of the Marian apparitions unlike what we have with the appearances with Jesus.[69]

As for the last claim, this is simply a variant of the “one less god” argument that theists who hold to particular religions are inconsistent by accepting their religion’s truth claims whilst rejecting others. However, as I have shown, there is a strong evidentiary basis for Christianity. Unless Avalos can show that another religion also passes such tests, then his claim is bunk. Ironically enough, Avalos claims Craig is a selective supernaturalist by citing certain parts of Matthew being apocalyptic imagery and not historical events. Avalos claims that is at odds with claiming the miraculous resurrection as being historical whilst rejecting other miraculous events as apocalyptic imagery. This is reminiscent of how recently, Norman Geisler, a fundamentalist Christian, accused New Testament scholar Michael Licona of “abandoning inerrancy” for reaching similar conclusions. The reasons for this are the evidence of the text itself and the literary genre of the passages in question as opposed to the resurrection accounts, Whilst the Gospels are recognised as being biographies of Jesus, some contain apocalyptic imagery, like Matthew. This is ascertained through careful literary analysis. The same analysis shows no such claims can be made about the resurrection narratives, which lack such apocalyptic imagery and language. Thus, I can only conclude that Hector Avalos is simply an imbecile who is being intentionally dishonest and disingenuous in order to attack Dr. Craig, et al.

Whilst the conclusion reached by assessing the resurrection by historical standards, when we factor in the socio-cultural facts bought up by the impossible faith approach, then these conclusions are strengthened by a significant order of magnitude. However, some have complained that nobody would have checked the facts and point to other religions that have allegedly survived “equally impossible odds.” Before we come to a close, I shall quickly address these two points. In group-orientated cultures, such as 1st century Judea, neighbours were expected to mind each other’s business. Privacy was simply unknown, unexpected and unwelcome to the point where it raised suspicion about those who were being secretive.[70] Neighbours exerted constant vigilance over each other, as people were constantly concerned for their appearance in terms of honour and shame:
“Men and women were surveyed from every point of the social compass… The Romans believed that the person who allowed excessive privacy would lose all self-control and become shameless… The Roman way demanded a degree of mutual surveillance and inhibitions that modern Americans might find only in an Orwellian nightmare or maximum security prison.”[71]
An example from a collectivist culture closer to modern times comes from the Sarakatsani in Greece, where within 48 hours of an incident, groups of Sarakatsani throughout the region would immediately begin passing judgment on the behaviour of the people involved and analyse critically whether or not a man displayed manliness in defending his honour.[72] Strangers in ancient times were viewed as posing a threat to the community and would need to be checked over to see if they would fit in and subscribe to the community’s norms.[73] Honour was assumed to exist within your own family, but outside that circle everybody is presumed as being dishonourable and untrustworthy until proved otherwise.[74] In such a society, the idea that facts would not be checked is completely ludicrous. When the Pharisees were out in the wilderness observing Jesus and His disciples, they were purposefully minding Jesus’ business. The empty tomb would have been checked, witnesses would have been sought out. A radical divergent group like Christianity that made all sorts of offensive and absurd claims would have been given especial critical scrutiny.

What then, of other religions? As a test, we shall analyse Islam, the second most large and popular religion today after Christianity. I should note, however, that this does not automatically disprove Islam, although if Christianity can be shown to be true, then it would mean that all other religions are wrong. Muhammad was born in Axum, Arabia in the 7th century, an independent region caught between the Byzantine and Sasanian empires. These two empires were at odds politically, philosophically, and religiously, whereas Arabia was mostly a collection of independent tribes. Muhammad eventually secured enough converts to take control of Medina, and spent about 10 years consolidating his power.[75] Muhammad proceeded to make raids against caravans that were the major source of finance of his former hometown, Mecca, leading them to negotiate a truce. Muhammad won members of his old tribe over by giving them positions of power, and became the most powerful political leader in Arabia.[76] After Muhammad’s death, his successors then took control of the entire Arabian peninsula, as well as Northern Africa (including Egypt), Persia, and managed to defeat entirely the Sasanian empire. In time, Islam took control over Spain for a time, and seriously threatened the Byzantine empire (resulting in its eventual collapse.) If it had not been for the Spanish Reconquista and the Crusades, then it is entirely possible that Islam would have seized control over most, if not all of Europe.

Muhammad himself did not come from a shameful background. Despite being an orphan, he was raised by his uncle, who became head of his clan. Despite falling out with his home tribe, Muhammad’s constant military victories would have served to accrue honour. Although not everything was all good, Muhammad did authorise his troops to fight during sacred lunar months, permitted the cutting down of palms and married his brother’s ex-wife, all of which were serious social taboos. Furthermore, Muhammad’s treaty with his former hometown was humiliating for some Muslims. However, Islam rose in the confines of Arabia, and nothing about his geographic origins would have put off other Arabians. Islam did teach resurrection, but it was a final end of time resurrection, like Judaism, and did not come across Roman aversions to the teaching. Muhammad’s revelations were also not testable and were not witnessed by anybody else, unlike the resurrection of Jesus, which had hundreds of witnesses. Islam did face some problems, to be sure, but there were nowhere near the same level as the problems facing Christianity. Whilst Islam certainly was an underdog for a time, it managed to spread rapidly thanks to Muhammad’s brilliant military tactics and strategies, and his ability as a political leader. Indeed, without Muhammad’s initial victories with the sword, it is doubtful if Islam would have succeeded at all. The success of Islam is thus more analogous to a skilled businessman who took significant gambles and yet won. Islam most certainly did not have to contend with a state as powerful as the Roman Empire who hated everything it stood for. The origin and spread of Islam is intriguing, and even inspiring, but does not pass the test of an impossible faith.

No other religion went through and survived what Christianity went through. Christianity arose in the most hostile environment imaginable. Modern religions, such as Mormonism and Scientology, did not arise in honour-shame settings, and managed to overcome persecution by a variety of means not available to Christians. Religions such as Islam spread via the sword. Christianity succeeds in providing a good historical hypothesis explaining the facts outlined in this chapter, and succeeds in that it survived against horrendous social persecution, eventually culminating in the effort of the Roman Empire to try to stamp out the religion. Where other religions either died or were forced to change their teachings and beliefs, Christianity remained resolute in staying exactly the same and yet not only survived but also grew exponentially. Where other religions are predicated upon mystical, metaphysical claims that are untestable, Christianity makes specific historical claims that can be and were tested. Where other religions had benefits, such as the sword, or state sponsorship, Christianity had none, and almost every disadvantage possible. Why would anybody have believed in it outside of a small band of loyal fanatics? How was it able to spread beyond the boundaries of its Jewish originators and spread across Greek and Roman pagan gentiles in such vast numbers? Given the minimal facts outlined, and the sheer impossibility of Christianity’s survival had it been false, then we can stand firm and sure that the resurrection hypothesis is not only a viable alternative, but the only valid hypothesis. Critics and sceptics are forced to raise the evidentiary bar to stratospheric heights unattainable by any hypothesis, and to rely on extravagant, ad hoc hypotheses, or combine multiple hypotheses just in order to answer the challenge. What we see is simply a naturalism of the gaps. If we treat the Gospels as any other historical documents, and the resurrection hypothesis like any other historical hypothesis, then we come to the explosive position that Christianity is, in fact, true.

We have surveyed as much information as is humanly possible in this limited space, but by now it should be obvious how good the evidentiary basis for the resurrection really is, especially compared to rival hypotheses. It is not the errant claim of someone suffering from mental health problems, nor is it the gullible claims of the uneducated, but a very serious hypothesis that demands to be recognised and scrutinised. We are fortunate to live in an era with access to materials and methods denied to previous generations, and so we should not squander them. Indeed, a growing body of authors have put the Gospels to the test and found them reliable. Greater minds than my own have spent far more pages, getting right into the hardcore details, laying out the facts and utilising modern methods to analytically scrutinise the evidence and sources we have. What is surprising is the sheer evidence in favour of the resurrection hypothesis. The conclusion: that Jesus really did rise from the dead and appear to groups of His followers after His death is simply inescapable. I think the evidence for this event is just simply too good to be skimped over for some lame concoction borne from the stubborn minds of those who still cling to their cherished naturalistic beliefs. Despite being a doubter and sceptic for a long time, and even an atheist for a while, the evidence for the resurrection repeatedly came back to bite. No matter how hard I have tried, I cannot see any other explanation: Jesus rose from the dead. If Christianity had been false, then it should have either died off completely or else transmogrified its claims to be more socially acceptable.

Notes
1 1 Corinthians 15:13-20, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Corinthians%2015:13-20&version=NIV (Accessed 12th September 2011)
2 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, Crossway, (2008), p207
3 Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach, IVP, (2010) p70-71
4 C. Behan McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, Cambridge University Press, (1984), p19
5 Gary R. Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus Time Line, from Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., Contending With Christianity’s Critics, B&H Publishing Group, (2009), p125
6 1 Corinthians 15:3-5, NIV, Biblegateway.com, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Corinthians%2015:3-5&version=NIV (Accessed 12th September 2011)
7 Byron C. McCane, Where No one Had yet Been Laid: The Shame of Jesus’ Burial, from B.D. Chilton and C.A. Evans, Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, Brill (1998), p433
8 Byron C. McCane, Where No one Had yet Been Laid: The Shame of Jesus’ Burial, from B.D. Chilton and C.A. Evans, Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, Brill (1998), p444
9 D. Brendan Nagle and Stanley M. Burstein, The Ancient World: Readings in Social and Cultural History, Third Edition, Pearson, New Jersey (2006), p314-315
10 D. Brendan Nagle and Stanley M. Burstein, The Ancient World: Readings in Social and Cultural History, Third Edition, Pearson, New Jersey (2006), p318
11 Martin Hengel, Crucifixion, Fortress, (1977), p22
12 Bruce Malina and Richard Rohrbaugh, Social Science Commentary on the Gospel of John, Fortress, (1998), p263-264
13 Deuteronomy 21:23, NCV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Deuteronomy%2021:23&version=NCV (Accessed September 13th 2011)
14 1 Corinthians 1:18, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Corinthians%201:18&version=NIV (Accessed September 13th 2011)
15 Hebrews 12:2, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Hebrews%2012:2&version=NIV (Accessed September 13th 2011)
16 Justin Martyr, First Apology, Chapter 13, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0126.htm (Accessed September 13th 2011)
17 David deSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship and Purity, IVP, (2000), p51
18 Martin Hengel, Crucifixion, Fortress, (1977), p19
19 Robert Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them, Yale University Press, (1985), p68
20 Geza Vermes, The Changing Faces of Jesus, New York: Viking, (2001), p241
21 Robert Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them, Yale University Press, (1985), p244
22 Murray Harris, Raised Immortal Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, (1985), p116
23 Gerald O’Collins, The Resurrection of Jesus Christ, Judson Press, (1973), p31
24 Bruce Malina and Jerome Neyrey, Portraits of Paul: AN Archaeology of Ancient Personality, John Knox, (1996), p164
25 Robert Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them, Yale University Press, (1984), p62
26 David deSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship and Purity, IVP, (2000), p46
27 David deSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship and Purity, IVP, (2000), p36
28 Bruce Malina and Richard Neyrey, Portraits of Paul, John Knox, (1983), p163
29 Bruce Malina and Richard Neyrey, Portraits of Paul, John Knox, (1983), p189
30 Michael J. Wilkins, Who Did Jesus Think He Was?, from Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., Contending With Christianity’s Critics, B&H Publishing Group, (2009), p170
31 J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel, p43
32 Craig A. Evans, Fabricating Jesus, IVP, (2007), p51
33 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, Crossway, (2008), p278-279
34 J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus, Kregel, p47
35 William Lane Craig, Rediscovering the Historical Jesus: Presuppositions and Pretensions of the Jesus Seminar, http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/rediscover1.html (Accessed September 13th 2011)
36 Craig A. Evans, Fabricating Jesus, IVP, (2007), p50
37 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, Crossway, (2008), p302
38 Mark 8:27-30, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Mark%208:27-30&version=NIV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
39 John 6:69, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John%206:69&version=NIV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
40 Matthew 11:3, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2011:3&version=NIV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
41 Luke 7:19, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Luke%207:19&version=NIV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
42 Luke 7:22-23, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Luke%207:22-23&version=NIV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
43 Matthew 11:4-6, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2011:4-6&version=NIV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
44 Zechariah 9:9-10, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Zechariah%209:9-10&version=NIV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
45 Zechariah 14:21, NCV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Zechariah%2014:21&version=NCV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
46 2 Samuel 7:12-14, NCV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=2%20Samuel%207:12-14&version=NCV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
47 Amos 9:11, NCV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Amos%209:11&version=NCV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
48 Isaiah 9:6-7, NCV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Isaiah%209:6-7&version=NCV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
49 Malachi 3:1, NCV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Malachi%203:1&version=NCV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
50 Isaiah 40:3, NCV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Isaiah%2040:3&version=NCV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
51 Daniel 7:13-14, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Daniel%207:13-14&version=NIV (Accessed September 14th 2011)
52 Matthew 28:8-10, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2028:8-10&version=NIV (Accessed September 15th 2011)
53 Luke 24:36-43, NIV, Biblegateway, http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=luke%2024:36-43&version=NIV (Accessed September 15th 2011)
54 William D. Edwards, Wesley J. Gabel, and Floyd E. Hosmer, On The Physical Death of Jesus Christ, The Journal of the American Medical Association 255 (11, 1986), p1455-1463
55 FP Retief, and L Cilliers, The History and Pathology of Crucifixion, South African Medical Journal 92 (112, 1993), p938-941
56 Josephus, The Life of Flavius Josephus, 75, http://www.ccel.org/j/josephus/works/autobiog.htm (Accessed September 19th 2011)
57 Craig A. Evans, Jewish Burial Traditions and the Resurrection of Jesus, Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus, 3/2 (06, 2005), p233-248. See also: Dale Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, T and T Clark, (2005), p318 and Byron McCane, Roll Back the Stone, Trinity Press International, (2003), p11, 14, 47, 54.
58 Byron C. McCane, Where No one Had yet Been Laid: The Shame of Jesus’ Burial, from B.D. Chilton and C.A. Evans, Authenticating the Activities of Jesus, Brill (1998), p431-452
59 This does not stop some for trying to argue otherwise. For example, Richard Carrier fraudulently appeals to two separate passages in Josephus as if they were referring to the same thing to try and support his belief that Jesus was only temporarily buried and then moved to a graveyard reserved for criminals. He uses a passage speaking about blasphemers, and then tries to link it to another passage discussing unruly and rebellious children, despite the fact that they are completely separate.
60 Leonard Zuzne and Warren H. Jones, Anomalistic Psychology: A Study of Extraordinary Phenomena of Behaviour and Experience, Erlbaum Associates, (1982), p135
61 Leonard Zuzne and Warren H. Jones, Anomalistic Psychology: A Study of Extraordinary Phenomena of Behaviour and Experience, Erlbaum Associates, (1982), p133
62 Leon Festinger and J. M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, p203-211
63 P. gosling, P. M. Denizeau, and D. Orbele, Denial of Responsibility: a new Mode of Dissonance Reduction, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, p722-733
64 The study in question being: Leon Festinger, H.W. Riecken, and S. Schachter, When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the World, University of Minnesota Press, (1956)
65 Hector Avalos, The End of Biblical Studies, Prometheus Books, (2007)
66 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 2nd Edition, Crossway, (2004), p183 and William Lane Craig, Did Jesus Rise From the Dead?, from Michael Wilkins and J. P. Moreland, eds., Jesus Under Fire, Zondervan, (1996), p163-165. Avalos is not unfamiliar with works either, as he even references page 186 of the 2nd edition of Reasonable Faith. Such an oversight thus demonstrates the appalling lows that Avalos is required to stoop to in order to answer Craig.
67 C. Behan McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, Cambridge University Press, (2004), p22
68 This is endorsement can be found on the back cover of the third edition of Reasonable Faith, Crossway, (2008).
69 For more, see: Elliot Miller and Kenneth Samples, The Cult of the Virgin: Catholic Mariology and the Apparitions of Mary, Grand Rapids: Baker, (1992), p107-108, 110,114-115, 153-154, 156-157,
70 Bruce Malina and Jerome Neyrey, Portraits of Paul, John Knox, (1983), p183
71 Carlin Barton, Roman Honor, University of California Press, (2001), p21, 22, 23
72 J. K. Campbell, Honour, Family, and Patronage, Oxford University Press, (1964), p39
73 John Pilch and Bruce Malina, Handbook of Biblical Social Values, Hendrickson, (1998), p115
74 Bruce Malina, The New Testament World, John Knox, (2001), p36-37
75 John Esposito, The Oxford History of Islam, Oxford University Press, (1999), p8
76 John Esposito, The Oxford History of Islam, Oxford University Press, (1999), p10